For an AIP like mine, which has been in totally opaque admin review for months, there should have been a clear legal check that shows whether it was approved, then a clear admin check that shows whether it is in conflict with the DAOs mission. That should have taken no more than a week. That would need to be done by two humans, neither of whom needs a six-figure salary.
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Question in terms of the ability to Appeal.
As far I know, and understand it to be, it seems like most things are one way.
Meaning, if something is passed, its written to be accelerated, implemented, and accepted… but with no recourse, appellate forum, or check-in to see if the things that were proposed, are actually completed, implemented, or properly followed thru on.
Do we, or should we, need the ability to “appeal” things?
In both directions.
Maybe thats something a Parliament type of group, could spin up.
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Summary of the Special Council job
Responsibilities:
- Enhance communication between the community and the DAO Admin Team
- Communicate with AIP (ApeCoin Improvement Proposal) authors during implementation and report progress to the community
- Schedule and publish regular communication with the DAO Admin Team, making it publicly available weekly
- Follow up with authors of accepted AIPs and publish a weekly public report on AIP statuses
- Retain existing responsibilities outlined in AIP-1 and AIP-426, including determining if further action is required for pending AIPs
Requirements:
- Future Special Council members will not be subject to non-disclosure agreements with the DAO Admin Team
- 6-month “cooling-off” period before a departing Special Council member can work with entities that contract with the DAO
- Conduct themselves with impartiality and avoid any appearance of conflicts of interest
- Have been a Discourse member for at least 6 months prior and achieved a minimum of Trust Level 2 on Discourse
The above scope of work seems to increase transparency, but it may not work without well defined accountability. I guess some current and former SCs have long known what the problem here is but still have not taken steps to correct it. Only a cool-looking phrase, “no more dumb shxt," that’s it.
Btw, the AIP process still has large space for improvement. For my AIP-500 as an example, I answered the questions requested by admin on 21st Aug, but have not received any updates since then until I decided to withdraw it on 6th Oct. Furthermore, those questions are just a template and not feedback on my proposal; some of my answers are just a copy and paste from proposal content.
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This definitely seems not to be unique to you. I know I have personally encountered it with AIP-396 and @DavidW is also currently dealing with it.
What it comes down to IMO, is accountability. We can design the best processes and rules around, but if we don’t have a viable way to enforce them, they aren’t worth anything.
I agree with @furiousanger that “people” may not be the best way to solve this, given people are what created the problem in the first place (though I know there are individuals who would very much take this seriously and deliver.)
I would like us to explore what processes can be built on-chain to solve for the failure modes that the current manual process has created.
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Beside this, the DAO also needs to identify the assets owned to date, e.g., treasury, domain, website/project source code, etc., and then reclarify the ownership and authority.
Or else everything may still remain the same. Only me feels weird about those GwG initiatives not including apecoin.com but having its own sites that cost the DAO more funds to maintain and distract users. Or even minor updates to DAO’s thing require an AIP?
Is Ape Foundation an entity supported by Special Council (currently has 4 SCs) and Administrators (currently has 3 Facilitators) only, with no unknown people in power in it? 
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On chain voting is coming for sure. But that doesn’t solve the need for communications with the community, AIP authors and the facilitators. Eliminating the Special Council without understanding who will do those jobs, how much it will cost, and how the DAO will operate after will do the same thing to us that AIP-466 did; we will be at the mercy of contractors to do those jobs and at an unknown cost to the DAO.
The DAO still needs to have someone that all parties can communicate with in regard to the jobs that the SC is currently doing. Someone will need to sign to move an AIP from the draft phase to voting to implementation even if there is a mechanism to keep track on chain. That someone should also be able to answer questions from the community in a public forum on at least a weekly basis. Legal and the facilitators do not respond to emails from the community.
I’ll provide a personal example that I have also heard many times from others. I submitted an MBA application for my law practice with Yuga and @badteeth contacted me to let me know that it could not move forward until I removed the ApeCoin logo from my website. I expressed to @badteeth that I only had the ApeCoin logo there to let the public know that we accepted ApeCoin for payment and that I did not think that the DAO should discourage vendors from telling the public that they also accept ApeCoin for payment. He referred me to @AllCityBAYC who said that he would see no issues but suggested that I email trademarks@apecoin.com for a “more direct answer” which I did more than 30 days ago but have not received any response.
If that is the kind of time that the DAO wants it to take to have a seemingly very simple question answered then I say, go ahead with eliminating the Special Council and rely solely on 3rd party contractors that have no accountability to the community. But, I would suggest that we make sure have an RFP from those contractors to do those jobs BEFORE we eliminate the Special Council because otherwise we will be at the mercy of 3rd party contractors to keep the wheels on at a time when the DAO needs to have leadership and accountability more than ever.
End of the day, that decision should be up to a DAO vote long before any plans are made to eliminate the Special Council. My suggestion is that we pass the RESET plan, elect three Special Council members that will implement this plan and put voting on chain for maximum transparency, and only then decide whether we should put up an AIP to authorize an RFP to do the jobs that the community wants to hire a 3rd party firm to do those jobs. Only then will the community be able to make an informed decision based upon the best available information. We may end up finding out that the kind of engagement that the DAO community wants will cost the DAO more than we are currently paying the 5 Special Council members.
