What does $APE do better than $ETH? There’s where you’ll find your answer.
I understand this factor
I just want to make clear that the reason that I am advocating for the entire SC to be replaced has nothing to do any one person. It’s not personal for me because I believe that I am capable of separating business acumen and responsibility from personal feelings.
And so, to avoid any impressions of favoritism, that to me, was a cleaner and more equitable resolution. Especially since 3 positions are up for vote anyway.
And even so, if the AIP passes by the will of the DAO community, they can obviously nominate themselves when new elections are up. And it’s not up to me. It’s up to the community because it’s their votes.
It’s all about a clean start at the top. Just like the board of a corporation which goes through an investor “no vote” procedural vote.
And for those who keep asking me in DM what about the other teams, my response remains the same. That being, the GwG and our outstanding secretary, all perform their respective functions to the best of their collective abilities - and they’re not responsible for the high level functions of the Special Council which is where the issues in my AIP originate from.
By having a brand new Special Council - all with C Suite credentials and experience - we better position the DAO for growth and prosperity.
This recently passed with around 6million votes and almost 100% voting for it. In the AIP I clarified 1 ApeCoin = 1 Vote
So there is no confusion on how the voting works as a governance token.
Nobody is denying or disputing that 1 $APE (ApeCoin) = 1 vote. It doesn’t matter if it’s APE or Ape or $APE. That’s not the issue.
The issue is that a wallet with 1M $APE = a wallet with 1M voting power
That’s not equality. And that’s the point of contention so that we go to 1 (person) = 1 vote because that’s equitable. And yes, we would still need to solve the issue of delegated wallets, but that’s solvable - and we know this already.
I had posted an expansive explanation of the above (culled from this AIP) in another thread, but it was removed - likely because it was off-topic or something. I don’t know, as no specific reason was given. So, below is an abridged and more concise explanation of the logic behind this section of my AIP, and for those who don’t have the time to read the expansive discussions regarding AIP-277.
Nobody wants to see the Ape Foundation breach a contract that it signed. That’s absolutely not the issue here. And as I have stated over and over, I am NOT in favor of doing that because I am old school and believe that contracts should be honored as originally written and agreed to. No exceptions.
The issue is that, by way of the reason given for the AIP-277 to be returned due to the possibility of contractual breaches, the Ape Foundation appears to have created and entered into contracts that it cannot terminate. On its face, I find that to be exceptionally problematic. Especially when we have attorneys and WebSlingers to prevent that sort of risk factor.
Regardless of that, the Ape Foundation prevented the AIP from going up to vote, though I don’t see a reason in the charter that prevents it; even with the “may include but are not limited to” qualifier.
If I were in the Special Council, my advocacy would have been to send it up for vote. And if it passes, then we deal with the ramifications of terminating contracts as applicable and required by law and the contract terms.
So, if the Ape Foundation can’t reduce a contract salary due to a violation of said contract, then, I don’t understand how it could adhere to the AIP-1 terms which actually allows for the termination of Special Council members who are in fact on contract.
I hope this brings some additional clarity to this specific issue.
1 = 1
10 = 10
10/10 = 10/10 = 1 = 1
You like mathematics.
Oh come on, man.
1 = 1 vote
10 = 10 votes
There’s no divisor here because that’s not how the votes are tabulated.
Explain how a wallet with 1M $APE, and thus 1M voting power, ends up being the same as one with 1 $APE with 1 voting power.
Right now, there’s a wallet with 4.8M $APE and which just killed 3 AIPS - in sequence. How would it have been able to do that if that wallet was tabulated as “1 person = 1 vote”?
It is assumed that the current members of the council cannot be re-elected in this case? Given their strong ties, status in the DAO and the crypto community, what will prevent them from being re-elected again and again. If the voting system is not changed, then friends with large bags of $APE will vote for them every time
Why not use a voting system similar to the one used by thank ape?
1 APE = 1 vote
10 APE = 5 votes
100 APE = 10 votes
1,000 APE = 20 votes
10,000 APE = 40 votes
100,000 APE or more = 80 votes
A great option for voting
Yeah that’s honestly very interesting. Especially because it’s an idea put into practice.
You see? This is what happens when silent members of the community are emboldened to respond on critical topics. Well done, friend. Your post covers a number of things, and I feel that you deserve a detailed response because you bring up some excellent points. So, LFG…!!!
The reason that I refrained from adding the condition that past and current members cannot be re-elected is one of fairness and because it’s not about singling out any one person. As I said before, this AIP isn’t about any one person. For example, I have a cordial and respectful relationship with Gerry - since I got here. He’s old school like me, has helped guide me around the many nuances of the DAO and more than once pulled me from the proverbial ledge of frustration. Similarly, while I don’t have the same relationships with the others in the SC (the GwG is a different story because I regularly get on their nerves - but I like them all equally), I respect the position that they’re in, as well as the complicated job of managing a community and a massive treasury. So, just writing up an AIP to terminate one person is unfair. This is the background of my decision.
Now for the other part.
If I added a condition that past and present members cannot be up for nomination if this AIP passes, it once again creates a situation whereby a member of the SC could end up being treated unfairly, due to circumstances that are not of their making. It’s bad enough to have been terminated. Remember, there are 5 people in the SC, and it doesn’t (I should hope not) take one person to make decisions - of any kind. What if, a critical issue (e.g. the disclosure of a $2.5M loan) was down to 3 people voting out the other 2 in favor of just disregarding it and blowing off the community? Would we blame those 2 people? And so, allowing those people to be nominated and possibly voted in again, is the right thing to do.
