AIP-359: Special Council Vote of No Confidence


Special Council Vote Of No Confidence




The goal of this AIP is for the community to vote on the merits of the role tasks performed by the Special Council members of the Ape Foundation.

In a time of much economic uncertainty as well as the rapidly declining value of the $APE token and its failure to reach its intended goals, this AIP also seeks to reduce the number of Special Council members, reduce their salaries in the process, and enforce strict professional guidelines for the nominations of the Special Council members.


APE-1 set specific rules for DAO governance. And some of those rules and guidelines are the subject of this AIP.

“APE Foundation, which will serve the ApeCoin DAO community and be governed by it, aims to be the heart of art, gaming, entertainment, and events on the blockchain.

A Board member may be removed and replaced prior to the term pursuant to a majority vote of token holders.”

The DAO is spending the following on the Ape Foundation:

  • $1,249,980 per year on Special Council salaries of $20,833 per month - for each member

  • $900K per year on WebSlinger (admin, finance etc) of $75K per month

  • Undisclosed sums to third-parties (e.g. Meta Law and others)

As a startup created around Mar 22, the Special Council has thus far failed not only to adhere to the guidelines setup by the founders, but has also placed itself above those very same guidelines in terms of performance, transparency and accountability. Some examples:

  1. It has failed to provide explanation to the community as to the provenance surrounding a $2.5M loan that is a part of the DAO financial reports. You can find additional discussions in this thread.

  2. It has failed to provide the DAO community with audited financial reports as specified and required by the very same RFC that hired the previous Cartan Group and their replacement, the current WebSlingers group. You can read more about that in this thread.

  3. It has failed to adhere to the very same AIP-2 that created the voting process in which the community that voted on it was assured - by the language of the AIP - that “Without a voting system in place, arriving at consensus on proposals would be centralized, with only a few people holding decision-making abilities. This proposal aims to avoid this result.” The resulting and much-maligned voting system, in the form of a few whale wallets (people) controlling the outcomes of the voting, has failed to uphold this simple concept of fairness and equality.

  4. It has failed to meet the goals and direction of the DAO by refusing to take steps towards the prosperity of the DAO in terms of the automation and speedy resolutions to approved AIPs. You can see the ramifications of this issue and #3 above with a glance at the secretary’s curated list of AIPs and their dispositions.

  5. It has failed to meet the accountability and transparency pledged to the DAO community in many instances. To the extent that it recently required an AIP-282 (what does the SC actually do) and AIP-305 (accountability practices).

  6. It has seemingly placed itself above the rules of the DAO by refusing to honor an AIP request by a long-standing community member. In the fiasco over AIP-277 which sought to reduce the SC salaries, the author was advised that his AIP could not be sent to vote due to the fact that if it passed - as by all accounts it would have - it would require the Ape Foundation to breach current employment contracts that it had signed. And so, the author had to put up another AIP-337 which only took into account future SC salaries. In addition to that, another drama related to the Special Council salaries is currently in full swing over in this thread.

  7. It has failed, as per “See Phase 9: Implementation, item at #3” to disclose to the DAO community the failure in the disposition of approved AIPs. To wit, AIP-209 was voted for in May 2023. According to this post by the AIP author it still wasn’t funded as of Aug 9, 2023. For such an expensive and impactful AIP, despite several inquiries, the SC has thus far failed to provide any insight as to why this AIP was not funded during that time span, nor to the current disposition of said AIP. There are several other examples of this. I will, upon request, provide a complete list in a follow-up comment.

  8. Despite the fact that the DAO was set-up as a not-for-profit grants governing body, the historical record of the grants offered has created a situation whereby a litany of whale wallets - who probably would rather not see the treasury be spent because it affects their holdings - determine the outcome and disposition of even the most impactful AIPs which clearly benefit the DAO. The Special Council has failed to take steps to uphold and maintain the fairness and equality that the founding members envisioned and intended for the DAO; and one in which One APE equals One APE was the rallying cry.