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Totally agree with having accountability.
What I’m trying to ask is how much of this can be programmed in on-chain so that fewer people are necessary?
I have no idea if the following is technically feasible, but here is the example I have in my head:
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AIP author submits AIP proposal on-chain
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Proposal goes through the idea phase for 7 days with commentary all on-chain
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After 7 days, the author can click “Extend” or “Proceed” in the system. If nothing is selected, the AIP proceeds to Admin Review
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Humans (I didn’t get rid of all of them) review the AIP for legal risk and alignment to the DAO’s objectives. They have 14 days to flag any risks or other concerns to the DAO. These are recorded on-chain and are publicly available to the DAO. In 14 days, the AIP is automatically progressed to “Voting” and the AIP is assigned a number, whether the aforementioned humans have commented or not.
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Every 2 weeks, any AIP marked as “Voting” is automatically posted on an on-chain voting platform and the DAO votes on-chain as they do today.
Again, no clue how to go about putting something like this together, but it takes away the human component of progressing AIPs through the process, and prevents humans from delaying or preventing an AIP from going to vote. The DAO is informed of the risks associated with the AIP (should there be any) and can vote accordingly.
Would love any pushback on this line of thinking, as I’m sure there is something I’m missing.
I do think it remains a valid question of what the structure is for humans to help facilitate the AIP process. Does the current 4-5 member SC make the most sense? Can 1-2 individuals employed by the Ape Foundation do this? Is there a third option? Ideally in the end, it should cost no more (and hopefully significantly less) than the ~$50k monthly expense the DAO currently incurs with the SC.
As for the use of ApeCoin Trademarks, I would hope we can be equally creative in developing an on-chain, streamlined process for that as well.
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Love the ideas but would like to see them implemented BEFORE we remove the existing SC. @furiousanger seems to know more about the automation than I do and suggested that we should spend up to $10M on this automation for implementation within the next 2 years. I don’t think that it should cost so much nor do I think it should take more than a year to implement. I think we are all on board for increased transparency and on chain voting.
That being said, I still think that the community should have individuals that voted into positions who are held accountable for the actions of the DAO and who have at least weekly public recorded and transcripted communications with the community to relay what is happening with the DAO and answer questions from the the community. Maybe that will be less than 5 at some point in the future but for now, we have 5 dedicated Special Council members than are more than equipped to do this job. I say we give them a chance.
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Agree on having the new solution in place before removing the current one.
I fear failing to do so puts AIP funding for builders at risk.
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I have this experience, and yet I can honestly say that it’s not crazy to say that people without a proven track record can do it too. I think all that’s needed is a full-time person with the time+motivation to do the job and the freedom to ask for help around the community. There’s enough brainpower in ApeCoin DAO to more than compensate for lack of a proven track record.
Experience is great, but if they have another job taking up their time or are prohibited from interacting with the community, then I don’t think they’re more effective than a junior person with time to learn and the flexibility to figure it out.
That might be a tough one. I’m struggling to think of how this would be accomplished even if they were doxxed. I haven’t been able to find the APE Foundation docs or SC contracts, but if it’s anything like Sandbox’s, then the only fiduciaries are in the APE Foundation. SC almost seem like support contractors to the APE Foundation from what I’ve researched.
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Re:
- Cooling-off Period
- For a 6-month period: Any future Special Council member who departs their position, regardless of the circumstances of their departure, may not partner with, freelance for, consult for, contract with, or be employed by any entity or individual that has contracted with or plans to contract with the Foundation or the DAO during the 6-month period.
This may be illegal and/or against non-compete related laws in certain jurisdictions. And for an industry like crypto, I don’t find this to be in alignment with the progressive underpinnings of this industry.
I urge you to recalibrate this
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This may be illegal and/or against non-compete related laws in certain jurisdictions
Recalibrate it as in remove it entirely?
I’m surprised to see you say it isn’t in alignment with progressive underpinnings. A cooling-off period guards against a scenario where a member leaves their DAO position on a Monday to join a corporation on a Tuesday and become lead negotiator of that corporation while it is in negotiations with a DAO for funding. On Tuesday, that newly minted lead negotiator gets to use their knowledge against the DAO they were part of on Monday.
That seems unfair and unethical to me, and it seems progressive to me because of the ethical concern.
Thoughts?
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I received some clarification from @ernestlee 
and also thank you for your response as well. Super appreciate the awesome communication and clarity
I meant recalibrate as in clear up the language so there (hopefully) isn’t a legal issue with the framing moving forward in some jurisdictions re: non-compete. In general, I understand the ways in which people can weaponize their positions and (perceived) power within DAOs; I have war stories for DAYSS, however, I would love to see this reframed as a conflict of interest rather than a non-compete. Open to language, so, just a suggestion.
I am super excited to see this AIP and more than anything, this community deserves open communication, accountability and transparency AT THE SAME DAMN TIME!
