Hi ApeCoin DAO Community,
@Amplify has requested to extend the community discussion period for this AIP idea. This topic will automatically close a further 7 days from now. We encourage the community to continue to engage in thoughtful discussions through constructive criticism, honest feedback, and helpful suggestions.
Follow this Topic as further updates will be posted here in the comments.
Great updates and refinements to the AIP.
Whatâs the thinking behind these OKRs?
Does the primary responsibility of facilitating elections fall on other groups or admins and if so which ones?
Thanks - SSP
Thank you @ssp1111 for your question,
Yes currently the Cayman Foundation Administrators (WebSlinger) have custody of the Discourse and Snapshot. At present, the WG0 interim Discourse Facilitators coordinate with WebSlinger in order to move AIPâs through the process to Snapshot. A similar relationship will exist until we can allow for further autonomy later down the road such as delegating Snapshot authorship to a Working Group Steward(s), or transferring the ApeCoin.eth ENS to a Working Group multisig. 
Specifically in this instance the Governance Working Group (and Stewards) would not have access to KYC information which will be administered by WebSlinger, but they would be helping to recategorize nominations and candidate withdrawals here in Discourse (day to day work).
-Amplify
Great job, thank you so much for your contribution to the growth of our DAO.
However, I have a question regarding the re-election of the current steward. We had to spend a month doing elections and outreach just 3 months ago, and now we have to do it all over again? I understand that we want to be inclusive and involve more people in the DAO, but constantly having to hold elections, train new members, and settle in can be inefficient. If this happens every 3-4 months, we lose at least a month of productivity each time. Is there any alternatives thatâs been brought up to make this more efficient?
Furthermore, I believe that the Metaverse Working Group should have members who are knowledgeable and up-to-date with the latest developments in the E-Sports industry. Since E-Sports is currently experiencing a downtrend, itâs important to have members who not only understand the community but also actively play games. This will ensure that the group can make informed decisions and effectively contribute to the growth of the DAO.
Hello @Zoopie and thank you.
The timeline for electing the other two Stewards is in June/July following the cadence of the Special Council elections, so it is every 6 months for now until we discuss further election timings. The idea of merging election timings for Governance Stewards and the Special Council is so the DAO is aware itâs âelection seasonâ and they should be paying attention to nominees during this time.
We have discussed what an extension to WG0 might look like, and allowing those 7 to continue facilitating the operations of our DAO, but the expectation set by AIP-196 was a 3 month mandate to transition operations into the hands of the community. We got a one month extension for this purpose, but we really do feel the DAO needs another chance at electing individuals for these positions going forward as they are fundamentally different workloads / responsibilities. 
-Amplify
The graphic reads âExpensesâ but clicking the âBudget Detailsâ reveals those figures are âCompensationâ.
Are those figures per person? $9000 USD per month.
And Stewards are in place unless a âProcess Proposal requesting the removal of a Steward from a Working Group [is] passed [or] Stewards may step down from their positionâ.
Meanwhile in those positions they have large budgets to spread around.
Is there a description somewhere of what sort of oversight or ethics reviews will be taking place? Should be in the Charter.
Elections are the worst and most inefficient way to place people in important positions, only fostering drama, content overwhelm, division and worse. Just like IRL.
Qualified, available persons should be vetted then appointed to key positions on a regular basis. Same as what works in IRL.
Why rush to go out of our way to copy what doesnât work and refuse what does work?
Hello @br00no,
When thinking about Working Groups and the entirety of their budget, compensation for their contributors is one of those expenses.
The figures are per Steward, of which there will be three starting in July. Only 1 starting immediately.
Stewards are in place until either a process proposal passes requesting their removal, or they have hit their term limit.
Weâve intentionally left the Governance budget rather small ($10,000 Ops fund and $10,000 for the Ape Assembly) in order to alleviate these concerns. Furthermore, this budget will remain in the custody of the APE Foundation until all three Stewards and the DAO Secretary have deployed their multisig.
Every three months after an election there is an opportunity to meaningfully reflect on this WG structure and propose changes, both to the contributors and the structure itself. Additionally, three months after any AIP passes the DAO can propose changes to it, including Stewards. These positions are responsible for our AIP process and governance in general so they should be very highly visible community members under direct oversight by token holders, with accountability to the DAO that elected them.