A “No Confidence” vote, common in corporate environments, sends a clear signal that the community cares about how its leaders are managing the DAO and its interests, and that elected members of the Special Council are required to adhere to the guidelines imposed by the DAO, and that by its very nature, the Special Council is accountable to the DAO community as a whole, and further, that it is not above the DAO rules and guidelines because One APE equals One APE - no exceptions.


  1. Terminate the contracts of two (2) members of the Special Council with thirty (30) day notice to the affected members.

  2. Send all five (5) Special Council names for DAO-wide vote. As an approved part of this AIP, this vote will go up in a format similar to AIP-256 where voters will vote for the two (2) people whose contracts should be terminated upon the passing of this AIP but with no “None Of The Above” option. The options are to be a total of five (5) names of the Special Council members only.

  3. Going forward and on the passing of this AIP, require all new Special Council elections are to adhere to strict professional guidelines & qualifications for nominations for candidates with C Suite/Level experience and qualifications.

  4. Going forward and on the passing of this AIP, require all members in new Special Council elections are to submit resumes along with their nominations. And these docs should remain visible on the ApeCoin DAO website and Discourse forum for as long as their contract is in force.

  5. Require WebSlinger to conduct third-party audited financial reports as part of the DAO quarterly financials provided to the secretary of the DAO. This data would be made available to the DAO members via the treasury reports created by the treasurer.

  6. Require the Special Council and/or WebSlinger to make available to the DAO community the official formation docs and bylaws of the DAO, including but not limited to any and all foreign and domestic documents thus far created, presently or in the future, and which pertain to the formation, administration and operation of the DAO. And these docs should be visible on the ApeCoin DAO website and Discourse forum.

  7. Require the Special Council and/or WebSlinger to disclose to the DAO community the borrower and provenance of the $2.5M loan present in its financial reports. We now believe these borrowers to be parties named Wintermute and Alameda; but we still require official confirmation as well as the details of these loans.

  8. Require the Special Council to ratify and confirm that any contracts signed by members of the Special Council, Governance Working Group, Secretary - and all future hires - are subject to termination with or without cause as per AIP-1.

  9. Require the Special Council to ratify and confirm that, going forward, an AIP submitted by a DAO member will only be rejected based on approved guidelines as per " Phase 6: Administrative Review" of AIP-1. The goal here is to prevent a repeat of the AIP-277 fiasco.

  10. Require the Special Council and/or WebSlinger to implement fair and equitable voting reform in which the concept of “one ape [person] equals one ape” is maintained and the role of whale wallets in our voting system equitably adjusted to the benefit of all apes. The mechanics and implementation of this is at the discretion of collectively WebSlinger, Special Council and the Governance Working Group (herein the “Group”) who are to collaborate on the creation of an equitable and fair solution. No voting for a final solution will be required. Instead, a Discourse forum topic will be created for the notification and discussion of whatever solution the Group have agreed to implement. This discussion period should take no more than 7 days, after which the discussion will be closed. During this 7-day period, any suggestions to the proposed implementation will be solely at the discretion of the Group.

  11. Require the Special Council and/or WebSlinger to implement a more seamless (automated where necessary) and quicker process for the processing of AIPs, with a view to reducing the time it takes for an AIP to go from draft to admin review to voting, and for that time span to take no more than 21 days from the date of AIP draft to date of Snapshot voting.

All items are to be implemented effectively upon the passing of the AIP and are to be concluded within 60 days of the AIP passing.


0 ApeCoin

Derek help me out a little.

If 51% of the community votes against the idea of firing the SC, we dissolve the DAO?

If 74% of people in favor, then we Fire the SC and dissolve the DAO?

If 10% of people vote for this, the SC keep their jobs but we still dissolve the DAO?

And if 76% of the DAO votes in favor of firing the SC, we fire the SC but the DAO survives?

Am I reading that correctly?

