a grand new beginning
3 Likes
I fully support this AIP. That said, while operating a DAO can be costly and governance discussions contentious, I recommend ApeCo allocate a modest portion of its business activities to ESG initiatives.
3 Likes
I support this 100%. It’s more than necessary and long overdue!
3 Likes
Just a reminder to the community, seeing as there are so many newcomers joining as a result of this topic:
The “Vote” button on this page is more of a sentiment check, and does not represent an official vote.
Be sure to follow this topic for updates and more information as it unfolds.
8 Likes
hell yeah! I’m excited again about apecoin future!
3 Likes
This is the perfect evolution of where we need to go.
Thanks for putting this together - kill the DAO and evolve.
2 Likes
I disagree with this AIP’s approach.
This is bad optics for Yuga Labs and @Garga . I personally have concerns about the confusing and fast sequence of events that led us here.
I do not think the ApeCoin DAO is a failure.
I do not think the ApeCoin DAO should be absorbed by Yuga.
3 Likes
If we are going to sunset the DAO, wouldn’t it be better to just sunset the DAO governance and to keep all the assets with the Foundation rather than distributing them. The Foundation could certainly engage Yuga or any other entity to assist with its operations, but would be required to reinvest the income generated by its assets into the ApeCoin ecosystem and ApeChain.
Something like this;
1. Abstract
This proposal would formally deprecate the ApeCoin DAO’s token‑holder governance system and transfer ongoing stewardship of ApeCoin and ApeChain to the Ape Foundation operating under an enhanced Investment & Development Policy (IDP). It:
- Retires Snapshot and Governor Bravo smart‑contracts on 30 September 2025 (23:59 UTC).
- Amends the Foundation’s Memorandum & Articles to remove the binding‑AIP execution clause introduced by AIP‑582.
- Segregates the DAO Treasury into (i) one‑year operating runway and (ii) a time‑locked Ecosystem Reserve.
- Establishes a 90‑day dissent/redemption facility (max 5 % of treasury) for token‑holders who opt out of the re‑organized structure.
- Publishes a new IDP detailing quarterly spending caps, KPIs, and reporting obligations.
The objective is to maintain and enhance ApeCoin utility (gas, staking, fee rebates, brand protection) while eliminating governance attack‑surface and increasing operational agility.
2. Motivation
- Governance fatigue: Sub‑10 % voter turnout across the past 12 AIPs undermines legitimacy.
- Treasury risk: Malicious or negligent AIPs can irreversibly deplete funds; existing ED veto under AIP‑582 is a blunt and contentious tool to eliminate the risk of a “run on the treasury” by any one member of the DAO.
- Operational drag: Multi‑month proposal cycles impede timely BD partnerships and ApeChain upgrades.
- Comparative precedent: ENS, dYdX, and Arbitrum have moved to foundation‑centric models after rapid initial decentralization.
3. Rationale
A Cayman Foundation Company is legally empowered to amend its own governance provided the directors act bona fide for the benefit of the beneficiary class (ApeCoin holders). Sunsetting token voting removes a material litigation & regulatory vector while preserving the Foundation as a purpose‑built steward for ApeCoin and ApeChain growth.
4. Specifications
4.1 Governance Infrastructure Changes
| Element | Action | Effective Date |
|---|---|---|
| Snapshot Space | Set to read‑only; last block height recorded | T + 7 days |
| Governor Bravo | Upgrade proxy to Governor_KillSwitch that blocks propose() and queue() |
T + 14 days |
| Discourse Forum | Lock new threads; archive existing | T + 30 days |
4.2 Treasury Restructuring
- Operating Wallet: Multi‑sig (ED + 2 Directors + Audit Chair); seeded with 12‑month runway.
- Ecosystem Reserve: Time‑locked smart‑contract releasing quarterly (token & fiat) per IDP.