We ride at dawn!
Reference:
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Thank you Natalie for your input. A district court issued an order months after it was issued preventing enforcement of the rule against noncompete contracts. The FTC appealed that decision.
That being said, this provision of the RESET AIP is not a non-compete restriction but instead prohibits Special Council members from going to work for an AIP author immediately after leaving the DAO.
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Well tell ya what, Natalie. I had completely overlooked that until you mentioned it yesterday. I’m SUPER appreciative that you brought it up. I ended up reading this article here on a law firm’s website “…enjoining the FTC from implementing and enforcing its Rule. As a consequence of this decision, the FTC Rule will not take effect and cannot be enforced for the foreseeable future.”
Still, I think you’re on to something about reframing it as conflict of interest. Noncompete does strike me as having a negative perception due to the way it’s been weaponized against workers. I hoped that “cooling off” would soften it, but it’s probably still reads too much like noncompete. I’ll bring it up to Ernest and Aaron 
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It is important to review the original founding documents for the APE Foundation and the ApeCoin DAO when considering the changes that are currently being suggested by others for the DAO.
For example, some have suggested that we move the jobs of the Special Council to the APE Foundation rather than the current 5 elected individuals. The ApeCoin website clearly states that the Foundation “is designed to become more decentralized over time” not less. (See ApeCoin for the Web3 Economy, quoted below).
The APE Foundation
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The APE Foundation is the steward of ApeCoin. It is not an overseer, but the base layer on which ApeCoin holders in the ApeCoin DAO can build.
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The Foundation facilitates decentralized and community-led governance and is designed to become more decentralized over time. It is tasked with administering the decisions of the ApeCoin DAO, and is responsible for day-to-day administration, bookkeeping, project management, and other tasks that ensure the DAO community’s ideas have the support they need to become a reality.
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The goal of the APE Foundation is to steward the growth and development of the APE ecosystem in a fair and inclusive way. It utilizes the Ecosystem Fund, which is controlled by a multisig wallet, to pay its expenses as directed by the ApeCoin DAO and provides an infrastructure for ApeCoin holders to collaborate through open and permissionless governance processes."
The Board
The Special Council of the APE Foundation provides, at the behest of the ApeCoin DAO members, stewardship and oversight of the APE Foundation. The Special Council members exist to serve the vision of ApeCoin DAO.
It does this by the following, though they are not limited to the items listed below:
- Conducting detailed administrative reviews of AIPs according to the process outlined in AIP-1
- Ensuring the implementation of the ApeCoin DAO’s intentions and wishes as manifested through approved AIPs
- Safeguarding and stewarding the ApeCoin DAO treasury
- Serving as primary community liaisons with the APE Foundation and its service providers in Cayman Islands, facilitating open and effective communication channels
- Overseeing the APE Foundation administrators and other service providers, ensuring they execute their duties with efficiency and timeliness, aligned with the ApeCoin DAO’s objectives and values.
The RESET plan above would serve to accomplish the goal of becoming more decentralized over time while keeping the Board in place; accountable, transparent and subject to the vote of the community.
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To be clear, the ApeCoin website also provides that when voting mechanisms are placed on-chain, the DAO will hire members to take care of the tasks currently being performed by third-party contractors, creating a steering committee and moving to annual voting to elect Special Council members. See ApeCoin DAO Governance quoted below.
The Future of ApeCoin DAO
Over time, ApeCoin DAO will transition the proposal and voting mechanisms into a full, on-chain platform in a form determined by the community. The DAO can do this by:
- Hiring DAO members to take care of administrative, project management, and moderation tasks to replace the company appointed
- Creating a community steering committee
- Implementing on-chain voting
- Voting annually to elect members for the DAO’s Board (the initial Board is in place for a shorter term of six months)
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@ernestlee This part isn’t clear for me. Can you elaborate?
And to be clear, I am not advocating for the removal of SC without a thorough plan in place to replace ALL the responsibilities the DAO has given them over time.
I am simply trying to push the conversation forward toward a more decentralized and autonomous structure.
Maybe the hypothetical version I laid out is a step too far in terms of technical capability, cost, etc, but I do think it’s worth a discussion of just how close can we get to a version the DAO that is both more efficient while still being a place where members can fund their dreams.
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The existing plan for on-chain voting, quoted above from the ApeCoin website, included “Implementing on-chain voting” AND still “Voting annually to elect members for the DAO’s Board”; Special Council.
The RESET plan would do this and more; adding jobs for the Special Council to perform around communication and coordination between the DAO contractors and the community. These individuals would be beholden to the DAO and subject to removal by vote.
Additionally, the existing plan was also to bring the other jobs currently being performed by 3rd party contractors in-house by …
"Hiring DAO members to take care of administrative, project management, and moderation tasks to replace the company appointed" … to perform those tasks.
We believe that more transparency is needed, not less. We feel that migrating the tasks currently performed by the Special Council to 3rd party contractors is the exactly the opposite and wrong direction for the DAO and would result in less transparency for the community.
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