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Dear Apes,

Seeing as I am already having background discussions with various members of our community, I find myself repeating the same things. And so, I have decided to write this short explanation to explain why I have taken this action.

To be honest, this has been brewing for quite some time, but this new AIP thread and the exchanges within were the last straw for me.

I am old school and hail from a time when community activity was based on goodwill, honesty, and companionship. The best communities, run by the best and kindest people, all carry out roles for the benefit of the community - for FREE. Contributing your time, effort and energy, from the goodness of your heart and for the benefit of your community, shouldn’t come at a cost or for a fee. And certainly not one that costs you your soul.

Though it was a bit rough for me at the start, I came to understand the very many eclectic and diverse people here. There are no heroes and villains, friends or foes. It’s just us. And like all communities, we will have our disagreements, our victories and our failures. We will choose sides, make our alliances, and stand our ground for the things that we believe in. The key to all of these ups and downs, is mutual respect. To that end, everything that I have done and written here has been in the furtherance of these simple goals. I think that my involvement in the community, coupled with the exceptional amount of time and engagement that I have given, stands for something. And if nothing else, it should stand as testament to my goodwill, dedication and good intentions.

I harbor no ill will, and my goal is not to divide the community. Regardless, if you want to make an omelet, you have to break a few eggs.

  • Our community isn’t growing. It is stagnant.
  • Our token is headed to zero - and nobody wants to touch it. At least not without intrinsic incentives.
  • Investors make money off our situation by, at every opportunity, shorting the token.
  • Whales - by the rights granted by our founders, and through no fault of their own - control our voting process to their benefit. I cannot in good conscience blame them for the power granted to them.
  • AIPs which, on their face, clearly benefit the DAO, get routinely killed by whales. The metrics are there for all to see. This is no secret.
  • Some of our leaders are clearly skirting the rules, thereby inadvertently making themselves kings. Thus, we as a community, collectively have no power; despite that which was granted to us by the founders.
  • The mandate and role of the DAO as a grants body is laughed at because deep down, there isn’t a single sensible person on this Gods Earth who thinks that a body that was seeded to the tune of $1B is just going to give it all away - and that the powers that be are just going to allow it.
  • There are far too many backroom dealings and discussions going on behind the scenes and in which power players shape the direction of the DAO and to the detriment of the community they’re supposed to serve and guide.
  • The Ape Foundation is spending money in ways that do not - in any way, shape of form - bring tangible benefit to the DAO. Even for a non-profit org.
  • The DAO is already engaged in legal action pertaining to the token, and for which, according to our financials, it has been spending copious amounts of money to litigate. At some point, the regulators will come - and we are not prepared for that fight.

All those things harm the community. An AIP for change, such as this, doesn’t harm it.

I have no interest in any DAO position in its current state.

I was previously interested in the Metaverse Working Group where I can be effective in garnering support for the community and to bring builders to the token. But the DAO is inefficient, it’s tribalized, it’s politicized - and most people don’t want to change things for the better. Aside from the fact that getting budgets passed for anything is a gruesome task etc. And so, unless the DAO changes, all I would be doing, if voted into a position, is drawing a salary for getting nothing done. I make enough money in my field. And so, I don’t need to sully my rep for no reason if I end up in a situation where I am ineffective through no fault of my own. I am old school like that, and I believe in rewarding progress. Besides, there’s nothing that I am doing now - for free - that I wouldn’t again do for free if it benefits the community in some way. With that, I withdrew from my name from the list several months ago.

I tried again to bring change by way of a community action group, The Ape Assembly, where I believed that my input would be valuable. The chaos in the AA led me to write two AIPs (here and here) complement each other. I did that in an attempt to help the DAO prosper in some way. And I did that for free, in much the same way that I offer guidance to people (even those here in our community) who ask for my advice, mentorship or opinions.

In short, I have kept trying my best to make a difference. But, I came to the conclusion that it was all for naught and that the DAO needed to change for any meaningful change to come.