- Redemption Pool: 5 % of total treasury, accessible for 90 days by verifiable $APE holders at a certain block height
4.3 Investment & Development Policy (IDP)
| Pillar | Annual Max Spend | KPI | Reporting |
|---|---|---|---|
| ApeChain Core R&D | 40 % | Block‑space utilisation | Quarterly |
| Strategic Grants / Equity | 30 % | New DAUs attributable | Quarterly |
| Legal & Brand Defence | 10 % | Enforcement actions | Annual |
| Community & Events | 10 % | Unique participants | Quarterly |
| Foundation Overhead | 10 % | ≤12‑month runway | Annual |
4.4 Cayman Legal Amendments
- Articles §7.3 – Delete obligation to execute “community‑approved AIPs.”
- Articles §9 – Insert IDP oversight by Audit Committee.
- File special resolution with Registrar under Companies Act §55 within 15 days of board approval.
5. Steps to Implement
| Phase | Milestone | Responsible | Target Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | Sunset AIP passes Snapshot vote | Community | Day 0 |
| 1 | Publish 90‑day dissent/redemption UI | Foundation dev team | Day 7 |
| 2 | Freeze Snapshot, deploy Governor_KillSwitch | Foundation dev team | Day 14 |
| 3 | Engage Deloitte (treasury audit) | ED | Day 21 |
| 4 | Segregate treasury wallets | ED & Audit Committee | Day 30 |
| 5 | File Cayman constitutional amendments | Cayman counsel | Day 45 |
| 6 | Issue Q1 IDP report | ED | 1 January 2026 |
6. Timeline
- Vote Window: 7 days (standard).
- Full governance shutdown: 30 September 2025.
- Redemption window closes: 29 December 2025 (23:59 UTC).
- Completion of legal filings: 15 October 2025.
7. Overall Cost
| Item | Estimate (USD) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Treasury audit | 100 000 | Fixed‑fee quote obtained |
| Legal & filings | 150 000 | Includes Registrar fees |
| Smart‑contract audits | 75 000 | |
| Redemption pool | 5 % of treasury | Variable; capped by design |
| Total (ex‑redemption) | 325 000 |
Costs are paid from the Operating Wallet.
8. Benefits
- Eliminates governance attack‑surface and reduces legal risk.
- Provides professional capital allocation discipline via IDP.
- Maintains token utility and brand equity.
- Offers clean exit for dissenting holders.
9. Risks & Mitigations
| Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Securities classification of $APE | Publish external Howey memo; emphasise utility enhancements |
| Litigation from disenfranchised whales | Document board rationale; provide redemption facility |
| Centralisation optics | Quarterly audited reports; Audit Committee oversight; time‑lock reserve |
| Smart‑contract bugs in KillSwitch | Third‑party audit and 14‑day bug‑bounty before activation |
10. Legal Considerations
- Cayman Foundation directors must act bona fide for beneficiaries; legal opinions will be published before implementation.
- Redemption facility characterized as voluntary “waiver and release” to limit future claims.
11. Voting Specification
- Type: Single‑choice, Yes/No.
- Quorum: 15 000 000 APE.
- Passing Threshold: Simple majority (>50 % of cast APE).
A “Yes” vote enacts all specifications herein. A “No” vote leaves governance unchanged and no part of this proposal will be executed.
12. Implementation Team
- Lead: Executive Director, Ape Foundation.
- Smart‑contracts: Foundation engineering team; audited.
- Legal: tbd
- Audit: tbd
- Comms & Community: Foundation Comms Lead.
13. Appendix: Reference Docs
- AIP‑582: Executive Director & Audit Committee Mandate.
- Cayman Foundation Companies Act (2023 Revised).
- Ape Foundation Memorandum & Articles (version dated 1 Feb 2025).
- External Howey analysis (to be published pre‑vote).
6 Likes
there is no doubt that Garga is lazer focussed on the core ecosystem and I truly believe that this is the best move for ApeChain. Here goes my vote
1 Like
Full support! Voted!
2 Likes
Full Support & Voted
Apechain on Top
2 Likes
I’m partially support this AIP as too many unknown:
ApeCo
- What is the ApeCo?
- For profit, venture or something else?
- Initial members and formation method?
- Who have the final say in ApeCo?
