AIP-439: The Community Delegation


The Community Delegation


MocaChief, of the Mocaverse and Yuga communities as well as many others, is the creator of this proposal. Available on Twitter, Discord or the Apecoin forum, search Mocachief, happy to chat publicly or through DMs.

Additional pertinent information requested: Author has extensive experience as a manager of people as well as extensive experience within DAOs without any expectations of monetary returns. The author has been on many boards, committees and councils both IRL and in Web3. The author is a lover of Yuga, Web3 and the Apecoin DAO and is a believer in the potential to reshape the future of funding through DAOs. This author gains no monetary compensation or additional voting power through this proposal.

If this AIP were to be approved, the management of this vote would be conducted solely by the governance working group stewards.


This proposal aims to amplify the voice and vote of the community outside of the three largest delegations. This AIP calls for the creation of the “community wallet" managed by the Apecoin Governance Working Group Stewards that votes in alignment with the voting outside of the three voters. This wallet will receive six million APE from the Apecoin Ecosystem Fund and its only purpose is to delegate and safely store six million Apecoin. The “community wallet” will be a multisig wallet managed by the Apecoin Governance Working Group Stewards. This multisig wallet will then delegate to the “delegation wallet” which will also be managed by the Apecoin Governance Working Group Stewards. The “delegation wallet” will interact with Snapshot while the “community wallet” will only receive funds, delegate, then return funds after the expiration of this proposal.

The Governance Working Group Stewards will calculate the vote 9 hours before the vote ends and vote in alignment with the community’s vote excluding the top three voters. This aims to increase the equilibrium of the DAO and boost the impact of the broader Apecoin community.


This proposal aims to restore equilibrium to the Apecoin DAO… Here is an example of a recent vote with an above average voter turnout:

A recent vote with around 21,000,000 Apecoin Votes:

Delegation A: 7,000,000 (33% of vote)
Delegation B: 6,000,000 (28% of vote)
Delegation C: 2,000,000 (9% of vote)

These three delegations account for over 70% of the vote. If there were a 6,000,000 Apecoin vote based on the other 98%-99% of the voters, these top three major delegations would still have an immense impact on the voting. Here would be this same scenario with the 6,000,000 APE vote from the “community vote”.

Same proposal with 27,000,000 Apecoin votes accounting for the 6,000,000 APE community vote:

Delegation A: 7,000,000 (26% of the vote)
Delegation B: 6,000,000 (22% of the vote)
Delegation C: 2,000,000 (7% of the vote)
Community Vote: 6,000,000 (22% of the vote)

The community vote would amplify the voice of all the voters outside of the top 3 including the regional groups as well as the day one holders with 12,800 Apecoin.

The community vote would amplify the hundreds of Apecoin voters that currently account for less than 30% of the final tally while the top 3 votes account for more than 70%

(every vote turnout is different-the example above was just one recent scenario)

The larger Apecoin voters should work in conjunction with the many voices within the Apecoin DAO, not determine the direction of the DAO entirely. This proposal aims to increase the impact of the community while improving the synergy within the DAO between the major delegations and community without lessening the impact of the other voters within the DAO.


1.Upon approval of this proposal the GWG stewards will create two wallets, one for holding funds while delegating, the other for connecting to Snapshot and voting with the delegated funds. They will transfer 6,000,000 APE to the community wallet, then delegate to the delegation wallet. The delegation wallet will connect to Snapshot only.

2.This proposal will take effect one voting cycle after approval. So there will be a 2 week gap between approval and implementation to allow for the setup of the wallets and delegation by the GWG stewards. At this point, the proposal will be fully implemented.

3.This proposal expires 01/01/2025. Upon expiration of this proposal, the 6,000,000 APE in the “community wallet” will be returned to the Apecoin treasury.

It is the hope of the author that during this six month(ish) period, the community will come up with solutions to balance the voting to prevent a landscape in which two voters control 60% of the vote.

If the landscape in the DAO changes and there isn’t a need for this amplification of the 98% of voters, this proposal can be ended by an AIP.

