ApeChain, On-chain – ApeCoin DAO Governance Revamp

[Ape.Admin]

PROPOSAL NAME:

ApeChain, On-chain – ApeCoin DAO Governance Revamp

TEAM DESCRIPTION:

@BoredApeG , ApeCoin DAO Special Council
@Hazel, ApeCoin DAO Special Council
@mo_ezz14 , ApeCoin DAO Special Council
@Waabam, ApeCoin DAO Special Council

PROPOSAL DESCRIPTION:

This AIP proposes replacing AIP-1 and AIP-2 and guiding the ApeCoin DAO to a drastically more effective governance process by removing administrative layers and moving more decision-making on-chain.This proposal would place more autonomy and power into the hands of the ApeCoin DAO, while focusing the DAO around a new mission: growing ApeChain.

Key Points:

1. DAO Treasury:

• On-chain DAO treasury using Governor Bravo contracts
  • 65/35 split
    • 65% of total treasury placed on-chain for the ApeCoin DAO
    • 35% of total treasury provided to Ape Foundation for its Administrative Budget
  • Power directly in hands of ApeCoin DAO

2. ApeChain Protocol Upgrades:

• On-chain protocol upgrades and updates using Governor Bravo contracts, governed by the ApeCoin DAO

3. Reducing Scope of and Sunsetting the Special Council:

• Significantly reduced scope of the Special Council, limiting their role in governance to merely security and administrative matters, including oversight of the Banana Bill program.
• Sunsetting the Special Council entirely once each current member’s term is over.

4. Replacing AIP-1 and AIP-2, and adopting the ApeCoin DAO Constitution (see below in the “Benefit to ApeCoin Ecosystem” section).

MOTIVATION

Following the successful launch of ApeChain, it is imperative that the ApeCoin DAO now focus its efforts on growing the ApeChain protocol.

While the introduction of a governable protocol and chain presents an economic opportunity for the ApeCoin DAO, it also presents an opportunity to reimagine and improve ApeCoin DAO governance to effectuate on-chain actions autonomously and streamline on-chain access to the treasury.

This AIP does not propose the end-all version of ApeCoin DAO governance and could evolve over time to incorporate governance processes that better fit an ever evolving DAO, such as the potential introduction of a bicameral governance system, or the introduction of ApeCoin lock-up mechanics to increase ApeCoin DAO voting power. Governance is not perfect and is an iterative process – this AIP proposes one giant leap for Ape kind.

BENEFIT TO APECOIN ECOSYSTEM

1. On-Chain DAO Treasury:
   a. Splitting the treasury (and locked APE streams) in a 65/35 split:

i. 65% of the treasury and unlocking APE will be directed to an on-chain DAO treasury contract, which will be controlled directly by the ApeCoin DAO.
ii. 35% of the treasury and unlocking APE will be directed to the Ape Foundation for its Administrative Budget, which will be utilized to build and maintain ApeChain, and to support the administrative needs of the ApeCoin DAO.

a. DAO-Controlled Drip Contract: In order to keep in line with transparency, decentralization and accountability to the ApeCoin DAO, the 30% treasury split for the Administrative Budget will be held in a multi-sig, over which the ApeCoin DAO will hold an admin key and be able to “clawback” such funds and send them to the DAO treasury contract.
b. The DAO-Controlled Drip Contract will “drip” along a monthly scheduled rate of 18 months, which will be able to be claimed by the Ape Foundation.

2. On-Chain Protocol Upgrades and Updates:
   a. The ApeCoin DAO, and the Security Council (as introduced below), will be given “chain owner” privileges over ApeChain, having the power to directly propose, vote on and implement ApeChain upgrades and updates.

3. Introduction of the Security Council:
   a. With the mainnet launch of ApeChain, security should be the utmost priority for the ApeCoin DAO. Given that the governance process is subject to a timeline unfit for quickly addressing emergency situations, it is critical that there be a fail-safe to quickly and immediately react to potential security threats to ApeChain.
   b. To address this issue, a democratically elected Security Council will be empowered to implement certain Emergency and Non-Emergency Actions, as described further in the Constitution of the ApeCoin DAO.