I love this community and I would love to see it prosper.

I urge you all to set your feelings aside, read the facts in the AIP, and consider everything that you have read, seen, experienced - and done for the community.

The DAO is a startup, and so, it has the unique benefit of enacting a radical pivot for the better. If it means burning it all down and starting over from a sound foundation with clear rules and guidelines which adhere to the changing times, and elect new leaders with impeccable and unimpeachable reputations and experience, that’s what we should do.

We are Apes. We can do this. We should do this.



It is…difficult…to encourage & support some of your initiatives when proposals like this come out of nowhere. Can understand and relate to some of your frustrations. Consider that maybe this could be harmful to the APE community. I’m sorry for your experience here so far. Your biz dev working group idea could be a game-changer.

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Hi Gerry - actually, I was about to address that because someone asked me the same thing in DM. But as I was writing a follow-up (above), I didn’t get around to addressing it.

I came up with a 75% number for specific reasons based on a model that I created and ran. It was running when I put up the AIP, and I didn’t wait for the results. Once those results came in, I edited the AIP to include the 75% figure. You can probably see the change using the pencil icon in the AIP.

You are not reading it correctly. And if someone, such as yourself, doesn’t understand the metrics, then it means that I have failed to clearly articulate my intentions. To that end, I will explain the logic - and subsequently edit the AIP for clarity as-needed.

Here is the logic model behind that [added] 75% number.

The standard avg for AIPs that pass and for which whale wallets are involved and responsible for the outcome, is currently at 53%. To be honest, this amount shocked me quite a bit as I was expecting it to be higher, given the general sentiments towards whales controlling our voting system.

The 51% needed for an AIP to pass, relies on a 19% avg abstain rate which, by itself, doesn’t affect the voting to any meaningful extent. In fact, as luck (?) would have it, this was demonstrated in my own AIP-316 which failed spectacularly in a vote controlled by the very same whale wallets in which 96.44% of wallet tokens - not people - voted to kill it.

For the record, AIP-2 passed with a 97.2% threshold, and AIP-138 passed with 99.9%.

As the voting system is already skewed in favor of whale wallets, and given that impactful AIPs require not only major outreach but also involvement of influential whales, it stands to reason that any AIP that seeks to either change the voting process or terminate the contracts of their friends, will fail - WITHOUT - the consideration of the community at large. Why? Because the voting system, by design, doesn’t adhere to the “One APE equals One APE” guideline. It’s why I had previously created an AIP for voting reform, but withdrew it after seeing the metrics and realizing that it stood no chance of passing due to it revising the voting power of the very whales who have every incentive to vote against it - thus killing it.

And so, as this is about an impactful and detrimental change, a 75% (it’s actually 74.89%) pass threshold ensures that the community at large has a larger input into changes either in the form of the specified DAO changes or its complete dissolution and reboot. As I am all but certain that 75% is an achievable threshold, going by avg metrics, then it means that, regardless of what happens, change - by way of this AIP - can happen. So yes, we either make a radical change or we kill the DAO. That basically amounts to a poison pill incursion.

And this is the sort of thing that gets discussed during admin review to ensure that it doesn’t run afoul of Phase 6: Administrative Review, at item #4 & 5 of AIP-1 which states:

  • Reasons to tag as “Return for Reconstruction” or “Return for Clarification” may include but are not limited to:
    • Cost to implement unclear/not able to be calculated (tagged as “Return for Clarification”)
    • Proposes to use more than 5% of the Ecosystem Fund (tagged as “Return for Clarification”)
    • Conflicts with another proposal (tagged as “Return for Clarification”)
    • Proposal is at odds with the mission/values of the DAO (tagged as “Return for Reconstruction”)
    • Proposal is at odds with the well-being of the DAO (tagged as “Return for Reconstruction”)
    • Violations of law, or against advice of counsel for APE Foundation (tagged as “Return for Reconstruction”)
    • Reasonable suspicion of fraud or other misleading information (tagged as “Return for Reconstruction”)

If the founders didn’t think that replacing board (aka Special Council) members was a needed remedy - for any reason - they wouldn’t have created that condition. And similarly, if they didn’t want a community to control the direction and future of its treasury and token, they wouldn’t have created a process by which the community specifically has that level of control.