If there is a continued need for this community vote, this expiration date could be extended by an AIP.




Total amount requested from the Apecoin Ecosystem Fund: 6,000,000 APE

6,000,000 APE will be moved from the treasury to the “community wallet” managed by the GWG Stewards in a multisig wallet upon approval of this proposal.

6,000,000 APE will be returned to the Apecoin Ecosystem Fund upon the expiration of this proposal on 01/01/2025.


I’d like to hear what others think of this, but the concept of trying to balance out the current voting mechanisms is obviously of interest to many of us.

A few initial thoughts:

  • Is it fair that we give this amount of votes to a wallet without the same amount of $APE?

  • To my previous point, does this devalue the votes of the other delegations? While they aren’t as large as the top 3, they are still sizable and should have their voices heard in the DAO.

I’m sure there are more pros and cons to this as I give it some more thought. Would love to see what others think as well.


Let me draw up a threat profile for the supermajority proposal and then figure out how your proposal would affect those outcomes. This certainly looks interesting :saluting_face:


GM @VonFrontin… Thanks for the feedback and initial thoughts.

Speaking to the fairness, it would really only decrease the impact of the top 3 voters and I know that the Mocaverse doesn’t want to control the DAO. The Mocaverse aims to operate in harmony with the DAO and it is my intention to increase that harmonious relationship within the Apecoin DAO. Currently, we have twin towers in the DAO, this would give the DAO outside of these delegates a better chance to compete in the current state of the DAO. This AIP could be revoked at any time through an AIP.

This proposal aims to amplify the voice of all the delegations and voters outside of the top 3. This proposal would increase the impact of delegations and voters outside of the top 3 voters. I don’t see this as devaluing any votes other than those top 3 voters.

Appreciate the feedback, definitely open to suggestions on how to improve the concept :sunglasses::+1:


Thanks for the reply. I’m totally on board for further democratizing the DAO so the intent here is spot on IMO.

I was just trying to think about it from other angles to make sure there wasn’t something we were missing or unintended negative consequences.

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Hey MocaChief,

Thanks for your thoughts! My concerns about this would be that the amount of $APE of the top 3 active voters is not fully stable over time but oscillates, the makeup of the top 3 does change over time, and the top 3 do not necessarily vote on every proposal.

It may make sense to consider attaching this number to a reactive moving average of the top 3 or top 5 voters to help balance the above concerns. You don’t want to have to go back with a fresh proposal if the number needs to change.

The other thing is that personally, I think the DAO should consider ways to give existing Guilds and community delegations more power. I worry that essentially creating a new mega-delegation actually unintentionally reduces their say/voice.

Finally, I suppose this could theoretically (if at great effort) be gamed by splitting up votes into multiple wallets and unintentionally promoting non-transparency.


There needs to be something that allows the DAO to work more like a business. If not, established businesses won’t work with the DAO as it’s so time consuming. I’ve personally neglected my CEO role for the past week or two just campaigning for my AIP.
I’m very passionate about ApeCoin as a holder and a BAYC as well as a MOCA, but time vs money for me has to be balanced. If I had a product that fit ApeCoin and wasn’t as passionate I wouldn’t even start the process. This makes me wonder how many other business opportunities are missed. I would guess, a lot!

I wish there was a way to demonstrate a product or service to a team of people who then can help advice the rest of the community that it really does benefit the DAO.

I like the idea of a wallet that helps things along, or I think the DAO will ultimately fail to deliver for ApeCoin and it’s holders.

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This AIP is trying to solve the same problem as the one that came out from Trippy and Waabam. I think the problem - too much power in the hands of the top corporate wallets and not enough power for the community - is real and needs to be addressed. Like the other two proposals, this feels like a short-term fix with a lot of potentially unintended consequences.

I’m 100% in support of the sentiment, but I think we need a working group effort to completely revamp the voting system for the long-run. I’d suggest all the proposers get together to propose a small amount of funding to work with political science/DAO governance experts to come out with a sustainable long term solution and do a joint AIP proposal. Happy to be involved on my end as a political science junkie.


