AIP-471: Special Council To Propose Voting System Reform

I believe there are more significant issues at hand than just the current voting system. While it’s not optimal, the primary challenge we face is achieving a shared vision of success for the DAO.

Since day one, I’ve been actively voting and reviewing the AIPs, and I’ve consistently noticed a lack of clear direction from the DAO leadership. Without a unified understanding of our objectives, we end up with numerous proposals that have ambiguous impacts, leading to the expenditure of $APE on projects simply because they seem appealing. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing, and there should be some allowance for such initiatives. However, unlike a traditional democracy where leaders are elected to execute on a program, we elect a council that mainly filters through an endless stream of budget requests.

The proposal for a Special Council to address voting system reform is a step in the right direction. Incorporating mechanisms like quadratic voting and shield voting can indeed mitigate the influence of whale wallets and promote fairer participation. However, these changes alone won’t solve the underlying issue of strategic misalignment.

We need a comprehensive approach that includes not only voting system reforms but also a clear definition of our collective goals and success metrics. The Special Council should prioritize creating a transparent framework that aligns the community on these objectives. This will help ensure that proposals are evaluated based on their potential to contribute to our shared vision, rather than their surface-level appeal.

Addressing this misalignment in objectives should be our top priority for reform, alongside improving the voting system. This dual focus will help us use our resources more effectively and build a stronger, more cohesive DAO.

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Indeed. But that’s not their role. Anything related to such things is up to the DAO, and for the Ape Foundation to implement and adhere to. And therein lies the rub because any such initiative requires participation and engagement - which invariably leads to votes for same. Catch-22.

@zatmonkey this proposal recently passed. It “clarifies” the role of the Special Council. AIP-426: Special Council- Future election requirement and role clarification

Hey, sorry for taking this long to respond. I got occupied in finishing the Research paper I’m (collage shenanigans) writing (Prediction of Hate speech on Twitter using Machine Learning) and submitting along with building the data pipeline for the upcoming ACT stack v2 pilot and its taking me a lot longer than I anticipated.

I’ll share the paper once its published if you’re interested

I like the idea of AA being its own subDAO and I understand what you’re saying about fractured initiatives, what about a mock DAO (like Model UN debates but for testing out any major changes there at a smaller scale) [imagine mock voting using a different vote scaling, as it happens in QV]

This way at least we can extract valuable insights from this venture and then iterate upon the feedback we receive.

I get it, grants don’t require accountability. But do you know who can ask for accountability ? the people who are going to use whatever is being built using the grant amount

We should focus on having a culture for transparency where the users of the projects being built using the money from their (the people’s) treasury, hold the beneficiaries accountable for said money.

When the people who are going to be users for particular project start asking questions, the project cannot afford not answering said queries.

If we achieve this, we wouldn’t have to codify anything at all, it’ll be expected of projects to share where the money was spent and how much of it is left and so on.

Yeah let’s see how that goes, although I don’t have high hopes for it. (this feeling might just be unsubstantiated, or due to lack of relevant information)

I have been going in and out of the trenches periodically, to aid my irl commitments so it is completely possible that I might’ve missed some developments which say otherwise

Sure, just tag me and I’ll pull through. Just lemme know beforehand if you want to post related to QV so I’ll drop the zKYC article in order to help the discourse in that regard

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This just came to mind, (not sure if it’s a thing (I think I’ve heard it before tho), but with so many longish replies I’m wondering what’s being said but don’t have the time nor the commitment to read them all thoroughly (this must be a common thing and not just me), - how about an AI popup or similar with preprogrammed commands that I can click such as:

Give tl;dr on proposal.
Give tl;dr on all replies.
Give tl;dr on proposal & all replies.

This would not only be helpful for readers but for the authors too to round up all the critical feedback.

I’d suggest this will be especially beneficial for both readers and authors as we see more members, more ideas, and naturally more replies.

Praying some gigabrain here can do this - as all of our time is expensive. :pray::pray:

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If you go ahead and read (I’m sorry, but it’s worth it and isn’t optional :gun: ) the Date Aggregation funnel I wrote up recently, you’ll see that there’s a provision in the ACT stack to do just this

We keep an updated database of all the proposals, replies and discourse which can then be summarised for the user

Is is I, the gigabrain who might be able to help out

Link : Data Aggregation Pipeline : ACT Stack v2.0

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LFG.

This is what I mean - I miss so much stuff and it’s always due to lack of time.

I will check it out and in advance I’d like to say - yes you are! :handshake::handshake: (Will read in full shortly, bookmarked.)

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I’ll drop more of such content in the upcoming days, had to stop for a bit as I have to complete a research paper for college which is taking a while

Apart from that, I’m testing out the multilingual translations for spaces summary on the backend and testing out how it performs at scale along with the entire stack, happy to say that it’s exceeded the expectations I had for it

I can surely say that you’ll enjoy reading through all that

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Hi all, new contributor here after being a lurker and voter for years. I’ve been a Mutant holder when they were expensive (17.8Eth) and bought more as the floor dropped (I’m not selling). Tech entrepreneur, 4 exits, last company acquired by Animoca Brands, more about me on my website.