Unfortunately whether I agree or disagree with you, we still havenât been able to solve this problem in its entirety. Part of the motivation of empowering an assembly of governance participants to elect the Stewards of future Working Groups is specifically to address these concerns. So while Stewards of our Governance WG will be elected through DAO wide votes including campaigning for those votes, elections for other Stewards will take place in a smaller, more contextual electorate. Hopefully this lessens the amount people need to âcampaignâ and play politician in order to get âhiredâ for a role they are qualified for.
-Amplify
Hi @Amplify,
Your topic will be moving to the AIP Draft phase in less than 24 hours. Are you content with the feedback received or do you wish to extend community discussion for another 7 days?
If we do not hear from you within 48 hours after your topic closes, your topic will be moved straight to the AIP Draft process.
We look forward to hearing from you.
Gerry asked me to review this particular AIP.
I like the concept of allowing people to propose and operate working groups. This feels like a well designed structure and Iâm supportive of it.
My only fear is accountability. If a working group with budget is approved, how do we make sure theyâre actually doing the things they promised and following through? It seems the stewards above are only funded for 4 months?
Separately, are the stewards/secretary being proposed full-time? Hard to imagine that the individuals who would take these roles (with only 4 months of runway) can quit their jobs to do this. What are the expectations of the people in these roles re: time commitment?
Apologies if some of these items were addressed - I admittedly took a quick read.
TLDR: Nice work, supportive, like the idea, just proposing a few questions/minor concerns.
Adam
Thank you so much for your feedback @hollanderadam.
In terms of addressing accountability from Stewards, the DAO Secretary and the Ape Assembly are key factors here. The DAO Secretary is non-voting, non-participating, but they are present in many (most) Steward meetings, responsible for relaying notes between the Stewards and the DAO token holders. Ideally the Stewards are performing meetings in public, but we have not gone that granular in this proposal for many reasons.
As far as budgets, I think this is an important reason why weâve included âOKRs until next funding window.â They serve as objectives and key results the DAO is expecting the Working Group to fulfill before they request follow up funding.
The Stewards and Secretary are full time, and this budget proposal is only until August because we wonât have the remaining 2 Stewards until July 1st. We think it makes sense for Working Group Stewards to propose their own budgets to the DAO.
Thank you again for your support. I would love to get on a call with yourself or anyone else who has outstanding questions or is interested for the tldr; or ELI5.
Thanks much for your reply. Hope I get the quoting right, and if not Iâll edit until it looks clearâŚ
Amplify: âWhen thinking about Working GroupsâŚâ
So, yes $9000 per month per person.
Amplify: âStewards are in place until either a process proposal passes requesting their removal, or they have hit their term limit.â
I didnât read any mention of a term limit, or even elections for Working Group Stewards after the initial ones are put in place.
What is the term limit please?
Can you detail this âprocess proposalâ process?
Amplify: âEvery three months after an election there is an opportunity to meaningfully reflect on this WG structure and propose changes, both to the contributors and the structure itself. Additionally, three months after any AIP passes the DAO can propose changes to it, including Stewards. These positions are responsible for our AIP process and governance in general so they should be very highly visible community members under direct oversight by token holders, with accountability to the DAO that elected them.â
So there is no direct or qualified 3rd-party oversight at all.
Self-reporting without 3rd-party auditing to token holders isnât how oversight is done, for a lot of very good reasons and hard-learned lessons. Token holders are swamped enough, and many wonât be into stirring the pot or qualified to do such oversight much less on self-reported numbers or metrics. Thatâs why IRL has 3rd-party ethics and audit oversights, etc.
Proper oversight would add very little to these costs as a percentage.
In re: elections, itâs empirical and irrefutable. Thatâs why no one asks for random people to elect their heart surgeon, trial lawyer, players to their favorite sports team, etc. etc. Only in politics do we have non-stop popularity contests and everyone knows how well that goes.
Term limits can be found under â4. Governance Working Group Steward Electionsâ under âWorking Group Guidelines and Processâ
The term limits are the exact same as the Special Council. There are 3 seats, and 2 seats go up for election in May/June 2023 for cycle two starting July 1st, with the other seat going up for election November/December 2023 for cycle one starting January 1st.
Yes! A âProcess Proposalâ is defined in AIP-1 as: â- a proposal about making a change to a process or proposing an implementation. Examples include procedures, guidelines, changes to the decision-making process, and changes to the tools or environment of the DAO or Foundation.â
Given the DAO Secretary can be anyone, I would argue there is absolutely an opportunity for 3rd party oversight. Given this first cycle, with Vulkan proposed as the DAO Secretary, you would be correct that he would not qualify as a âthird party.â
I think its worth noting the entire DAO acts as an oversight body:
A: They will vote on this AIP.