4. Reduced (and Eliminated) Role of Special Council:
   a. Rather than serving as the last filter before an AIP is put up for vote by the ApeCoin DAO, the Special Council’s Administrative Review will no longer be a prerequisite for an AIP to go to vote by the ApeCoin DAO, and the Special Council will merely provide administration and oversight of AIPs until the end of each current member’s terms, after which the Special Council will fall away entirely.
   b. Additionally, with the passage of AIP-454: “The BANANA Bill: Apes Gotta Eat”, the Special Council will temporarily serve to provide oversight over the Banana Bill program until its elimination entirely. With the passage of this AIP, AIP-454 will be amended to remove references to the Special Council and instead replace their final oversight role with the directors and administrators of the Ape Foundation.

By adopting the below proposed Constitution, inspired directly by the ArbitrumDAO Constitution, the ApeCoin DAO will be empowered to have a stronger voice and on-chain authorities and powers to shape the future of the ApeCoin ecosystem and ApeChain.

Constitution of the ApeCoin DAO

This document lays out the Constitution of the ApeCoin DAO.

Some of the rules and procedures of this Constitution will be enforced directly by smart contracts on a blockchain, and some will not. All rules are equally binding. Actions taken under this Constitution may be on-chain or off-chain actions. On-chain actions are those that are actuated directly by the governance smart contracts of the DAO as transactions on a blockchain. Off-chain actions are those that are actuated by other means.

This Constitution also includes some “recommended guidelines” which are non-binding but strongly recommended as good governance practice.

This Constitution describes the procedures by which it may be amended and lays out the governance framework of the ApeCoin DAO and the Ape Foundation.

Definitions:

• AIP: An Ape Improvement Proposal
• Administrative Budget: The assets held by the Ape Foundation separate from the DAO Treasury.
• ApeChain: The canonical ApeChain blockchain utilizing Arbitrum Nitro technology
• DAO Treasury: All $APE tokens held in a governance smart contract governed directly by the ApeCoin DAO and/or the Security Council of the Ape Foundation via on-chain voting mechanisms.
• Votable Tokens: All $APE tokens in existence, excluding any tokens held by the Ape Foundation, including its Administrative Budget and the DAO Treasury (including any locked APE intended for the Administrative Budget and DAO Treasury)

Section 1: Chain “ownership”

This Constitution describes the decision-making framework for the ApeCoin DAO governance over ApeChain and the broader ApeCoin ecosystem.

ApeChain, utilizing Arbitrum technology, has one or more “chain owners” who have the power to take administrative actions that change ApeChain’s core protocol and code and/or alter any of its core parameters. The “chain owner” will also have the power to upgrade certain associated Layer 2 contracts. The “chain owner” will control affordances on the chain such as updating the contract implementation of any of ApeChain’s core protocol Transparent Upgradeable Proxy contracts, and adjusting system parameters via, e.g., setter methods in the ArbOwner precompile.

“Owner” privileges on ApeChain have been given to both the ApeCoin DAO and the Security Council of the Ape Foundation.

Section 2: DAO Proposals and Voting Procedures

The following process governs the rules and procedures by which the ApeCoin DAO may propose, vote on and implement Ape Improvement Proposals (AIPs). Each phase may only begin once the prior phase is completed, unless otherwise stated. No AIP may be in violation of applicable laws, in particular sanctions-related regulations. Any such AIP in violation of applicable laws, including sanctions-related regulations, may be vetoed by the Security Council.

Phase 1: Temperature Check (1 week): The AIP is suggested on the Discourse and discussed/debated for 1 week. The AIP should be accompanied by a Snapshot poll or other method as determined pursuant to the governance process, which can only be submitted by an address that can vote at least 500,000 Votable Tokens. The Snapshot poll also runs for 1 week, and is decided by a simple majority with no required participation threshold. An AIP that fails the temperature check should not be submitted for a vote.

Phase 2: KYC and contract negotiations (0-14 days): During this phase, if applicable, the Ape Foundation will be tasked with oversight and administration of the AIP, including, but not limited to, conducting KYC and contract negotiations. Coming to contractual terms at this phase will allow for votes approved in Phase 4 to be self-executing.