To create a fair voting mechanism in a community where engagement is measured by the amount of tokens held, particularly for $APE, you could consider a system that combines quadratic voting with a weighting factor based on the duration of token holding. Here’s a proposed mechanism:

Quadratic Voting with Duration-Weighted Adjustment

  1. Quadratic Voting: Each vote’s cost increases quadratically. For example, to cast ( n ) votes, the cost in tokens would be ( n^2 ). This helps balance the influence of large token holders and gives smaller holders more proportional voting power.

  2. Duration Weighting: The weight of each vote is adjusted based on how long the tokens have been held in the wallet. This encourages long-term commitment to the community and reduces the impact of short-term speculators.

Detailed Steps:

  1. Determine Voting Power: Calculate the voting power for each participant.

    • Let ( T ) be the total number of tokens held.
    • Let ( D ) be the duration (in days) the tokens have been held.
  2. Calculate Duration-Weighted Tokens: Adjust the token count based on the holding duration.

    • ( W = T \times \sqrt{D} )
    • This formula gives more weight to tokens held longer, without overly penalizing short-term holders.
  3. Quadratic Voting Cost: Implement the quadratic voting cost on the duration-weighted tokens.

    • If a participant wants to cast ( n ) votes, the cost in duration-weighted tokens is ( n^2 ).
    • Each vote’s effective weight is ( n ), but the cost in voting power is ( n^2 ).

Example:

  • Participant A has 1000 $APE tokens held for 30 days.

    • Duration-weighted tokens: ( 1000 \times \sqrt{30} \approx 5477 ).
  • Participant B has 2000 $APE tokens held for 10 days.

    • Duration-weighted tokens: ( 2000 \times \sqrt{10} \approx 6325 ).
  • Both participants want to cast 5 votes:

    • Voting power cost: ( 5^2 = 25 ).
  • Effective votes after cost:

    • Participant A: ( 5477 / 25 \approx 219 ) effective voting units.
    • Participant B: ( 6325 / 25 \approx 253 ) effective voting units.

Advantages:

  • Balance of Power: Reduces the dominance of large holders while still valuing their stake.
  • Encourages Long-Term Holding: Rewards users who are committed to the community over time.
  • Engagement Focused: Reflects both the financial stake and the commitment level of participants.

This system combines the benefits of quadratic voting and duration weighting, ensuring a fair and balanced approach to community decision-making.

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In much the same way that the value of a wallet shouldn’t be considered in a vote, I am similarly opposed to anything weighted in favor of wallets because that too creates an imbalance.

Also, in large numbers, your formula does in fact overly skew in favor of much older wallets. In fact, from a mental calculation, if we went all the way back to ApeCoin TGE, most wallets from that era will control the present day voting outcome. Don’t take my word for it, go run the numbers.

Duration weighting is a very interesting idea! I appreciate how it seeks to quantify loyalty in a measurable way rather than relying solely on the amount of money invested into a token, especially when tokens could, theoretically, be acquired and then immediatley disposed of following a vote. I do appreciate @SmartAPE’s point that this means the intial wallets may potentially have controlling votes due to their duration, though.

I see the argument for one person = one vote, which is how representative democracies conduct governance. No matter how rich or experienced an individual is, they have one vote. No matter how unexperienced an individual is, they have one vote. In theory, this prioritizes equality over all other considerations. One thing I appreciate about the DAO space is that we can experiment with systems that take into account weighing certain considerations, such as experience, knowledge, background, loyalty, investment, and other measures of trustfulness or ability to govern. My only other concern with one person = one vote in the DAO space is the need for a proof of humanity solution (preferably better than Gitcoin passport) to handle potential sybil wallets.

Indeed,

It’s too easy to move 1 APE to 1000 wallets and get 1000 votes.

It’s actually more than proof of humanity, it’s proof of unique humanity.

This is what worldcoin is trying to solve - but i’d like a non-creepy solution :slight_smile:

I also believe we’d want to cap the quadratic formula to address @SmartAPE 's concerns

month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
sqrt 100 50 25 12 6 3 2

essentially this wolud prevent people throwing money in to swing votes, while making it less weighted long term

I agree. lol

Yup - that would work. Well done. Though I still like the concept of 1 wallet = 1 vote better.

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I think we also need something connecting the engagement level on the community, and i don’t think discourse activity is the right metric.
Another thing i’m not a huge fan of is the concentration of delegation. I would love it if it were behind representatives supporting a vision for the dao, but as far as I can tell, it’s drives by convenience or personal interests.

I agree. We should go build it. :stuck_out_tongue_winking_eye:

Yeah, there’s that. But delegates are best left alone because eventually they will work themselves out once we revise the voting system accordingly.

Hi ApeCoin DAO Community,

We have no further questions for @SmartAPE. This AIP is now under Administrative Review.

Follow this Topic as further updates will be posted here in the comments.

Kind Regards,

-@Facilitators

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