You know what the ultimate solution will be? That voters are like shareholders and a “board of directors” make the decisions.

I actually don’t think it’ll end up like that. The DAO governance could end up being structured with the model being a public corporation, but I think given how vibrant this community is and how full of excited, smart, passionate people, it makes more sense to have DAO governance modeled on a nation-state’s government. My hope is that we end up with a representative democratic system where delegations voted in by ApeCoin holders act as the parliament or Congress. But overall, I like the idea of getting a bunch of specialists to debate this out and come up with a really sustainable proposal.

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GM GM… appreciate the feedback constructive criticisms and an open mind leads to the best end result. I’m completely open to alternative ideas on ways to increase the voice of the broader community.

Maybe this isn’t the way there, but we’ll get there :sunglasses::+1:


GM @Aepicurean

I appreciate you recognizing the sentiment in which this proposal was drafted. We truly do want to work in harmony with the DAO, this is about the most simple way possible to correct that.

I do agree that long term, this proposal should/could/would be replaced with a better alternative as the DAO evolves. But honestly I will never see the voice of the 99% of voters as needing to be dulled.

I also could see a group of big brains coming up with the best option collectively (obviously :sunglasses:) completely open to reworking or scrapping the idea for a better alternative.

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This is fairly similar to this that was proposed two months ago: REDRESSING THE BALANCE - APE FOUNDATION will delegate 6.3million $APE to a community VOTING wallet

Off the bat, you should revise the Overall cost statement, because this isn’t a 0 cost, its the cost of ape to be delegated for this task. 6 Million $APE (~$7.32M USD). Asking for money to be repurposed and moved out of the treasury wallets is a cost.

While I can appreciate and sympathize with the need to help align voting with the community I don’t think this is the most appropriate solution.

This example of how this could work can and will be gamified by those or anyone holding the top 3 wallets of any vote to independently or cooperatively manipulate their wallets to be just enough to establish the top three wallets and then create additional wallets with just below them to affect voting.

This may or more probably will promote sybil attacks to overcome this issue because it would effectively nullify the voting power of the top 3 wallets.

I think that we need to start doing more evaluations and analysis of our voting behavior and start doing more comprehensive breakdowns of potential paths forward. While this idea is definitely one of many, i think it would be better served in a breakdown list of possible ways of addressing this issue.

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Moving apecoin from one custody method to another is not a cost. The funds will remain under the control of the administrators and never leave ‘our’ balance sheet.

I’d argue a cost must include a payment of some kind - and there simply isn’t one.

I’ll give a very simple example:

If I delegate my apecoin to @Lost is there a cost involved? If yes please elaborate. Thanks.

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:grinning: actually good call out. made no sense bc i misinterpreted the intent of the aip.

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GM @LiveFast9986 … please correct me if I’m wrong, I believe the proposal idea by @furiousanger call for the creation of a new voting pool based on qualified trust level 2 members… while similar in sentiment and intent, that was one stark difference.

In this current voting climate, this proposal aims to create a 3rd major delegation that is essentially a vote of the 98-99% of voters. You used the word nullify, which is an exaggeration. The top three voters would still immensely impact the vote, just less…

Example 1: 408 was the gov budget last week

Total votes 21M
Top 3: Horizon 7M (33% of the vote)
Mocaverse 6M (28% of the vote)
JRNY 2M (9% of the vote)

If you added a 6M vote from the remaining 232 voters that currently account for 30% of the vote, here would be the new breakdown:

New impact for top 3 delegates:
Total votes: 27M
Horizon 7M (26% of total vote)
Mocaverse 6M (22% of the total vote)
JRNY 2M ( 7% of the total vote)

The added vote would be the 232 voter that currently account for 30% of the final tally while the top 3 votes account for 70%…

I am completely open to suggestions, this is an attempt from a member of one of the bigger delegations. The best result usually comes from a collection of minds and that may be the best path forward. This was a very simple solution that decreases the impact of the top delegations marginally, definitely doesn’t nullify them.