Phase 3: Formal AIP and call for voting (3 days): The AIP is submitted via governance contracts on ApeChain, with a user interface available on Tally, Snapshot X, or another on-chain voting platform. The AIP proposer is required to have an address that is delegated at least 1,000,000 Votable Tokens.

After 3 days, a voter distribution snapshot will be taken and the voting period will begin; this gives interested parties time to discuss the AIP and gather votes before the voter distribution snapshot is taken.

Each AIP must be labeled as Constitutional or Non-Constitutional.

A Constitutional AIP is one that:

• Process: Modifies the text or procedures of this Constitution
• Software update: Installs or modifies software on ApeChain
• Core: Takes any action that requires “chain owner” permission on ApeChain

Recommended guideline: DAO members should vote against any AIP that is incorrectly labeled.

A Non-Constitutional AIP is one that is not considered a “Constitutional AIP” including:

• Funding: Requests funds/grants or otherwise propose how to spend or allocate funds from the DAO Treasury and, so long as the Ape Foundation exists, the ability to clawback the remaining funds in the DAO-Controlled Drip Contract
• Informational: Provides general guidelines or information to the community but does not otherwise propose a new feature or update

As a recommended guideline, an AIP should include:

• Team Description - A brief description of the team.
• Proposal Description - A summary outlining the proposal.
• Benefit to ApeChain - An explanation of how the proposal benefits ApeChain.
• Definitions - Definitions of any terms within the proposal that are unique to the proposal, new to the ApeCoin community, and/or industry-specific.
• Steps to Implement - The steps to implement the proposal, Including the project’s start and end dates, any milestones and key performance indicators, any associated costs, personnel, and platforms needed for each step., and any requests directed to the APE Foundation for each step.
• Reporting Expectations - A schedule for sharing progress reports to the community.
• Overall Cost - The total cost to implement the AIP.

As a recommended guideline, the AIP author can add additional fields to any template if necessary to fully communicate the intentions, specifics and implications of the AIP.

As a recommended guideline, resubmitted AIPs should also include:

• A link to the original AIP;
• Reasons such original AIP was not approved;
• Changes that have been made and why it should now be approved; and
• Any additional fields to any template if necessary to fully communicate the changes made and the intentions, specifics and implications of such resubmitted AIP.

Phase 4: DAO votes on AIP, on ApeChain (14-16 days): During this Phase 4, the ApeCoin DAO will be able to vote directly on-chain on a submitted AIP.

An AIP passes if the following 2 conditions are met:

1. More Votable Tokens have casted votes “in favor” than have casted votes “against” (“Threshold 1”); and
2. In the case of a:

• Constitutional AIP, at least 5% of all Votable Tokens have casted votes either “in favor” or “abstain”; or
• Non-Constitutional AIP, at least 3% of all Votable Tokens have casted votes either “in favor” or “abstain” (collectively, “Threshold 2”).

The voting period ends 14 days after the start of voting. However, if Threshold 2 is reached within the last 2 days of the 14-day voting period, the voting period will be extended to end 2 days after Threshold 2 was reached.

If the AIP fails to pass, the process ends after this Phase 4.

If the AIP passes, then:

1. If it is a Constitutional AIP, Phases 5 through 8 below are carried out.
2. If it is a Non-Constitutional AIP, Phase 5 is carried out, and then Phases 6 and 7 are bypassed, after which the AIP enters Phase 8 immediately.

Phase 5: L3 Waiting Period (3 days): After an AIP has passed Phase 4, a 3 day waiting period occurs. This gives users who object to the AIP time to initiate withdrawal of their funds or take other action on L3.

Phase 6: Initiate and Finalize an L3-to-L2 Message (at least 1 challenge period of the rollup protocol): After the 3 day waiting period in Phase 5 has passed, an L3-to-L2 message is sent indicating that the AIP was passed. When this message is finalized on L2, anyone can redeem it to complete this step and initiate the next step. This step ensures that the completion of the L3 waiting period will be recognized on L2 after any withdrawals initiated during or soon after the voting period have been recognized on L2.

Phase 7: L2 Waiting Period (3 days): Following the completion of Phase 6, there will be an additional 3 day waiting period. This ensures that users who initiated withdrawals or other L3-to-L2 messages have time to execute them on L2 before the AIP takes effect.

