This is a discussion that needs to be had whether or not AIP-183 passes.
Undoubtedly, many issues shall be discussed between these two sophisticated and thoughtful documents. I’ll focus on one piece of thoughtful sophistication that chafed my left booty cheek – the introduction of the so-called “Steward” into the working group. This is a structure the DAO should abide under no circumstance.
BoredApeG’s transition plan relegates responsibility for all “ecosystem grant funding and activity” by assigning it a “LOW” priority rating, stating repeatedly that this is “not a priority; can be assigned to future working group.” Which would place that responsibility squarely within the purview of Amplify’s document.
Amplify, it seems possibly under the influence of a special interest, chose to centralize operations for Working Groups under the position of “Steward.” By the document’s definition:
Steward — “Stewards serve within working groups on behalf of the DAO, not the working group. They perform administrative oversight and make executive decisions.”
“Working groups will function as a two-level hierarchy, consisting of a DAO elected Steward and working group contributors. The key difference between Stewards and contributors is that contributors are not required to manage working group budgets”
… which means the Steward IS. So the Steward, this almighty singular point of execution, is also the sole controller and arbiter of the working group budget. Never mind the new technologies we have at our disposal, the multisigs, the vaults. No; let’s just go back and do everything the old VC way. Might there be a VC influence here? Hmmm.
What else is this Steward in charge of because the transition document chooses to, perhaps correctly, de-prioritize it?
establishing policies and procedures for dispersing funds to grant recipients
implementing KPIs and milestones to monitor results for follow on funding
I might actually stomach these if the next two weren’t so egregious.
collecting KYC and due diligence on grant recipients
collecting, reviewing, and analyzing RFPs for accepted AIP’s
You people went nuts because Horizen geofenced your staking frontend. Do you really expect new blood to enter this DAO if they have to produce a corporate RFP after the grueling AIP process?
I’m sorry; did Y00ts have to create a corporate-level RFP before it started building? Aave? Maker? How about CultDAO or Dogecoin? Shibaswap? Genie.xyz? The Mutant Hounds collar drop? Did they need a corporate friggin RFP after an AIP, or did they just need really motivated people? KPR? Aurory’s still building. Ronin, too. NFTfi… never saw any RFP from them. Site works perfect though. Non Fungible Arcade, The Game Disease; they’re as degen as it gets. I don’t even know if they have a business address. I didn’t see any RFP from Satoshi Island and they are brokering agreements with the Vanuatu government. I could go on.
Let’s not even get into KYC. You want one person, a person who could easily be voted in by a special interest, to control how KYC is administered in the working group? If that special interest has interests in remaining compliant with certain governments, then you are now limited under that same philosophy regardless of your own jurisdiction or philosophy.
Why don’t you just go get money from a straight up VC, then? This structure is basically the same with an additional step of having to suck up to DAO members to pass a vote. At least with a traditional VC you only have to suck up to like 3-4 old guys.
We could even go after the KPIs. One person now sets the KPIs for a DAO that can’t even accept revenues yet. WTF man. At least go in order. And if it’s a VC influence setting these KPIs, you can bet they’ll be revenue-based, which means people already with money will get the grants and ground-level builders get the shaft.
This entire philosophy is based around the ridiculous and unproven notion that centralized entities produce at higher efficiencies. First of all, I want to see the scholarly work on this unfounded assertion. Second, this DAO exists to experiment in new structures of government, namely consensus rather than singular execution.
Falling back into the status quo structure of a singular point of execution without even trying the multiple forms of successful consensus mechanisms crypto have given us is intellectual
d. all of the above.
The answer is (d). Come get your Scooby snack.
Right now, this DAO’s governance represents a poor facsimile of the worst parts of basic US republican-democracy. DAO = legislative, Cartan = executive, SC = judicial. But just like the US, everybody’s role is getting mushed together so no one knows what they’re supposed to be doing and everybody with any leverage is just power grabbing.
Each working group should have its own consensus mechanism, or the DAO structures a consensus mechanism that a working group must agree to before it can be made official. Even the worst and most basic of these far outpaces the single point of execution structure, which is easily manipulated under the current, very flawed voting structure.
I urge deep research into the power of consensus, and a swift repudiation of the Steward in the Working Group. Wow, this is long. GN