Towards an Ideal governance System : Beyond 1 $APE = 1 Vote

Beyond 1 $APE = 1 Vote : The future of DAO governance :saluting_face: [future = mid to long term]

Note : This was meant to go live around 2 weeks back but was postponed cause of a myriad of reasons, with that said now its finally out

A great Philosopher once said “Don’t destroy what you don’t understand” which at a first look doesn’t seem to make sense but then it started to grow on me.

I’ll give you an example, You come across a fence in the middle of nowhere and it’s being a nuisance, what’d you do ? Do you (a) Destroy it or (b) Be inconvenienced and change your path

“If you don’t see the use of it, I won’t let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then when you come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it.” This teaches us to first try and understand why the previous system was set up the way it was and without that prior knowledge, you cannot act to the best of your abilities and are much more likely to commit some blunders.

He further stated “Tradition is the solution to problems which we forgot we had”. just something to ask yourself

This is known as Chesterton’s fence and is the principle that Reforms should not be made until the reasoning behind the existing state of affairs is understood. As some prominent voices inc @0xSword has pointed out that no changes should be made to the core workings hastily. Some have even proposed a supposed halt to any changes to the core mechanics for a specific period.

Then there comes the old reformer vs traditionalist debate.

I consider myself as a reformer but with that said, There’s nothing more dangerous than reform just for the sake of it.

Any robust voting mechanism would need strong anti sybil measures in place. And not just that, a lot of supporting mechanisms are needed to uphold the integrity of the system. (Checks and Balances peeps)

Context : Here

The way I think of it, nothing is ever truly sybil resistant, It just gets financially, technologically or chronologically infeasible to do so. As the Incentive to rig the governance process of a Treasury with a billion $ treasury is so severe that it cannot be overlooked.

“Show me the Incentive and i’ll show you the outcome” → This quote by charlie munger perfectly encapsulates how Incentives are a powerful tool which help in shaping Human behaviour.

If the incentive for rigging something so fundamental is still there, then you best believe that’s what’s gonna happen. That’s just Game theory playing out in real time.

Now it’s very Important for me to make my position clear on this :orangutan::sparkles:

Q1) Am I favouring a secure implementation of Quadratic Voting mechanism with the purpose for this post to sway popular sentiment ?


Q2) Am I trying to shill another mechanism, let’s say Conviction based voting ?


Q3 ) Am I exploring alternative governance structures so that we can analyse a particular mechanism thoroughly as a collective in the meantime ? Just get the ball rolling on the discussion side of things.

Yes, That's what exactly I'm trying to do.


These are the major problems which some popular mechanisms face :

I’ll add to this with time

  • One person, One vote → Proof of Humanity How !?
    How can we , in a trustless system say with 100% certainty … without intrusive measures like KYC or sam altman’s Iris scanning zK proofs ?
    It has strong connotations wrt Sybil . That attack vector is wide open.

With the rise of Generative AI, esp (GPT 4) our perception of reality, what’s true and what isn’t will start to change radically and there’ll come a time where genuine human interaction and AI generated content (more like hallucinations ad it has a tendency to just make stuff up) would be pretty much indistinguishable from one another. Worst part ? It’s not even that far away.

And dw, Sam is providing solutions to the problems he helped create. Introducing Worldcoin. where you only have to scan your iris to help prove your humanity. (Yikes !!)

  • One $APE = 1 Vote → Obsolete (Maybe ?)
    Negligible representation for smaller holders, Voting power disproportionately concentrated within a few entities. Now that’s not a bad thing, but it demoralises the small to medium holding contributors which make up the majority of the contributors (n) on a particular platform.

Well to be fair, this system has some merit to it cause it brought us up to this point so we can have those conversations.

Buying influence in this system is pretty straightforward and each additional (or consecutive) vote costs the exact same as the one before. Although this system isn’t vulnerable to sybil type attacks as in Quadratic Voting.

Pros and Cons people, pros and cons.

No. of Votes APE Holding
1 1 $APE
500 500 $APE
1,000 1,000 $APE
5,000 5,000 $APE
10,000 10,000 $APE
  • Conviction based governance → Requires locking in of stake for scaling voting power up

TLDR : Your voting power scales dynamically according to the lock in period (in weeks)

However, If someone wants to use the traditional system, it’ll still be in place but without any of the vote scaling benefits.