Phase 8: Implementation: The AIP is fully executed and implemented. This may happen on L2 or via a transaction sent from L2 to ApeChain.

This AIP process as specified will typically require 37 days from the beginning of the temperature check in Phase 1 until an AIP is finally executed in Phase 7 for a Constitutional AIP, or 27 days for a Non-Constitutional AIP. An AIP may optionally specify further delay before its implementation.

Section 3: The Security Council

The Security Council is a committee of 9 members who are signers of a multi-sig wallet, which has powers to perform certain Emergency Actions and Non-Emergency Actions, as delegated to it by the ApeCoin DAO and the Ape Foundation, and is responsible for upholding this ApeCoin DAO Constitution. Through the submission, approval and implementation of a Constitutional AIP, the ApeCoin DAO is able to modify the Security Council’s powers or to eliminate the Security Council entirely.

Equivalent “copies” of the Security Council multi-sig contracts exist, one on Arbitrum One and another on ApeChain.

Emergency Actions:

The Security Council has the power to execute any software upgrade or perform other required actions with no delay in order to respond to a security emergency, should one arise (such actions, “Emergency Actions”). Performing any Emergency Action requires a 7-of-9 approval from the Security Council. The Security Council must not use its power to perform Emergency Actions except in a true security emergency, such as a critical vulnerability that could significantly compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of ApeChain.

After performing any Emergency Action, the Security Council must issue a full transparency report (at an appropriate time after the security emergency has passed) to explain what was done and why such Emergency Action was justified.

The ApeCoin DAO is able to curtail or eliminate the Security Council’s power to perform Emergency Actions via approval and implementation of a Constitutional AIP.

Non-Emergency Actions:

The Security Council may also approve and implement routine software upgrades, routine maintenance and other parameter adjustments in a non-emergency setting, as well as veto AIPs which violate applicable law or otherwise put the integrity, security and safety of the ApeCoin DAO, ApeChain or the Ape Foundation at risk. These actions (“Non-Emergency Actions”) require a 5-of-9 approval in order to take effect. Any software related Non-Emergency Action, after approval by the Security Council, will bypass Phases 1 to 4 of the AIP process and instead directly go through Phases 5 to 8 of the AIP process, to provide a delay before any Non-Emergency Action is deployed. The Security Council may optionally specify additional delays before deployment. Other Non-Emergency Actions may be utilized during Phase 5 to ensure the security, integrity and safety of the ApeCoin DAO, ApeChain or the Ape Foundation.

The ApeCoin DAO is able to curtail or eliminate the Security Council’s power to perform Non-Emergency Actions via approval and implementation of a Constitutional AIP.

Section 4: Security Council Elections​

The Security Council has 9 members, who are divided into two Cohorts of 4 and 5 members.

The members of the initial Security Council are:

Matthew Katz (Caldera)
Bill Lingafelter (LayerZero)
[Placeholder] (Offchain Labs)
Quit (Yuga Labs)
Feld (Boring Security)
Roman (Ape Express)
Gerry (Ape Solar, Former APE Foundation)
BoredApeG (APE Foundation)
CaptainTrippy (Banana Bill)

The initial Security Council Cohorts were determined by randomly splitting the 9 members into two 6-member cohorts – 4 members in the ‘First Cohort’ and 5 members in the ‘Second Cohort’.

The first Security Council election is scheduled to begin on the 15th May 2025 or the earliest possible date. The election can only begin upon the availability of an on-chain election process that is approved and installed by the ApeCoin DAO. This first election replaces the ‘First Cohort’. The next election replaces the ‘Second Cohort’ and so forth.

The date chosen for the first election will form the basis for all future elections. Every election should begin 6 months after the previous election has started and it will replace its respective cohort of 4 or 5 members.

All Security Council members are expected to serve their term until the election is complete and the new Security Council members are installed.