B: They will vote on Stewards every 6 months.
C: They will vote on budgets every 6 months.
As a token holder, to exercise your oversight rights you would merely adjust your vote to a candidate who does represent you and your interests as a token holder. Additionally, if the DAO feels that Stewards are abusing their budgets, token holders can merely elect to not vote for their follow up budget proposal or simply remove and replace those Stewards that are abusing their position as per section 6. Removal and Replacement of Working Group Stewards.
We are currently discussing and deliberating the creation of a Governance Working Group. While I agree we shouldnât be running âelectionsâ for the people who are going to facilitate our Social Media accounts, it only makes sense to discuss politics and elections when weâre talking about a Governance Working Group that directly facilitates our governance process, or AIP-1.
-Amplify
Thanks again. To be clear then, are those elections you mentioned 1-time only for initial appointments or are they recurring⌠meaning a given Working Group Steward is up for (re)election every year?
IRL âterm limitâ means youâre done, not up for re-election, btw.
Thanks also re: process proposal. Iâve read all this stuff before, and recently more than once, AND Iâve gotta say itâs not always clear whatâs referring to what or in which scenario. Iâm far from dumb, and work daily with fancy legal, regulatory and financial terms, so if I find this dense âŚmaybe itâs just me.
So a process proposal to remove a Working Group Steward is only something thatâd be necessary in-between the (if I understand correctly) 1-year term limit before re-election?
The DAO cannot act as an oversight body. In spirit, yes, but thatâs not what true oversight is - especially when huge budgets are involved - and I expect Stewards would know this. Why not pay a qualified auditor, former regulator, or ethics lawyer to suggest proper oversight?
I type all this with sincere respect and gratitude for what you and the other Stewards have done so far, and with the DAOâs best interests at heart.
It shouldnât be left up to maybe-informed voters, who may be qualified to judge, to âfeelâ whether self-reported items and budgets were abused (by which time itâs already done), of âfeelâ whether ethics were violated, much less to try to figure that out via scattered Spaces, servers, boards, hearsay, etc. and then âfeelâ like making waves during a heated popularity contest and to adjust public votes which could get all get negated by a single whale (and Stewards will soon be whales, if not already), etc.
Thatâs literally the exact system under which every major abuse of power or budgets happens IRL. We couldnât come up with a worse system, other than no system at all.
It should have proper oversight, and clear reporting by qualified neutral 3rd parties.
No sir, a Term is 1 year and a Steward can run for re-election once. Term limit = total of 2 consecutive terms, again the exact same as the Special Council.
And yeah⌠
Our existing Governance process can be a little confusing with a ton of (arguably unnecessary) administrative overhead.
1 Year terms, but a two term limit, yes. Anytime after 3 months from passing a proposal can go up to remove a Steward. This rule also applies to Special Council members, the Foundation Director, Administrator, or really any role in the DAO.
Iâm certainly open to hearing more about this, as this is the first time itâs come up but Iâm not sure the best way to go about this? Would the Governance Working Group hire a third party to perform oversight on themselves, this seems like a conflict of interest? Iâm not convinced we want to invite regulators, but Iâm happy to hear how you would address this issue.
-Amplify
Thank you again. Much more clear.
Short answer: YES.
Known, qualified entities in this field would have a significant footprint IRL and chance of being connected to the Governance group and corrupt and wiling to risk their reputations and livelihoods is effectively zero. Pick at random an active poster to pick at random among a provided list of three to five such entities. Easy, quick, excellent. Potential conflict eliminated.
Alternately, find someone studying in related fields at the Masters or PhD level and give them the chance to do a quick study and submit a report of recommendations & findings. Itâd spread DAO awareness, perhaps cost nothing, and give such a person a fantastic opportunity! Public good.
On Discord there is the starting stages of a Legal Working Group. It has been suggested there that there should be an Ethics Group for exactly these purposes. A lawyer specializing in securities and teaching university PhD level ethics posted a desire to help - heâd also know advanced-level students in case he couldnât do it. Ask him to address the WG on this in a discussion? As did I offer to help in that WG, given my day-to-day is totally in line with this stuff.