That said, it is my hope that this AIP doesn’t end up being a repeat of AIP-277 because that would be a very - very - bad thing for all of us; and which I am 100% certain will test the DAO’s legal protections because the public tenets of the DAO and which were created by the founders and subsequently memorialized in AIP-1, are not open to interpretation. They are clear.


  • Boldness: We don’t shy away from the weird, the hard, or the new.
  • Equality: One APE equals one APE.
  • Transparency: Processes and decisions are shared openly with the community.
  • Collective Responsibility: We leave everything better than we found it.
  • Persistence: Success is an ouroboros, not a straight line.

I look forward to working with the Special Council on this AIP and to see that it goes through the admin review process in a timely manner.

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Thanks for your thoughts. I understand and respect them completely and without malice or any reservations.

That said, a motion for change isn’t “harmful” to a community. If we can’t change things, and if we don’t stand up for something, everything will fall.

I stand by my decision, and thus have no regrets. Whatever comes next is on me; and so, I alone will bear the responsibility and ramifications - if any - for this action taken.

I just want for there to be change - for the better because clearly the status quo isn’t working.

Actions like todays make it difficult for me to want to be supportive* of what you’re doing in the ecosystem. This is very unexpected! If you cant understand why this above proposal could never get through review, or why any mention of -very- bad consequences and legal is unnacceptable, there’s nothing anyone can do to help. There’s absolutely no path forward that I can see where this doesnt harm the community and cause upsets. It sets up for another year of “As The Bananas Spoil,” an awful TV show. It might be time for you to look at doing other things for a while. I say that with no malice. For your own inner peace, if nothing else.


It is unfortunate that you feel this way. While I vehemently disagree with these sentiments in their entirety, I respect your opinions and your right to have them.

To be clear, as to the legal part, I believe that you are referring to this final paragraph.

“That said, it is my hope that this AIP doesn’t end up being a repeat of AIP-277 because that would be a very - very - bad thing for all of us; and which I am 100% certain will test the DAO’s legal protections because the public tenets of the DAO and which were created by the founders and subsequently memorialized in AIP-1, are not open to interpretation. They are clear.”

To that end, you are misunderstanding the intent of that comment. I can provide clarity.

The DAO is an organization that is bound by legal guidelines. It’s why they have attorneys. If the Special Council fails to adhere to legal guidance and act outside the realms of their contracts, they open the DAO to liabilities. You know how that happens? If they act with impunity to skirt the rules and against legal (for which we have attorneys) guidance. I have already explained this in a previous post which you can still find here.

I hope that’s clear now.

Makes no sense. You can’t instruct an action if an AIP fails to pass.

Not to mention you don’t represent the people you list here.

Also stop making up lies regarding one ape = one person rhetoric.

one ape = one vote as all ApeCoin is treated equally. This was the original intention and has not been changed.

You don’t like it, fine just say so, not twist historic facts with outright lies. You want a system where there is no incentive to hold more than one ApeCoin as a governance token. In fact you are trying to not make ApeCoin remain a governance token and then what?

This AIP has far too many different things that are all slammed into one post. If you have one specific thing, which could actually be voted on write it. The many ideas above in its current form I cannot see a way it can even get to go to snapshot.


It does make sense to me because I wrote it. If it doesn’t make sense to you. That’s a different thing.

That’s not relevant because it’s not about “representation”. It’s about “recommendation”. There’s a difference.

So, interpretations are lies now? Is that it? And who said they had been changed? I am referencing it in terms of the voting system for which it was clearly related to.

Again, your interpretation is flawed and without merit. You should probably read the relevant AIPs again.