Sunsetting the DAO (aka ApeCoin Foundation, BANANA Bills, ApeChain, etc) and Launching ApeCo doesn’t solve the fundamental issues:
- Trust: The AIP approval to vote solely relies on the “taste” of the Foundation, some ridiculous AIP might just get to vote in a short period without due diligence, eg: AIP-455
- Efficiency: The AIP process can just be infinite with “Return for clarification”, “We have sent a list of follow up questions to the author.” while some of the questions had been asked or in the proposal.
- Proposal Conflicts: DAO does not allow competition between AIPs, which violates healthy competition and survival of the fittest. Moreover, whether it can be passed should be decided by the community.
BANANA Bills
- Passed on Jul 2024 with 100 Million APE and already allocated 31.2 million $APE by Apr 2025. It’s efficient in terms of capital allocation, but does it somehow do it too quickly, or healthy with the current status of treasury?
- Funded a few big names, but what the purpose and result? To add yet another ApeCoin deposit and withdraw channel? Not even a PR news/tweet posted. Are there any under table jobs in between?
- Funded for profit/profiting business from a near death DAO, isn’t that weird?
Yuga
- Not to doubt Yuga is one of the most successful pioneer in NFT’s space, but if Yuga are the controller of ApeCo, I’m here to worry.
- The ability of the Yuga team to take on another organisation again is in doubt as not a beautiful transcript in the acquisition of Cryptopunk, Meebits, Moonbirds, WENEW, Roar and building Otherside with studios, like Improbable, etc.
- Yuga had/hired the All-Star team and a lot of chief positions, but the impact is just as little as compared to the nobody startup stage of Yuga. It might be market conditions or over-promising, but we should still face the problem directly, shouldn’t we?
2 Likes
So glad that yuga is finally taking control of what was always meant for yuga to handle in the best possible way. Too many funds given for non delivery or expansion of apecoin & too much time given with title perks which has cost not just money but time in a very competitive space! I can’t wait to see the new administration taking control. I hope this is the final time this happens & we only stay winning!
1 Like
I like the thinking behind the AIP. My suggestions would be:
- Having a strong leadership team for ApeCo. People with proven Web3 credentials who are crypto native and can make things happen (doers over talkers). As we saw with Ape DAO, an inefficient leadership team really erodes confidence of the holders and community at large
- Clearly articulated goals and transparently sharing regular progress (in action, not just words). Again, learning from Ape DAO and Banana bill - a lot was promised around transparency and very little really done. This needs to be rectified.
The community will cease to have any say on the operations after the DAO is dissolved. Ensuring the 2 points above will give a degree of confidence to the community.
I am fully supportive of this proposal. Godspeed and send APE to $69 
1 Like
Fully supported and voted for!
worth a read, good points.
1 Like
Much needed IMO. This has my full support.
Lfggggggggggggggg 
@Garga described this as a non stock entity, established by Yuga - but non able to give dividends. Hence a Public Benefit Corp (his words).
Can this be added into the AIP text. Thanks.
1 Like
What is the plan for the Security Council?
Section 3: The Security Council
The Security Council is a committee of 11 members who are signers of a multi-sig wallet, which has powers to perform certain Emergency Actions and Non-Emergency Actions, as delegated to it by the ApeCoin DAO and the Ape Foundation, and is responsible for upholding this ApeCoin DAO Constitution. Through the submission, approval and implementation of a Constitutional AIP, the ApeCoin DAO is able to modify the Security Council’s powers or to eliminate the Security Council entirely.
Equivalent “copies” of the Security Council multi-sig contracts exist, one on Arbitrum One and another on ApeChain.
Emergency Actions:
The Security Council has the power to execute any software upgrade or perform other required actions with no delay in order to respond to a security emergency, should one arise (such actions, “Emergency Actions”). Performing any Emergency Action requires a 7-of-11 approval from the Security Council. The Security Council must not use its power to perform Emergency Actions except in a true security emergency, such as a critical vulnerability that could significantly compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of ApeChain.
After performing any Emergency Action, the Security Council must issue a full transparency report (at an appropriate time after the security emergency has passed) to explain what was done and why such Emergency Action was justified. These reports would be released on the forum and on Twitter/X.
The ApeCoin DAO is able to curtail or eliminate the Security Council’s power to perform Emergency Actions via approval and implementation of a Constitutional AIP.
4 Likes