Let me formally suggest here to get that WG up & running, ASAP. We already are missing ethical and other oversight on AIPs that have passed or will come up for vote.
And YES we would want to consider former regulators because theyâd know best, just like the best defense lawyers are former prosecutors.
We know weâre a fat, premium target due to the size and BAYC brand association, and we know thereâs already scrutiny, and when TSHTF âbut muh Caymans!â wonât fly because nobody will say we operated in good faith without any true, qualified oversight or advisory.
Iâm slightly unclear here on what exactly you are proposing and who the âpickerâ is in this scenario. Are you proposing âweâ choose someone at random and pay them to review this, and all AIPs for ethical concerns?
I do think this is the reason we elect individuals to positions of trust. We do, to a degree, trust individuals we elect to act honorably and remain accountable to our governance process to which they are subjected to; knowing that if they donât, we remove them and elect someone new.
Re: Working Groups. I think itâs helpful to think of Working Groups as community led entities which facilitate DAO operations. DAO ops can be likened to things we are currently doing like facilitating our governance process on Discourse, maintaining ApeCoin.com and relevant domains, using the ApeCoin social media accounts, etc. I only say this because the rules around how âWorking Groupsâ operate is very clearly outlined in this document, and I donât know if it makes sense to subject a legal group to the same rules as those facilitating DAO operations and day-to-day work.
-Amplify
You asked how to avoid a potential conflict if the Governance WG were to hire qualified 3rd-party oversight. I offered a simple, quick, effective way to avoid any potential or perceived conflict - make a short list of accredited entities, have a random person from among the community pick at random from those qualified entities (same way âelectionsâ should be done) - whereas the system being proposed as-is has potential conflicts written all over it.
Nothing in human history suggests itâs ever worked out that way, at least not for long. What ends up happening, as I detailed above and anyone above voting age must surely realize, is much the opposite and few if anyone will, or can, rock the boat. Meantime people remain entrenched in those roles (at least in this case thereâs a 2-year limitâŚfor nowâŚwhich can of course easily change).
If a committee, WG, or council, or whatever, of informed, highly qualified $APE-holding people doing proper oversight isnât âfacilitating DAO operationsâ then I canât imagine what is.
In any case, however proper oversight is done - say by 3rd parties as originally suggested - it needs to be done. It shouldnât come down to trust. We can and should do much better. Especially given the reputation of Web3 and crypto.
We should lead by example, not copy the worst systems IRL has. It should be in the Charter and proven on a regular basis. That shows respect for the DAO and token holders.
As proposed there is no true oversight, while itâs many of the same people in multiple roles - in some cases getting multiple compensations or rewards - and before long they can sway any vote theyâd like to via their $APE or influence.
Itâs not a good look, especially to any outsiders looking in, to say the least, to go the way of IRL politics or to resist proper oversight.
I think we may not be on the same page. Before I address your concerns, I want to make absolutely clear that under no circumstances is anyone being paid multiple times for multiple roles in the DAO. While Vulkan and I are currently Stewards of WG0, our mandate (and pay) ends May 1st.
In terms of oversight, Iâm still a little confused on what exactly you want oversight on? If itâs budget expenditures there are reporting requirements written into this proposal, as well as Funding Windows every six months in which WGs request funding from the DAO in the form of an AIP.
If itâs decision making processes, I donât have the ability to mandate that WGs facilitate calls in public or only coordinate In public channels.
One of the main objectives behind proposing Working Groups is to remove our constant reliance on the APE Foundation and provide some autonomy to working groups instead. Oversight and accountability is very much needed and weâre proud of the many layers of token holder protections weâve placed in these guidelines. The Ape Assembly, the DAO Secretary, election cycles, term limits, funding windows, reflection periods, reporting requirements, etc.
This document is proposed as a starting point, not the end result. We believe in progress over perfection. One of our guiding values is collective responsibility and leaving everything better than we found it.
With the understand that we are attempting to further decentralize our DAOs operations into the hands of the community, while also removing reliance on the APE Foundation to facilitate the will of the DAO and our governance process, we need people to facilitate the Discourse perpetually. The structure proposed is a solution to either delaying the process entirely, or just letting the APE Foundation hire people and do it all.
I like to think our community wants to be empowered to truly push culture forward into the metaverse and become less reliant on the Cayman Islands Foundation structure as we mature. I believe Working Groups are how we can achieve that. Empowering trusted individuals in our community to request a budget to perform work for the betterment of our DAO.
-Amplify