BB has solved this argument above - proves beyond doubt it is incorrect to suggest this.
Yes. But you have thus far failed to show where the Foundation has actually done this. And neither of the two failed delegated wallet AIPs allowed it to do this.
When tokens unlock, the Foundation can use them as part of its treasury. There is literally nothing that requires the DAO to claim locked tokens and not use them as it deems necessary. What do you think happens when the treasury runs out of funds and is unable to satisfy accounts payable because it kept claimed tokens locked?
I don’t understand what you mean. What has the BB to do with the GwG?
Sorry - BigBull (BB) - not bananas bill - suggests that the WG budgets are exempt from the 3 month conflict rule, meaning they could put up budgets every two weeks if they liked. So if true, this means WG budgets would not be effected overall by this idea of £300K restriction.
That is not what I said. They have specific funding windows, unless an emergency. Hence why Allcity made that AIP.
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Thanks for the clarification.
However, I had previously suggested (scroll up) that GwG be exempt. So, how is that different from what bb is suggesting?
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I don’t need to demonstrate the foundation has actioned their directive, just that they intend to when applicable. And the only way to action is to transfer the locked ape tokens they speak of as snapshot doesnt allow coinbase cex connections.
That’s what I figured that you were going for, there. Which is why I didn’t understand what he meant.
ps. Did you abandon this?
You said the WG budgets would not be effected by the 3 month conflict period, meaning if AIP-517 passes could have unlimited budget requests no? Meaning, the £300k limit I propose would not defund as some are falsely claiming.
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We know this. So, what problem are you trying to solve?
Not abandoned, waiting to take to the AIP Draft phase.
First to put in place simple rules regarding our locked ape tokens as they’re fully accessible. We don’t have any in place, so seemed like a simple task to undertake and good commonsense.
Second to stop any further overreach. The foundation should always be neutral.
Third to prevent circulating supply increasing prematurely - which could happen due to the security risks attached to transferring and the self-custody of multiple millions of tokens to facilitate voting delegation for example.
Fourth is to mirror what a trustless automated system would look like - also how other ape unlocks happen for additional stakeholders - tokens can be “used” only once the predetermined schedule permits.
Another point to note is whether AIP-436 should have already prevented this from happening - “spending or allocating” - but we’ll let that slide as won’t matter if AIP-517 passes.
Positive to this! Just that these may only be temporary solutions that don’t address the fundamental issues DAOs are currently facing.
The main problems I’ve observed are:
1. Lack of alignment and coordination
The current structure of DAO leads to fragmented operations and inefficient use of resources. This manifests in several ways:
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Siloed Operations: The groups operate as separate legal entities, lacking a unified strategy or vision. This includes the Ape Foundation, Special Council, various Working Groups (GWG, MarComm WG, W3D WG, Metaverse WG), Banana Bill, and others.
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Unclear Responsibilities: There’s often no clear delineation of professional responsibilities among committees. Each maintains its own to-do list without considering how it fits into the larger organisational goals.
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Inconsistent Goal Setting: Using the Web3 Development Working Group Proposal as an example, stewards propose and manage their own initiatives independently, potentially leading to misaligned or overlapping efforts.
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Limited Cross-functional Collaboration: Initiatives that could benefit from multiple perspectives and skill sets often remain isolated. For example, the GetApe.io project could leverage expertise from various working groups:
Web3 Development WG for technical implementation
Marketing & Communications WG for promotion
Metaverse WG for identifying gaming/AR integration opportunities
Special Council for strategic endorsement
2. Lack of Accountability and Transparency
The decentralised nature of DAOs can sometimes lead to reduced accountability and transparency, which are crucial for maintaining trust and efficiency.
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Unclear Task Definitions and Outcomes: There’s often insufficient clarity on specific tasks assigned to individuals or groups, as well as the expected outcomes of these tasks.
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Unified Reporting: Lack of a single channel for regular (e.g., monthly) summaries of all initiatives across committees, including performance metrics, challenges faced, and progress updates.
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Difficulty in Performance Evaluation: Without clear metrics and regular reporting, it becomes challenging to evaluate the performance of individual contributors, working groups, or the DAO as a whole.
Proposed Solutions
To address these challenges, DAOs should consider implementing the following strategies:
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Cross-functional Integration:
Establish regular inter-committee meetings to align goals and share progress.
Working across the proposed initiatives, ensuring diverse expertise and perspectives. -
Enhanced Accountability Measures:
- Develop clear KPIs for each working group and individual role within the DAO.
A single pinned post for regular (e.g., monthly) summaries of all initiatives across committees, including performance metrics, challenges faced, and progress updates.
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So just quickly on the figures with some references.
Below picture shows position as at end of Q1 - approx 267m $ape left net.
Next picture shows AIPs from Jan to Aug. Added yellow to account for ones costed into Q1 report. Light blue is a rough $ape figure (generous btw) of $ape approved to date for AIPs.
So 127m $ape can confidently be deducted from the 267m $ape net position end of Q1.
That leaves around 140m $ape.
We have to estimate our operating costs for Q2 & Q3. And take into consideration possibility of community events supported, additional expenses, loans, grants the special council may have approved etc etc.
Examples of some we can work with:
Administrators - $900,000 a year. (A)
Custody fees - $775,000 a year. (E)
Legal - $1,050,000 a year. (E)
Special council - $625,000 a year. (A)
Offset USD/USDC - $150,000 a year. (E)
(A=actual E=estimation)
Confidentiality allowing me to estimate we are at around 120/130m $ape left today. 
OK. So, these are preventative measures rather than activities which have yet to occur.
That said, how exactly do you intend for the DAO to enforce those controls when in fact the Special Council has the sole authority to act as it deems necessary? It’s right there in the charter (see apecoin.com) and which puts to bed that fallacy laden nonsense about them acting at the ‘behest of the DAO’. So, even if AIP-517 passes, they can very well disregard it - and there is literally nothing that either of us can do about it. What then?
Funny story. We actually had something like this. Then one day, less than 6 months later, out of nowhere, came AIP-426 which reversed it. Not even joking.
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LFG.
Raising awareness & having the tough conversations imo will eventually lead to change, even if it’s not put forward by you or I.
Regards the temporary solution - yep that’s exactly what it is.
Thanks for great points. Bookmarked. 
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A lot closer to mine. But you didn’t account for the $60M year-1 (year-2 is $40M) BB budget, monthly token unlocks etc.
And why didn’t you post this in the relevant thread when previously prompted? I encourage you to do that.
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Your reply to Q1 report contained all the relevant info and links and even bookmarked it myself. Sometimes I feel like I always “doom post”, so just was happy to be content with the reports being published.
The 100m $ape for BB - splitting over two years is likely because of the lack of available $ape on hand to fund the full amount in one go.
The token unlocks are about even - what we have left comes from the unlocks until they end in 2026 (130/130 approx). It might be a good idea to add it on you’re right, just to reinforce everything else is spent & allocated/reserved just awaiting payments or claims.
Thanks 
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Yup. That was my deduction as well.
Also, the last time I checked the treasury wallets, I didn’t see any large amount egress, so it’s likely that the Foundation isn’t sending $60M to a BB multi-sig but instead are funding them based on tranches, deals etc. ofc we wouldn’t know for sure because asking questions like that tend not to result in answers. I will probably check the wallets this week to see if there’s any movement pertaining to BB.
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