The following timeline governs an election that starts at time T:

1. Contender submission (T until T+7 days): Any DAO member may declare their candidacy for the Security Council, provided that a current Security Council member in one cohort may not be a candidate for a seat in the other cohort.
2. Nominee selection (T+7 until T+14 days): Each DAO member or delegate may vote for their declared contender. Each token may be cast for one contender. To the extent that there are more than six contenders, each eligible contender must be supported by pledged votes representing at least 0.2% of all Votable Tokens.
3. Compliance process (T+14 until T+28 days): All candidates will cooperate with the Ape Foundation and complete the compliance process. The Ape Foundation is responsible for removing any candidates that fail the compliance process. In the event that fewer than 4 or 5 (as applicable] candidates are supported by pledged votes representing at least 0.2% of all Votable Tokens, the current Security Council members whose seats are up for election may become candidates (as randomly selected out of their Cohort) until there are [4 or 5 (as applicable)] candidates.
4. Member election (T+28 until T+49 days): Each DAO member or delegate may vote for any declared candidate. Each token may be cast for one candidate. Votes cast before T+35 days will have 100% weight. Votes cast between T+35 days and T+49 days will have weight based on the time of casting, decreasing linearly with time, with 100% weight at T+35 days, decreasing linearly to 0% weight at T+49 days.
5. At T+49 days: The process for replacing the cohort of Security Council members with the [4 or 5 (as applicable)] candidates who received the most votes will be activated. The installation process must be executed via the on-chain governance smart contracts and it may take several days until the new Security Council members are installed.

The Ape Foundation is allocated 14 days for the Compliance process and it should be executed between the Nominee selection and Member election. The Ape Foundation has flexibility to update its compliance policy for every new election. This is required to allow the Ape Foundation to comply with Cayman Island laws. Furthermore, the Ape Foundation maintains the right to issue new procedures and guidelines for off-chain components of the Security Council election. All efforts should be made by the Ape Foundation to ensure an orderly, fair, and transparent election.

As a matter of best practice for maintaining an independent Security Council, no single organization should be overly represented in the Security Council. In particular, there should not be more than 3 candidates associated with a single entity or group of entities being elected to the Security Council, thereby ensuring that there will be no single entity or group of entities able to control or even veto a Security Council vote.

Furthermore, no candidate with conflicts of interest that would prevent them from acting in the best interests of the ApeCoin DAO, ApeChain and/or the Ape Foundation should be elected to the Security Council. Potential conflicts of interest could be, but are not limited to, affiliations with direct ApeChain competitors, proven histories of exploiting projects and others.

The DAO may approve and implement a Constitutional AIP to change the rules governing future Security Council elections, but the AIP process may not be used to intervene in an ongoing election.

Security Council members may only be removed prior to the end of their terms under two conditions:

1. At least 5% of all Votable Tokens have casted votes either “in favor” of removal or “abstain”, and at least 5/6 (83.33%) of all casted votes are “in favor” of removal; or
2. At least 7 of the Security Council members vote in favor of removal.

The seats of Security Council members who have been removed prior to the end of their respective terms shall remain unfilled until the next election that such seats are up for appointment, unless otherwise replaced prior to such next election by a vote of at least 7 of the Security Council members, in which case such seat shall be up for appointment at the next such election. The Security Council may not re-appoint a removed member and they can only be re-elected via the election voting system.

Section 5: Data Availability Committee​

Transactions occurring on the ApeChain are settled on Arbitrum One, with the underlying transaction data batches posted and stored by the members of the Data Availability Committee on a Data Availability Server (and not on Arbitrum One).

The members of the Data Availability Committee of ApeChain are the following:

1. Yuga Labs
2. Offchain Labs
3. Animoca
4. Caldera
5. Magic Eden
6. LayerZero Labs
7. Horizen Labs

Data Availability Committee members can be appointed and removed at any time pursuant to a Constitutional AIP approved by the ApeCoin DAO. In the event that a Data Availability Committee member is removed (and not otherwise replaced) pursuant to a Constitutional AIP approved by the ApeCoin DAO, or in the event that a Data Availability Committee member resigns without a replacement, the Security Council may execute an Emergency Action (7-of-9 approval required) to appoint a replacement for such removed or resigned Data Availability Committee member.

Section 6: Community Values​

As the guiding values of the ApeCoin DAO and the Ape Foundation, ApeChain, technology, and community should be:

1. Boldness: We don’t shy away from the weird, the hard, or the new.
2. Equality: One APE equals one APE.
3. Transparency: Processes and decisions are shared openly with the community.
4. Collective Responsibility: We leave everything better than we found it.
5. Persistence: Success is an ouroboros, not a straight line.