Dynamic scaling of voting power helps incentivise a more long(er) term approach.

Voters would generally want to maximise their voting power while trying to minimise the lockup period, then there’ll come a time where this reaches equilibrium (Nash equilibria). That’s what Game theory dictates.

  • Meritocratic or Merit Based systems → Seems interesting, relatively uncharted territory

TLDR : Citizens give up their influence on particular issues to gain influence on others based on their knowledge and prior experience.

Seems Interesting really, needs further studying.

  • Quadratic Voting → Sybil attacks, Collusion
No. of Votes Cost
1 $ 1
5 $ 25
10 $ 100
50 $ 2,500
100 $ 10,000
500 $ 250,000
1000 $ 1,000,000

The biggest issue with QV is with Proof Of Individuality.

How do you determine the humanity of a certain Individual , without directly going against the values which we stand for ? That’s a question which I’ve tried to address with → zKYC

If not, then how can you manage the sybil attack vector ?

No. of Voters Votes (v) per Individual Associated Cost Total Votes
1 100 $ 10,000 100
2 50 $ 5,000 100
5 20 $ 2,000 100
10 10 $ 1,000 100
20 5 $ 500 100
50 2 $ 400 100
100 1 $ 100 100

So now the cost of every consecutive vote doesn’t scale to the factor of (v) → v^2 $ and instead is divvied up among legit voters and / or aliases of existing one. I’ve put in aliases to emphasise the Sybil attack vector

The Fundamental flaw in the Implementation of a Secure (but public) implementation of QV as a robust governance system is that it’s very susceptible to Sybil type attacks.

For a vote ranging from 1 → n, the cost of every vote scales from 1 → (n) ²
So, it can be determined that the vote scales much more effectively for those with smaller holding. If the amount is small enough, it achieves near parity.

Now’s where the sybil attack vector comes into play, a single account with 100 … and that’s exactly why we’d need strong measures to take

Now the Incentive here is to spoof this system by introducing an overwhelming no of seemingly real aliases to try to game the system with the ultimate aim of undermining the authority of a reputable system by maliciously gaining a significant influence over the executive (either a separate body which oversees governance ot the process itself)

TLDR : QV requires quadratic pricing of votes per individual, two colluding individuals can buy v votes for a lower price than one individual alone and that effect scales up massively as we’ve seen before

The process to do such a thing might look complex at first look, but this effort in the face of such a big incentive is negligible.

- — - - — — — - — - - — — — - — - - - — - - — — — - — - - — — — - — - -

I’ve seen the debate come up for looking into alternate forms and I’m glad I’m not alone in this

The old Reformer v/s Traditionalist debate is going strong over here as election season nears, things are starting to heat up in this regard.

And at the end of the day, we’re still subservient to the will of the DAO and the will of the DAO is paramount. Just some food for thought till the next post

PS : Added the section for Collusion between parties with an aligned incentive here → Quadratic Voting Threat Assessment


This is only the first draft, will make changes to it along the way while documenting that effort :saluting_face:

Reserved for Change Log :


To get more voters or more people involved I would like to see a few things in place to even the voting.

Allow staked $APE ( top staking pools -BEND, Paraspace, etc) to vote.

Create a threshold min and max to vote having 1 $APE is kind of pointless when those that have 10-100k get the full weight of each coin.

Say 1k-2k $APE to vote this shows a desire or vested interest of folks that choose to be involved. Go with 2k $APE gets 1 vote up to 10k (holder of 10k or more gets 5 votes) basically 1 vote for each 2k $APE held with a max of 5 votes (10k or more)

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We are NOT creating a government but a organisation.

We are a Decentralised Autonomous Organization NOT a Decentralised Autonomous Government.

1 Vote - 1 Apecoin is a core tenet which in my view cannot be changed.

Growing the functionality of delegation and participation in delegation is the way not what you suggest.

Why don’t you start the under 1000 apecoin club and get 10,000 people to delegate to you?

10,000,000 would create the representation you are looking for.

Even an average of 100 ape would be a 1m APE voting block of people with some alignment?

@CEOofWeb3.0 what do you think?