The concept of “One APE equals One APE” (see AIP-1) is not manifested in a voting system (see AIP-2) that yields results in which one APE holds more voting equity over another APE. How has this simple concept proven so difficult for you to grasp - in all our exchanges (do you want the links?) related to this?

If I have more voting power over you and in a community where votes determine outcomes, then we’re NOT equal.

If APE #1 has 1 $APE while APE #2 has 100 $APE, how is that conducive to equality? And how does it manifest itself in the “One APE equals One APE” guiding principle?

And the founders envisioned a system that was subject to change. And they made allowances for that.

It’s my AIP and I alone get to determine what goes into it. If you have anything constructive that I determine would improve on it, do feel free to share and I will make that determination. Until then, it’s my call - not yours. Don’t like it? Don’t vote for it. That’s the whole point.

In various discussions surrounding this AIP, I have come to the conclusion that the “poison pill” that I included in the AIP has proven to be a confusing distraction of sorts.

If this AIP fails to pass with a minimum 75% in favor, then the DAO - in its entirety - would be dissolved, all contracts terminated, and the management of the treasury multi-sig handed over to Yat Siu (previous SC member), Gerry (current SC member) and Amplify (current GwG steward) - all active and trusted members of the community. In addition, the contracts of WebSlingers would be maintained for as long as is necessary for an orderly wind-down of DAO operations. We start from scratch if needed. It’s the only way to be sure.

And to avoid any additional drama surrounding it, as well as protracted back and forth in admin review, coupled with the fact that it is still unclear to me whether or not the DAO can in fact be dissolved via an AIP, I have removed that part from this AIP. After I have concluded my research, and if it becomes necessary, I will create a separate AIP specifically for that.

To be clear, I am of the opinion that the best solution for the DAO is to close it and rebuild it from scratch with new rules and guidelines created by the community, for the community and one which is compliant with regulations, while designed to be a profitable enterprise that “promotes a diverse and self-sustaining ecosystem” and which benefits from all that we have learned since the inception of this DAO.

Sorry for the confusion, but Rome wasn’t built in a day.

Noone in the BAYC that I know of capitalizes APE unless they’re talking about $APE

I believe that may be where some of your misinterpretation has come from.


I have mentioned this to you time and time again, so have others - when people say APE they almost always mean the token. Only you keep referring it to as a “person” and insist on using it that way. You continue to interpret it that way and keep confusing everyone. Very few people remember to put the $ in front of the token symbol.

Do you know where 1 APE = 1 APE comes from? It comes from the bitcoin community that loves to say 1 btc = 1 btc. You can read more about it here. It’s just coincidence that we have a token symbol APE which can be interpreted directly to mean “human”. Everyone else is pretty clear on this except you.

You constantly twist the founding guideline as 1 ape = 1 ape as a reference to 1 human = 1 vote. If you were familiar with the crypto world you would know it always refers to the token being equal no matter who owned it and that its worth was self referential. This is pretty much the only, and the obvious interpretation. The origin like i said is “1 btc = 1 btc”. Google it. And please don’t keep repeating this clearly wrong interpretation that has no history.

With regards to voting with governance tokens, that guideline implies that a random person’s 10 APE vote is equal to SC member’s 10 APE vote. All APE votes are equal. i.e. people don’t have preferred votes, or special votes like in the corporate world.

That may be. However, the founders capitalized it for a reason. And from a linguistics point of view their use of APE vs Ape is inconsequential; and certainly bears no relevance to the token per se. Instead, theirs was a democratic inference that denotes equality in the community. In that regard, to me, APE and Ape are interchangeable.

Regardless of the notation and use, the equality inference cannot be ignored. And so, if we take that equality at face value we can then apply it to the APE|Ape community of equals. And if one APE|Ape has more voting power than another, then they’re not equal. The end result is a lopsided tiered system akin to seat classes in an aircraft or even in society as a whole.