DEFINITIONS:

The definitions in the Constitution are referenced and incorporated herein.

PLATFORMS & TECHNOLOGIES:

1. Snapshot
2. Tally, Snapshot X, or other on-chain voting platform
3. Arbitrum Nitro technology stack

STEPS TO IMPLEMENT:

Implementing ApeCoin DAO governor contract and adding it as an “owner” of ApeChain contracts

Moving 65% of treasury held by Ape Foundation to on-chain treasury

Deprecating AIP-1 and AIP-2 via adoption of the ApeCoin DAO Constitution

OVERALL COST

Total Cost: $0.

This AIP represents a cost savings of $400,000

Each Security Council member shall receive $25,000 per year.
There are 9 Security Council members proposed. The total cost of which would be $225,000.

However, Special Council members currently receive $125,000 per year. There are 5 of them, representing a total cost of $625,000. This role is being eliminated, which offsets the $225,000 for the Security Council and saves the DAO an additional $400,000.

[ernestlee]

Full disclosure, I am a co-author of another proposal which proposes to expand the role of the Special Council and to increase transparency. RESET : Reorganize & Empower the Special Council for Enhanced Transparency - #41 by ernestlee

Initially, it appears that under the REVAMP above the opposite is being proposed. Under this plan,

• the ApeCoin DAO would only fund ApeChain related projects,

• an AIP author would need to have 500,000 APE to submit a new proposal and would need to have at least 1,000,000 APE delegated to them before the AIP Idea will move to vote, and

• a 9 member Security Council will oversee the DAO and will be paid $25,000 each annually for the work that they do for the DAO.

Unfortunately, it appears that this REVAMP idea would further centralize the day to day decision making and operation of the DAO performed by contractors without any provision for any transparency to the community. When I first heard that this proposal could be coming, I had honestly hoped that this would not be the case.

Further, it appears that 35% of the current treasury would be allocated to the administrative functions of the DAO. So although this REVAMP idea purports to save the DAO $400,000, that figure does not appear to be completely accurate.

[VonFrontin]

Several clarifying questions:

1. What are the dollar amounts associated with this? 35% feels big. Can you help us understand why this is the right amount for the Ape Foundation to be able to run its operations? Also, can you describe what “Power directly in the hands of the ApeCoin DAO” means?

@Ape.Admin

On-chain DAO treasury using Governor Bravo contracts

• 65/35 split
  • 65% of total treasury placed on-chain for the ApeCoin DAO
  • 35% of total treasury provided to Ape Foundation for its Administrative Budget
• Power directly in hands of ApeCoin DAO

2. Does the following mean that only authors with 500,000 $APE can submit proposals? If so, I’ll have several follow up questions, but want to give you the opportunity to answer this first.

@Ape.Admin

Phase 1: Temperature Check (1 week): The AIP is suggested on the Discourse and discussed/debated for 1 week. The AIP should be accompanied by a Snapshot poll or other method as determined pursuant to the governance process, which can only be submitted by an address that can vote at least 500,000 Votable Tokens. The Snapshot poll also runs for 1 week, and is decided by a simple majority with no required participation threshold. An AIP that fails the temperature check should not be submitted for a vote.

3. Similar question as above, does the below mean that authors would then need to have an additional 500,000 $APE (1,000,000 $APE in total) delegated to them in order to unlock voting?

@Ape.Admin

Phase 3: Formal AIP and call for voting (3 days): The AIP is submitted via governance contracts on ApeChain, with a user interface available on Tally, Snapshot X, or another on-chain voting platform. The AIP proposer is required to have an address that is delegated at least 1,000,000 Votable Tokens.

Additionally, while the spirit of the AIP says that the DAO focus on ApeChain, it is silent on the types of AIPs that would be accepted to further this. Is this intentional? If not, clarification of the types of AIPs this AIP is seeking to have the DAO fund would be helpful. Again, several follow up questions depending on the answer here, but will give you the chance to answer the first question.

Appreciate all you do for the DAO, but given this is a significant shift in the direction of the DAO, I hope we can have a robust discussion about this before it ultimately goes to a vote.

