AIP-318: APECOIN DAO Voting Reforms

A few comments and thoughts around this

I disagree, primarily because you are not “born” into apecoin and in a similar sense while it bears some similarities to digital citizenship in my view apecoin as a foundation is more akin to an institution which means I’m applying a blend of a corporate model that embeds with it capitalist ideals.

In that sense a stake in capitalism represents both earned (labour) and owned (capital) and I believe we need to strike a balance between the two for it to be successful for the DAO hence my proposal to have a kind of “earned” structure to complement the capital structure not its wholesale elimination which is what you are suggestion. In removing any reason to have a meaningful capital incentive (i.e. a holding of APE in this case) doing you are removing the capitalist incentive which I believe is essential for the DAO to be sustainable.

In terms of the issue of voting, unless we have a much larger number of apecoin holders who are voting which currently still only sits somewhere in the low thousands sometimes hundreds, a ticket system makes it harder to prevent vote buying and in its current state becomes quite easy to manipulate. At least with the current delegation system one can easily ascertain the strength of the voting element and counter that in the open, vs. in the dark where transparency is not as clear when one can introduce 1000 new apecoin voters who nobody may have seen before each holding 1-10 ape. Once we get to a point were apecoin has, eg. 1 million it becomes much much harder to corrupt the system.

But ultimately my main issue is that it removes the Capital incentive which I think is necessary for the apecoin DAO to succeed. This is of course a matter of opinion but if you do the math and add up the total number of apecoin holders today and let them vote with a maximum power of either 1 or 10 ape (or even 100 ape) you would lose the incentive to hold a stake in apecoin that was meaningful other than to extract from its treasury which I think is a misaligned incentive and would create a disproportionate incentive to allow for a kind of sybil attack (I don’t mean sybil attacks in purely computational form but one that would create incentives to subvert the reputational system that maintains the governance of the apecoin DAO primarily because the DAO is not mature enough yet given its size).

Pure token holdings isn’t optimal either but provides a simple mechanism to provide a public defense that is auditable with rules that are at least simple to understand that are not subject to the same sybil attacks because it requires substantial cost to do so, for the time being.

I believe the mechanism that I introduced maintains the element of both labour and capital, you need both and the ratios can be determined to create the right incentives for it to be sustainable in my view.