We simply cannot ignore the fact that the founders went to great lengths to drive home the equality of the community they were creating. And they absolutely envisioned a situation whereby one Ape could have more power than another. And so they allowed the delegation of votes, not just as a decision making caucus but also as a way to have a coalition of people - for whatever reason - to have a voice.

No community is perfect. We all know that the voting system is a burden to the survival and prosperity of the DAO. But, playing devil’s advocate, I would say that creating a situation where the most influential get to rule and shape the direction of the DAO - and the treasury - is probably as intended. Nobody wants to say the quiet part out loud, and so I have kept doing it because someone has to: I don’t believe that they intended for a group of degens to just deplete the treasury out of the goodness of their hearts.

At the end of the day, the issue is simple and clear in that our voting system isn’t based on equality. And that inequality is derived from the fact that one APE with more tokens has more votes - and thus power - than another APE with less. And I am not the only one who is aware of this. As I type this, there’s another AIP-342 that’s seeking to address this very same problem.

I am aware of all that, even before you and others started and continue to explain it - and to great detail.

And yet still, with all the interpretations, we end up at the same junction. That being the inference is one of equality. The decision to ignore this simple thing is quite puzzling to me; even as I have consistently indicated that when it comes to the voting system, the equality of all people in the DAO is of great consequence - regardless of the interpretation inherent in a three letter notation.

Regardless, none of this is relevant to the incident AIP.

ps. Here in my voting reform AIP is a comment by Yat, an OG member of the Special Council. That entire thread, one of the largest on Discourse, encapsulates the issue surrounding the voting system and the APE nomenclature.

it doesn’t. How can I be more clear than I have? You say “I am aware of all that” but then type words that don’t seem to grasp the misinterpretation that leads to a completely different conclusion.

If you claim to be aware of what the origination of that phrase is, then you understand that the token is equal and that the owner doesn’t matter. The implication is the token is interchangeable. i.e. your 10 APE = my 10 APE. If this guideline wasn’t there, we could potentially create a system of elites where if you have a yuga NFT, your voting power is multiplied by 10x. This guideline stops that. Everyone gets the same voting power if they have the same amount of APE.

If we go by this, then the guideline is being followed. 1 APE = 1 APE. The only way you can interpret it as the guideline not being followed is if you interpret APE to mean human. Again, this is a wrong interpretation given that that phrase has provenance. So if APE means token, in our current voting system, 1 APE = 1 APE. That’s how it is currently. We don’t “end up at the same junction”. We end up in totally different places which makes your starting thesis (the guideline is not being followed) flawed.

In the comment you point out you can clearly see yat constantly saying “APE” referring to the token. I don’t think he used the $ once.

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I am going to say this for the last time, and then just move on because circular arguments are a waste of time and achieve nothing.

The spelling or use of the term is irrelevant. What’s relevant is how it applies to the issue of equality, which in turn, relates to the voting powers. Do feel free to ignore this as you see fit.

ps. You might want to read this other comment by Yat.

I agree. I would appreciate if you could stop quoting the founding guidelines and grossly misrepresenting it to fit your narrative. It wasn’t written the way your interpret it. That much is clear.


Interpretations are subjective. I stand by mine. You don’t have to like it, and that’s OK. You just have to make peace with it.

I think what matters here is that from the point-of-view of the AIP’s author, 1 ape (meaning 1 human) having an equal vote to another ape, is a superior form of governance to 1 $APE = 1 $APE. From there people can agree or disagree. The initial DAO statement made by the founders would have been more clear if they said $APE vs. APE.

I do think seeing the massive influence that Machi currently has with his voting power should be at least concerning to people. I do not personally believe having that much centralized power in a decentralized system is a good thing. AIPs currently live and die by the opinions of one person, unless there is truly a massive number of votes who rally against that singular person’s vote. This AIP, especially in its original form, was a “nuclear” option to fix that. But of course whether or not the current system is a problem is a matter of opinion. I’ve shared mine.