[nataliecrue]

@Ape.Admin

Phase 1: Temperature Check (1 week): The AIP is suggested on the Discourse and discussed/debated for 1 week. The AIP should be accompanied by a Snapshot poll or other method as determined pursuant to the governance process, which can only be submitted by an address that can vote at least 500,000 Votable Tokens. The Snapshot poll also runs for 1 week, and is decided by a simple majority with no required participation threshold. An AIP that fails the temperature check should not be submitted for a vote.

This is a GROSS misstep that disenfranchises the average community member in this DAO and continues the trend of power grabbing at the expense and health of this DAO all while centralizing decision making and power within a group comprised of a select few.

Furthermore, the treasury and adjacent structures should remain as is and not sent to a treasury controlled by said group of companies and individuals.

Funding should be available to ALL token holders and no minimum amount of tokens should be a requirement of such. Proposers shall not have to meet a minimum requirement of tokens.

Lastly, the security council should be an even balance between reps from these companies and community members. This election should be fair, open and equitable. There shall be clauses that allow for the removal of security council members as at the moment this is extremely vague and lacks specificity. The suggested conditions that details the ways in which members may be removed are not sufficient and also may lead to . The quorum should be sufficient and equitable. Seats should also not be dictated by a percentage of token holders.

[Lanzer]

Disclosure: I am coauthor to the RESET Bill, an AIP about empowering and adding transparency to the existing Special Council.

This appears to be a very well-thought-out proposal. It does seem to centralize power and raise the bar above most people’s ability to participate.

Was this perception the intended outcome?

an AIP author would need to have 500,000 APE to submit a new proposal and would need to have at least 1,000,000 APE delegated to them before the AIP Idea will move to vote

the underlying transaction data batches posted and stored by the members of the Data Availability Committee

Significantly reduced scope of the Special Council, limiting their role in governance

autonomy and power into the hands of the ApeCoin DAO

Recommendation: Clarify if ApeCoin DAO is meant to refer to the APE Foundation, or include the ApeCoin DAO community members.

I tried figuring out what Governor Bravo is. The closest I could get was that it automates the proposal creation, proposal voting, and proposal execution functions. Can you give a little more insight into GB’s role? Please and thank you!

[ernestlee]

If this moves forward, it should be either returned for clarification or reconstruction because it spends more than 5% of the treasury AND is at Odds with the mission/ values of the DAO

---

Reasons to tag as “Return for Clarification” may include but are not limited to:

• Cost to implement unclear/not able to be calculated
• Would use more than 5% of the DAO treasury
• Conflicts with another proposal

Reasons to tag as “Return for Reconstruction” may include but are not limited to:

• Proposal is at odds with the mission/values of the DAO
• Proposal is at odds with the well-being of the DAO
• Violations of law, or against advice of counsel for APE Foundation
• Reasonable suspicion of fraud or other misleading information

[Cryptosheep]

Here we go again - zero costs - must be good right

I love all involved - but this is a big joke

[ernestlee]

AIP-552: Pausing Special Council elections pending the outcome of the Governance Revamp AIP vote

Amazing. That is the fastest that an AIP idea has ever moved forward to a vote.

[Cryptosheep]

How can an AIP be posted on Snapshot if the community post doesn’t even have a number assigned?

[ernestlee]

Let’s talk about this on x.com

[Waabam]

Hey folks,

I see a few people asking about the thresholds for submitting proposals to vote.

Wanted to add some more info on that here:

——

The proposed governance revamp mirrors Arbitrum DAO’s governance style, which relies heavily on delegations to initiate proposals.

You need a delegation with 500k $APE to propose a temperature check, and then a delegation with 1 million $APE to actually send it to the final on-chain vote.

This process puts a greater emphasis on participating in delegations and on getting support for your idea before it gets submitted to a vote to the entire DAO.

So any community member can still suggest ideas for proposals on discourse - they just need to get a delegation to support it in order to ultimately send it to a temperature check.

——

I also see folls asking about where the 35 / 65 proposed split comes from, and why the Foundation would need 35%. It is primarily to cover the costs associated with running ApeChain, including paying for infrastructure, paying for team members, service providers, and many other expenses associated with maintaining and improving the chain.

It is also to cover expenses associated with implementing ApeCoin DAO governance.

