I think providing transparency is a key role of the foundation (i.e. https://docs.arbitrum.foundation/assets/files/ArbitrumFoundationBiannualReport2024H1-c8e9ab997fe68ad09c0105181f9826d8.pdf).
I don’t think you can expect individuals to consistently provide this independently and ever be happy w/ how it turns out.
Please define “affected stewards”.
Please list out which Stewards are included, put in a list.
Thanks.
A simple question, will this require additional spending from the Foundation to manage? Yes or No answer please.
Breaking it down, so you don’t miss parts or choose to selectively answer parts.
If the DAO saves money, please quantify this statement. How much money? Especially given Working Group budgets are required to pass separate AIPs.
Also if the Foundation spends money to do the same task, compare the saving amount or remove this subjective statement.
A reminder, the AIP-1 states clearly
Please note below is a historical RFP by WG0.
This RFP was administered by Working Group Zero (WG0), with support from the ApeCoin Special Council. Via AIP-196, the ApeCoin DAO empowered WG0 to administer the RFP and bring the selection decision to a DAO-wide vote.
Please note WG0 was NOT a 0 Cost process, neither is the involvement from the Special Council.
That’s the weird part of this DAO, SC are not decision maker, but somehow can have the power to let AIP return for clarification.
Definitely need to revamp : AIP-466: Proposal To Close Non-Essential Working Groups - #64 by likkee.eth
RFPs are BS - let me explain:
Below is linked the RFP choice which saw Matt and webslinger win the one year contract to replace Cartan.
That was in February 2023 over 19 months ago. All attempts to ask for details regarding what’s happening (forum posts, emails, DMs) are just ignored.
Tbf the community were told the other bidder wasn’t any good just before the vote took place - so it was hardly a resounding victory or a fair contest at that stage.
Also one look at snapshot you’ll see 890 voters turned up, most with tiny amounts of $ape voting for webslinger - wonder who did that - one of the largest turnouts ever and only 4.5m $ape voting. 
And you’re all jumping for joy as you give total power to the “highly transparent” foundation with more RFPs, and no longer have any say.
More wonderful times to come……
Indeed. And that’s why some of us started laughing when the AIP-426: Special Council- Future election requirement and role clarification proposal went up because it didn’t actually change anything. It was just [pointless] words in digital format. Imagine if the SC were just “advisors”, who then would be taking active measures in the DAO? WebSlinger? No - that’s not their role.
If an AIP passes that is what it is, unless the Foundation Directors override that AIP or a new AIP is put up to replace it.
A friendly reminder, when the Special Council were directors they could have vetoed the AIP on grounds of it being a risk to the DAO. They did not do that.
What is in the AIPs is what counts.
Legal documented agreements, such as contracts and corporate constitutions, generally supersede actual business practices in terms of legal obligations.
Please refrain from spreading false statements.
There are many unclear parts of this AIP. I have written clear questions, please answer them.
Dear @SmartAPE @capetaintrippy as you are both Authors please answer these questions.
I have put it all in one post so easy for you to find them.
Thank you.
Bigbull
https://forum.apecoin.com/t/aip-466-proposal-to-close-non-essential-working-groups/24526/94
To be clear, fact is that, though you may feel that way, you’re simply not entitled to anything, let alone a repetition of what was already painstakingly explained to you.
Once again:
Hi ApeCoin DAO Community,
We have no further questions for @SmartAPE . This AIP is now under Administrative Review.
Follow this Topic as further updates will be posted here in the comments.
Kind Regards,
But I like ThankApe, GWG, and The Small Grants Program. I’m not against any of these things, and I don’t mind if any come back up for additional funding. I don’t think those are the issues.
Why can’t we just get rid of the people who are not showing up, if that is in fact the case?
The SC has the power through AIP-1: Proposing the DAO - Process.
It was also mentioned in AIP-426: Special Council- Future election requirement and role clarification where it was clarified as well that reviewing AIPs was their main responsibility.
Do agree that current system needs a revamp, but not so sure that centralizing things through the Foundation is the way to go.
Isn’t these statement somehow conflict in interest?
As right now, everything (eg: Add Apechain url to Apecoin.com, Add GWG initiative urls to Apecoin.com) must go through AIP, while the SC have the ability to “indefinite delay" of AIP like return for construction, unknown duration of administrative review, etc. Doesn’t this somehow decide on the right to die of AIP?
You are so correct, please check here.
Here’s the issue; “not showing up” isn’t the right term.
Most of the stewards are doing things. I saw @PhilWatkins be accused of “not showing up” earlier, but I know he does because we get constant advice and connections from him on the gaming side for Banana Bill, and he’s consistently out there networking on behalf of ApeCoin/ApeChain.
What’s actually the issue here is that most working group stewards aren’t (or can’t) effectively following their organizations’ charters, laid-out specific initiatives, and original OKRs. Many (I’d say most) use their positions as a bully pulpit to pursue the spirit of their working groups, and a number of them are quite effective in doing so, but that’s not the same. There’s also clearly a need to revamp transparency reporting if nobody can follow it. And that’s what I meant when I said there are structural issues.
So, given the above, I think that what needs to be considered is either:
100% agree here. A level of centralisation is fine, but it needs to be fully transparent and the DAO needs the ability to hold the WGs etc accountable. Either via a pause in operations or removal.
It also seems to me (please correct me if i’m wrong). If said WGs/SC have the ability to approve/refuse proposals means that it is unlikely that it’s even possible to hold them to account if needed. If true, then this is a major problem.
I am working on an outline of how I think a new structure could work (delayed be illness 
). I will try and get it in here soon.
SC can refuse proposals / shuttle them on for vote. That’s a regulatory/legal issue that can’t be changed under the current set-up.
On-chain voting can help fix this and allow a move to set and automated preparation periods, heat checks, and referendum killers (i.e. allowing more of an open and automated process for getting towards a DAO vote and putting that line of defense both out in the open more clearly and having to actively “kill” proposals in public rather than sit on them. Note that that is not an accusation that SC is sitting on anything, but right now, the system, as I understand it, is very manual and requires affirmative approval to pass through, so things take time).
Thank you for clarifying that. I too do not assume any misuse of power, but the current set up does leave room for potential corruption. It’s good to know that going on-chain will allow more transparency, and potentially fix this issue.
There still lies the issue of unevenly distributed voting power, but one problem at a time 