In the words of Gordo to Tropo, I welcome a better solution.

Love and appreciate all contributors and feedback and greatly respect yours. :sunglasses::+1:


Difference of requirement.

This AIP is asking for the perpetual and permeant creation of a delegation of 6 million ape to be used specifically for this purpose that cannot be used for payment on anything else. Meanwhile your delegated coins to Lost, or anyone else, while doing a similar function is not under any requirement to be perpetually and permanently assigned to Lost. Thus you are free to do as you please, this AIP and the Ape Foundation will not be.

hey, first and foremost, i respect you presenting a solution.

I apologize in my use of the word nullifying if it was upsetting or improepr. Maybe it wasn’t the most adequate term to use in order to convey my point, however I did feel it did convey the level of concern that I felt needed to be addressed.

Looking at your example its unclear to me how this plays out.

To me this reads that this is the ratio without the three largest voters who voted (not sure if you intend to use the largest voter in a particular voting round or just specifically designated the three current largest holders of APE). If this is the ratio without the three largest voters then what are the different permutations of For/Against from the three largest voters and how will the end result be affected once we introduced a new delegate with 6M voting power?

Does this make sense? I think i can help break it down in an excel sheet to help better convey it but it will take time for me to create that.

Much like above, its also worth considering the impact of how each of these delegates voted and how this new delegate would vote in relation and if this would achieve a desirable effect.

Then we should also consider what happens if one of these delegates decided to spread their Ape across multiple wallets. What happens then?

Again, i’m here to help understand and help better improve your idea.

TBH, I genuinely think we need more comprehensive data about all aspects of voting. Delegates, voting habits, voting power, types of delegation and how they operate. More data and understanding it will (and i hope should) present to us a path forward.

The more thought I give to this AIP, the more I think it has the best chance at democratizing the DAO compared to the other AIPs seeking to do the same (not that they have to be mutually exclusive).

  1. It doesn’t place limits on the accumulation of $APE by delegations. Delegations can still amass however much $APE they want in order to vote.

  2. It allows the those outside the largest wallets to still vote as they choose and have their voice heard via this “champion” wallet who fights at scale on their behalf.

  3. It can still allow larger delegations to pass/veto ideas with significant voting power if their collective votes + the community outweigh the votes of this wallet + community.

There will be ways around every idea that is brought up on this topic until we no longer want to use $APE as our denomination for voting (which I’m not proposing).

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No the AIP does NOT ask for or state any of this - you are making those assumptions incorrectly.

If I have 1000 apecoin and delegate 10 of those apecoin to Lost then becuase those tokens are fungible that means I can add and subtract from my 1000 apecoin balance as I please - some days I can have 2000 other days only 50 - and the 10 apecoin delegated will always stay the same.

However, if there comes a point when I need to spend my last 10 apecoin then the vote power I have delegated to Lost will reflect and gradually decrease as my balance lowers below 10.

This is exactly what would happen in this situation. If we get to a point where the treasury has been totally drained and there’s only 6 million apecoin left it is evident that the delegated vote would be demininished - that is just common sense as we all know how a delegated vote works (and ofc this AIP does not ask for the last 6 million apecoin not to spent).

Anothet issue I have is once you slap a 6 million apecoin price tag on an AIP (in this case wrongly if you’re successful) is you’ll introduce the topic of TRUST. Do we trust the author with 6 million apecoin? Do we trust that the removal of 6 million apecoin will not cause a price dump? Etc etc. Righly or wrongly people will be asking these types of questions.

Tl;dr - there’s NO COST, yours comments are untrue (re whats asked for and stated within the AIP) & if we get down to last 6m $ape in the treasury then ofc the delegated vote will reduce as the last pennies are spent bc thats how delegation of voting power works - if the money isn’t there then it cannot be delegated in voting power. This is a ZERO COST AIP.

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