It would be helpful to:
Include a job description of the role of a Security Council member
Include a brief bio of each member to allow the DAO to see if/how they are qualified for the role; and
Also to @nataliecrue’s point, would be great to understand how diversity (race, gender, experience, etc) was considered in the selection of this group.
This is a good point actually. 
AIP-436 reads, “This passing of this proposal would constitute a material change to AIP-1 (notably Phase 7 of the AIP Process) and AIP-2.”
AIP-436 revised AIP-1 and AIP-2, as did other AIPs, which would be replaced by the REVAMP idea or the RESET AIP-553.
Proposed change for consideration:
Lower the thresholds for Temp Check and Voting requirements:
Temp Check: 250k
Voting: 500k
This should help encourage more delegations to be engaged in the sponsoring of proposals and help new authors potentially find homes in these respective delegations.
I think it should be even lower. It seems like we’re trying to mimic Arb’s voting structure without looking at their total supply & circulating supply…
Arb DAO
Keep in mind that Arb has:
ApeCoin has:
What’s being proposed for ApeCoin DAO sets the thresholds significantly higher than Arb DAO. If we are to mimic their structure, then it should look something like this:
Is there a reason we’re putting such high thresholds for ApeCoin and not adopting Arb’s votable token percentages as thresholds instead?
Appreciate the research here. Great questions.
Estimates are there’s 130m $ape after all our liabilities are paid/claimed, and more than likely we will have around 100m $ape left at the start of 2025 (which will be substantially less after the 65/35 split proposed here - so roughly around 65m $ape left for the DAO treasury to spend on qualifying AIPs). So it makes perfect sense that our thresholds are set much higher as we simply can’t keep turning on the free money printer like before & ARB have so much more than we do to give away.
To make sure there’s NOMOREDUMBSHIT.
I think the Threshold at 250k or 300k is reasonable and more inline with other major DAOs.
However, the voting at 500k is not that high. Don’t forget we normally have 20m vote in total, so 1m isn’t high for voting.
Hi @BoredApeG
After some thought of where we’re at in a year from now if this passes I’m finally ‘drinking your kool-aid’ (as you predicted) & VOTED yes. However, can we get a reassurance or at the least a reason why not, that when this AIP goes up to vote you will apply the 69% super-majority threshold - due to ALLOCATING 35% of our treasury as an 18 month administrative budget. In fact, you could even use similar wording under the overall cost section instead of a random/arbitrary $ figure, although $45,000,000 is probably a very conservative estimation of this amount.
And just one last small detail - I presume/common sense dictates the 65/35 split will use the remaining treasury figure after all liabilities are accounted for, and not the $ape held in treasury wallets at the time of implementation? I ask this as under the sub-heading key points the term ‘DAO treasury’ is used, with no clarification or amounts, and yet later under definitions you clearly explain what the DAO Treasury is after the split & changes are applied - so this just seems a little odd to me. Trust but verify. 
Hi @Ape.Admin,
The community feedback period for your proposal would be ending in less than 24 hours.
If you’re content with the feedback received, your next steps are to finalize your proposal using the AIP Draft Template.
A moderator will reach out to the author to finalize the AIP Draft. Upon receipt of the final Draft, we will review and provide instructions on the next steps.
Are you ready to proceed to the next phase or do you wish to extend community discussion for another 7 days?
We look forward to hearing from you.
The changes that we have suggested in AIP-553 for the REVAMP idea are;
Focusing the mission on growing ApeChain while ALSO continuing to accept no-ApeChain related AIPs.
Clarifying that the REVAMP idea will completely replace AIP-1 and 2 as well as all amendments thereto.
Requiring that the Ape Foundation submit an annual budget for the DAO to approve.
Clarifying how much ApeCoin will be transferred to the Foundation pursuant to this plan. Some estimate that 30 million ApeCoin will be transferred to the Ape Foundation without any oversight pursuant to the REVAMP idea.
Reducing the number of Special Council members to two Ombudsmen or Ombudswomen. We prefer the latter but the initial two would be @Waabam_eth and @Mo_Ezz14
Repurposing the Special Council to provide Treasury oversight, communications with the ApeCoin DAO community at least once weekly and as a liaison between the community, delegations, AIP authors and the Foundation/ DAO. Although the REVAMP idea would provide increased transparency in the on-chain voting, it would not provide the DAO with any transparency in regard to the budget nor management of the Foundation.
Continuing its role of oversight for the 100M ApeCoin Banana Bill. We feel that this oversight is necessary and should be expected by the DAO.
Clarifying that “votable tokens” means all ApeCoin tokens in existence except ant tokens held by the Ape Foundation.
Even after paying the Special Council and the new Security Council, AIP-553 would still save the DAO $150,000 annually.
While I support the idea of moving the AIP process on-chain and potentially getting rid of the Special Council, I have concerns that there will be a lack of oversight over the Foundation, which could increase the risk of misuse of DAO funds.
If the Special Council is abolished, I believe there should be an alternative system for oversight. This could include DAO members approving the Foundation’s yearly budget instead of automatically allocating funds without direct approval. Without such measures, the 35% allocation to the Foundation seems excessive. I think it also could be worth exploring alternative mechanisms for oversight, such as some sort of elected community liaison role. This liaison could act as a bridge between the Foundation and the community, ensuring transparency and accountability on key matters.
Additionally, who will be responsible for tasks such as publishing Transparency Reports, approving logos/mascots, hiring or firing Discourse Facilitators, and managing other third-party contractors? The Foundation is already overdue on Transparency Reports for the last two quarters and has been slow with logo approvals. Will there be any accountability or repercussions if the Foundation fails to meet its obligations?
Lastly, I noticed the lack of women on the proposed Security Council. While I don’t believe in diversity for its own sake, it’s hard to believe there aren’t qualified women who could have been considered for these roles.
This topic was automatically closed after 7 days. New replies are no longer allowed.
Hi @Ape.Admin,
Thank you for your ideas [and the ApeCoin DAO community for the insightful discussions].
A moderator will reach out to the author to finalize the AIP Draft using the appropriate template.
Follow this Topic as further updates will be posted here in the comments. In accordance with DAO-approved guidelines, if the author does not respond within 30 days, the proposal will be automatically transferred to the Withdrawn category, and the author can re-submit the idea.
I am a little confused. If an AIP is submitted by an address that can vote at least 250,000 Votable Token. It then passes with a simple majority.
It then passes KYC.
What happens? It goes to On-Chain voting? This should be made more clear.
As Phase 3 - states that the AIP proposer is required to have an address that is delegated at least 500,000 Votable Tokens.
Is this for only for proposals that skip phase 1 or for all proposals?
It would be nice to make a table like I suggested back in August.
Maybe better:
Creating the Executive Director role and changing the role of Special Council:
or clarifying the new role of Special Council.
As the SC role is very clear in a previous AIP, so it is really about changing it.
How can you randomly split, when three are placeholders (one linked to a company)? When will those placeholders be announced? Who is selecting the initial Security Council members?
Hello everyone,
I’d like to share my thoughts on the proposal “ApeChain, On-chain – ApeCoin DAO Governance Revamp.”
I believe it introduces significant changes to our governance structure that could bring benefits, but at the same time, I see some serious risks. I’d like to draw your attention to both the potential advantages and disadvantages, which, of course, are my subjective observations. To make it easier and clearer to discuss and possibly restructure if you agree, I’ll present my points as follows:
Strengthening the Community’s Voice:
The proposal introduces a new Constitution inspired by the ArbitrumDAO model. This could enhance our influence over the development of ApeChain and ApeCoin DAO, which is a major plus.
On-chain Governance:
Moving all key decisions to the blockchain will increase transparency and efficiency in our processes. Everything being visible builds trust.
Cost Reduction:
Reducing the remuneration for Special Council members from $125,000 per year to 36,000 $APE is a significant saving for the DAO, freeing up more funds for other projects.
Reorganization of Responsibilities:
Shifting the Special Council’s duties to the Executive Director could simplify our governance structure and accelerate decision-making.
High Voting Thresholds:
Requiring 500,000 $APE to submit a proposal and 1,000,000 $APE to bring it to a vote may exclude smaller token holders. This limits the diversity of ideas and community participation.
Focus on ApeChain Only:
If the DAO primarily funds projects related to ApeChain, we risk overlooking other valuable initiatives that could enrich our ecosystem.
Elimination of the Special Council:
Removing this body might result in insufficient oversight of stewards, weakening control and transparency.
Lack of Fund Transparency:
Questions regarding the allocation of 100M $APE for ApeChain development remain unanswered. Without a clear picture of fund allocation, we risk losing the community’s trust.
Centralization of Power:
High delegation requirements could concentrate power in the hands of a few large token holders, contradicting the principle of decentralization.
Innovation Limitations:
A narrow focus on ApeChain might discourage creators of other valuable projects from collaborating with the DAO.
Legal Risks:
Implementing changes without thorough legal analysis could expose us to issues with international crypto regulations.
Lack of Transparency:
Unclear fund allocation and opaque decision-making processes could erode trust in the DAO.
While learning about writing applications in AIP_U, I began to reflect on the challenges and tensions within the DAO. I came across various opinions and perspectives, but as a newcomer to DAO structures and operations, I decided to independently explore the issues without aligning with any side. I analyzed several AIPs and, inspired by my inclination to build bridges and connections, I came up with a potential solution: introducing a three-way division of powers in the DAO, built on the solid foundations of AIP-1 and AIP-2. The key elements include:
Community Assembly
Special Council
Stewards
Community Commissioner
On-chain Governance:
All key decisions and votes take place directly on the blockchain, ensuring full transparency and security.
Separation of Powers and Term Limits:
Development and Marketing Fund:
Transparent Compensation:
KYC for Council Members:
High Voting Thresholds:
Focus Exclusively on ApeChain:
Potential Nepotism:
Lack of ROI for Social Projects:
In my opinion, the current proposal has many positive elements that can be adapted, but it requires legal consultation and some adjustments to avoid centralization and stifling innovation. I believe introducing a three-way division of powers with clear mechanisms for control and transparency could better balance the needs of the community and the operational management of the DAO.
We are the best DAO in the world, equipped with excellent tools and leading degens — a group of intelligent and open-minded people. But we are also human, with our own problems, fears, and struggles.
Please don’t take this as stirring the pot or trying to act as an expert — because I am not one. However, I do know that cooperatives, decentralization, mutual support, and collective efforts toward development always bring good results.
To illustrate this, I’ll refer to the example of a wolf pack — strong, cohesive, and always ready to support one another. Even in the face of leadership changes, they remain united and work together for the good of the whole pack. Such changes should never be seen as rejection; changes do not have to mean chaos or broken ties. On the contrary, they demonstrate adaptability and the strength of a community that can overcome any challenge.
What do you think?
What parts of this can we use?
I’d love to hear your opinions.
I may have missed it in the thread, but have we received clarity on who would be on/in the Ape Foundation?
See the explanation of the Executive Director role, just not sure who would make up the rest of the Foundation team. Would be interested in learning more and potentially supporting there.