We can provide some more details on ApeChain expenses. I will share that soon.

Waabam

[ernestlee]

Thank you for that clarification Waabam. Would you like to participate in an X Spaces right now? x.com

[Lanzer]

Hey Waabam, one thing that stuck out to me while reading this. How does sunsetting the Special Council benefit ApeChain?

[ernestlee]

Waabam- We were just discussing your AIP idea on the X Spaces for the last few hours and had a few questions.

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Would you be open to allocating 20% of the net inflows to a DAO operated VC Fund that would continue to fund AIP ideas for businesses such as MBA licensees? The idea would be that the DAO could either provide venture debt or joint venture deals to continue to fund dreams but only where the DAO has the funds to do so. All proposals would still be put up to a community vote to approve funding.

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Would you also be open to the Foundation hiring an Ape Foundation community liaison that would provide the transparency and accountability that we suggested in the RESET idea? This individual would communicate with AIP authors fro the cradle to the grave on their ideas making sure that they are meeting the expectations of the DAO and vice versa.

[Evil]

This rings so many red flags but as long as trusted members are on the council I think we are in good hands. Most expensive expense right now for the DAO is the admin fee itself lmao

[0xSword]

This design has a fatal flaw. Happy to discuss with relevant parties. A conversation with me could prevent catastrophic system failure. My price is expensive - low six-figures for perhaps a single call. Would be worth the time. NMDS, money upfront, check writers only

[VonFrontin]

Thanks for the clarification.

So based on current delegations, the proposal means that, 13 delegations can Temp Check and 8 delegations can move an idea to vote.

This seems rather centralized to me and I also fear that those new to the DAO without an established network wouldn’t know how to garner support (or even who to contact).

How does the Arbitrum DAO deal with this?

My main fear is we’re introducing a level of gate keeping into the DAO, where the few decide what is voted on and approved. This is a model we are all too familiar with and I doubt anyone wants return to.

Appreciate your thoughts on this.

(Will post separate follow up below to keep the convos separate)

[VonFrontin]

In re: ApeChain

The DAO has already allocated 100M $APE to the development of ApeChain via the Banana Bill (not to mention the initial funds to build it in the first place). In the AIP, we established structure for the management of those funds as well.

So my question is: what happened to that?

I ask this genuinely as I am not aware of any signed agreements the team has made. Not that I should, but it would be helpful to understand both the use of the funds already allocated as well as what becomes of the current leadership structure of the Banana Bill should this AIP pass.

Additionally, is the intent of this AIP that all DAO approvals should be made only if a proposal is building on ApeChain? I ask for two reasons:

1. Wasn’t that the point of the Banana Bill?
2. Doesn’t that disenfranchise other builders in the space who are building with IP or integrating Web3 in other ways?

I want ApeChain to succeed as much as the next person, but I’m hesitant to do so at the cost of so many builders in the space who look to the DAO as a path to achieving their goals.

Appreciate your thoughts on this as always.

[furiousanger]

@Ape.Admin

OVERALL COST

Total Cost: $0.

Let’s just keep it simple rn (although I have several more questions & concerns).

You’re seeking to assign 100% of our DAO funds; ring-fencing & allocating 35% for administrative costs over 18months.

Meaning a 69% super majority threshold should be imposed on this AIP by the foundation, however, the issue ofc is the foundation are the ones proposing this change.

Zero cost label is completely unpalatable for me, & ngl deeply offensive.

[MaximusMX]

Thank you for putting together a comprehensive proposal and including appropriate detail so we can understand not only the intent, but what execution of the proposal would look like.

A few follow-up questions / requests as I’m digesting it, suspect others have similar thoughts:

• Can you provide dollar figure estimates for the 65% and 35% allocations, respectively? Would be good to understand the figures at play, even if the net impact is smaller (i.e. the “cost to the DAO” figures)
• Can you share more background on the APE Foundation mission, goals, members, etc.? I may just be playing catch-up and have missed it, but not sure I’ve seen a great deal of detail there
• What do you make of the marketing, community, and other initiatives the DAO has put forward to date in terms of revamping focus on ApeChain? Seems like many of these could/would continue, just with a more explicit focus on ApeChain versus ApeCoin itself? Curious for your thoughts