Having said that, with WebSlingers mandated to write up professional requirements for the position, not this crap whereby we could elect a chef from Shangri-La to govern over an eclectic community that’s the beneficiary of a $500M entity, we stand a good chance of still getting quality people. And so, once the new nominations and elections go up, those in the current SC who don’t qualify, simply won’t get the nomination. And if they somehow pass, then it’s up to the community to vote. As much of a fiasco-laden drama as our leadership elections tend to be, I am confident that the greater community who want to see the DAO succeed, isn’t going to vote back in people who just lost a community-wide vote of no confidence. In addition to that, this will now be a full-time role, so, there’s no moon-lighting involved. So, any of the present SC who wants to serve again, will have to quit their current jobs because the minute it is discovered that they are moonlighting, their contracts will be terminated immediately.
As a business owner and hard-nosed leader, some decisions are difficult to make - especially if they involve family, friends, peers etc. But the key to effective leadership is to be objective and to consider the bigger picture. For example, as much as my relationship with Gerry goes, I care more about the greater good - of the DAO. Businesses rise and fall based on the quality of the leadership, regardless of the fact that in most cases it’s the workers who end up making successes happen. To that end, I listed all my grievances in order to better articulate why I made the decision to write this AIP. Even though I already knew that I would get a lot of public & private flak and derision for it, even from guys like @0xSword who I have a good relationship with, I felt that it was the right thing to do because the alternative is to retain the status quo. Where has that gotten the DAO thus far?
We need change, and that’s not going to happen without an AIP like this. Yes - the final decision is up to the community to vote, and so, we may very well end up retaining the status quo; but maybe - just maybe - the retained SC will recognize the power of an AIP such as this, the mistakes that need to be corrected, and opt to do the right thing for the greater good. I believe that too can happen. And given that I am notorious for being tenacious and resilient, if this AIP fails and still nothing changes, I will just keep writing new ones. In fact, that will be proof positive that I was right to even write up this first one.
And if at some point I determine that WebSlingers are just a carbon copy of what the SC is doing and wants to do, I will focus my attention on them too. I can do this for as long as it takes. I’m not going anywhere. But one way or another, change is coming to this DAO. And if down the road nothing changes, my next move will be to write-up an AIP to dissolve the DAO and start over. Now that I have concluded the research on that, and spoken to some friends of mine who are legal experts, I have thus far not seen nor heard anything that says I can’t attempt it - even though it would require production of the DAO formation docs, which, shockingly none of us have even seen thus far. And to that end, from discussions with those legal experts, I was going to either add a section requesting them in this AIP or just write-up a new AIP for them. To get a better idea of the legalities surrounding DAOs and why it may become necessary to dissolve and start from scratch, please read this primer by the Harvard Law School.
I need to keep repeating this. You can’t keep going against the tide while hedging for your turn in a lucrative paid DAO position. So, for someone like me - who has zero interest in any of that, and who can’t be bought, coerced, bribed etc. - my motivation is to always do the best that I can. Heck, my game AIP failed spectacularly because it wasn’t what the voting community wanted. I get it. And that still doesn’t faze me. That’s why I’m still here. I’m not one of those guys who writes up an AIP, it fails and they’re never to be seen again. I am but one person, but usually, and in all of history, that’s all it tends to take.
Back when I was writing my voting AIP-318, later withdrawn, I considered this. However, mathematically it will not be as effective in our DAO given the size of the voting wallets. The end result is that, for example, a wallet with 4.8M $APE would still have an exceptionally huge advantage. In fact, somewhere in my Notion dB, I still have a printout of the math model that I used. I will see if I can dig it up and share because it’s very detailed. I will probably run a new model because at the time, that wallet - one of the largest - was around 1M $APE. In fact, ahead of AIP-304 going live, having read up on the wallet owner who was unfamiliar to me at the time, I even sent a message to the Special Council regarding my findings and why they needed to be cautious etc. It was part of my bid as to why I believed that we needed to change the voting system because high-value impactful AIPS needed to be subject to stricter voting or we run the risk of the voting being rigged in a bid to drain the treasury. Then, an 11M $APE AIP passed without even needing the whale wallet which had grown to 4.1M $APE at the time of the vote. The community at large, by their votes, supported the AIP - and that’s all that matters. Which is why I stated in my AIP that I can’t in good conscience begrudge whales because they were given this voting power - which can be used for good or bad to benefit or detriment of the DAO. However, it’s interesting to note that if we had a 1 person (wallet) = 1 vote system, the AIP would have failed spectacularly. I have that model too.
ps. I love and support what ThankApe is doing for the community, and I have said so many times. To the extent that I do believe that they should be better funded because obviously what they’re doing is working. However, it’s a double-edged sword because once they get bigger, they’re also going to attract larger wallet voters. And that’s when their voting formula would need to be revised or they run into the same problems that we currently have here in the DAO.
This is way to easy to game.
I think it is either 1 ape = 1 ape, 2 ape = 2 ape etc. or if there is a component maybe a multiplier 20% max for the social capital contribution from activities, such as on discourse, twitter, passing an AI etc.
I can support something along the lines of those contribution qualifiers because I have always agreed that whales should be recognized (not sure what for tbh) to some degree.
But, to be clear, if I am understanding you correctly, you are aware that:
1 ape = 1 ape
2 ape = 2 ape
1M ape = 1M ape
…doesn’t change anything in terms of “voting power”, right?
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Hi ApeCoin DAO Community,
@SmartAPE has completed editing their AIP Idea to be their AIP Draft.
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