I will start the 1000 $APE club when you start the 1 $APE club you could get 10,000 holders to delagate to you and get wiped out by 1 person holding 10,001 $APE. Im saying folks are not coming to vote or participate because if they hold less than 10k $APE its a waste of time and effort. I keep hearing “we need more holders” but when any participation or involvment is wiped out when 1 holder of 50k swings the vote why bother.

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  1. If in Apple or Tesla, you have 1 share the same applies, you can attend the AGM but with stocks there is no easy/common way to delegate your vote into a block as an individual holder.

2.You can also via thankape get your community to 100 APE each easily. I am testing this out this week. It just requires them spending sometime. So your 10,000 holders would suddenly have 1,000,000 voting block.

3.What are the metrics on this? Percentage with 1 APE only ? versus the categories below?

50000 and above

I doubt there are many holders with 1 ape, due to the cost. I sent someone 2 ape this week as a gift so they could join and it cost me 2 usd in gas.


A very complex subject, I believe that in the view of @CEOofWeb3.0, he seeks a “democratization of votes”, if I understood correctly…


Then he should join a DAG.

I have updated my post above to give a good solution for a massive voting block delegation.

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I understand your position, I even agree with this part:
“Go with 2k $APE gets 1 vote up to 10k (holders of 10k or more get 5 votes) basically 1 vote for every 2k $APE cast with a max of 5 votes (10k or more)”.

But really the power of votes is concentrated on those who have a greater purchasing power to participate, but that way you mentioned at the end, I believe it democratizes more, because if you have 10k or more $ape, the number of votes you will be able to have, will not increase exorbitantly.

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Wow, so much numbers :heart:

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In reality 99% of Alt coin holders only buy because they want their purchase to increase in value. They see this as a proxy for the entire web3 space, like an industry index tracker fund.

I will prove my point that having 1 APE is a choice. If anyone can get to 100 APE using ThankApe in a few weeks max.

Contributors this season are eligible to win raffle prizes.
17,600 APE
Rewards earned this season from all contributors
Total contributions on this season

So only 2000+ care to get at least 100 APE for FREE. Maybe a better focus is why this isn’t 10,000 participants?

Sorry I didn’t understand very well, it’s just that I have a language barrier, I still have difficulty with some things in English…

but in this case you mean that few people want to add to the community and seek their ape$ to be part of the ecosystem…
and many people just want to know about the profit…
would it be this?

  1. They either don’t want OR don’t know how to get involved.
    Only 7000 have signed up to this discourse
    Only 2000 signed up to thankape.
    Only 1000+ in discord
    17000 in snapshot - Quite high, shows bad conversion rate to deeper involvement. Maybe they don’t know they can earn by actions with thankape.

  2. Profit - they are looking at passive (meaning not active) profit.
    a) A proxy to Web3 Cultural Sector - Meaning I think web3 CS will go up, so I buy ApeCoin as it represents the sector.
    b) If they wanted to seek profit through work/effort they would complete Thankape tasks.
    c) When price goes up or down the swings are large showing not holding with long term conviction.


Numbers numbers … this might get pretty confusing or deep for some ppl. But in general I am in to exploring different methods / solutions at the same time retaining what we have . Pros and cons Pros and cons as mentioned must be weighed thoroughly on the long term basis and vision. Some might think whales that hold a lot of $Ape can be unfair as it sways the voting results 1 sided but at the same time some whales might also think their bags their own decision as its their bags they are trying to protect with the decisions they go with

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Now yes, I understand perfectly.
it really makes perfect sense.
In deeper involvement with interactions the number drops a lot.

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I am in and signed up for thank ape specifically after seeing a few posts problem for me is I have to be on my wallet with the $APE…which is staked. I will do everything I can to earn $APE it is great just takes presence there…and dont think its mobile

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I’m sorry I don’t understand the question, If you can elaborate more then I’d love to clear any doubts. :saluting_face:

Such numbers, Much wow

I’ve gone back and forth over this but ultimately, as @bigbull has said, the best solution (not to say it is without its flaws) is to simply get more to either participate directly OR join a delegate group that they trust.


In a way, yes.

But I do realise that this is a very complicated topic and all I intend on doing with this is to try and present those sides of the argument.

In the end, we’ll achieve consensus as a collective :saluting_face: