AIP-474: Delegated ApeCoin Community Voting Wallet

PROPOSAL NAME

Delegated ApeCoin Community Voting Wallet

TEAM DESCRIPTION

@SmartAPE // Derek Smart, DAO member and writer-of-many-words

I am an indie software developer who has been in the games industry as a gamer and game dev for over 40 years. I have designed, developed, and published over a dozen games during my career.

My first game, Battlecruiser 3000AD (aka BC3K), was a ground-breaking game that was ahead of its time. Published by Take Two interactive in 1996, it was one of their portfolio titles when they went public in 1997. So, you could say that I helped the company succeed to where it is today.

Over the decades, I have worked with some of the best software developers and publishers around the world, and my works have been featured in various online and print magazines around the world.

You can learn more about me on my professional LinkedIn page.

PROPOSAL DESCRIPTION

This proposal is for the creation of a 25M $APE multi-sig “Community Voting Wallet” controlled by members of the DAO community.

The purpose is for the CVW to be the voting voice of the community without the influence of whale wallets which tend to override the wishes of the community whereby whale wallets vote against the community pulse.

This mechanic will require a temp check voting period during which the “pulse” of the voting community is based on a “1 wallet = 1 vote” linear voting Snapshot recipe. The results of this voting temp check then determines how the community CVW votes on proposals.

Background Overview

  • Despite the size of the ApeCoin community, a few whale (1M+ $APE) wallets control the outcome of most proposals up for vote.

  • In fact, the majority of token holders don’t actually participate in the DAO voting system.

  • The voting turnout continues to decline because, as in real-life, the general consensus among voters is that they can’t be bothered because they know that their vote isn’t likely to count.

  • In the June 2024 period alone, the average voting turnout for all AIPs was 189 (!)

  • The introduction of the Horizen wallet in the voting system last Oct has thus far created a polarizing effect whereby, at 4.3M $APE, it is now the 2nd largest voting wallet next to the Mocaverse (delegated by Animoca) at 6.3M $APE. And due to the turnout of the voters, these two wallets control the outcome for every vote in the DAO.

  • The effects of whale voting wallets controlling the outcome of the DAO voting is a centralized paradigm that is outside the realms of decentralization, trust, and fairness.

  • Putting caps on a voting wallet isn’t the answer as that will just lead to Sybil solutions whereby that same wallet can be split into amounts below the cap, then all vote anyway.

  • The Ape Foundation, acting at the behest of the DAO, has an obligation to ensure that each member of the DAO has a voice, and that the voting system is fair and equitable to all.

See also Special Council To Propose Voting System Reform

BENEFIT TO APECOIN ECOSYSTEM

This initiative ensures that the DAO community voting, via this proposal, is fairly representative of the wishes of the community.

It can also dramatically reduce - even eliminate - the influence of whale wallets in the DAO voting system.

This community temp check Snapshot voting system is similar to the For|Against ApeChain vote which came ahead of the final AIP vote for the selected team to build ApeChain.

STEPS TO IMPLEMENT

Within 14 days of the passing of this proposal, the Ape Foundation will put into effect the following:

  1. Create a multi-sig (2-3) wallet for use by the three community members who will use this wallet to vote. The proposal author will select the three community members who will have access to the wallet.

  2. Delegate 25M $APE from the ecosystem fund wallet to the above multi-sig wallet.

  3. Going forward, within 3-days of proposals going up to vote, a team of community volunteers selected by me, the proposal author, will put up a temp check Snapshot vote which will run for a period of 3-days (including weekends). It’s preferable to have them up on the GWG TempChecks Snapshot.

  • The temp check voting should support the following Snapshot strategies:
  • The temp check will be a Snapshot for each of the AIPs which are up for vote at the time. This means that the number of temp-check Snapshot votes would match the number of AIPs up for vote. Instead of individual temp-check Snapshots, the community team also has the option to include a single multi-choice Snapshot that includes all AIPs that are up for vote.

  • This temp check Snapshot will also require a quadratic voting strategy setup as well as Sybil resistance safeguards.

  • This temp check Snapshot will support FOR, AGAINST and ABSTAIN options, in which the ABSTAIN count is not considered in the final tally of the votes.

  1. At the end of the 3-day temp check voting period, the CVW wallet will be used to vote for the AIP based on the voting results of the temp check Snapshot. A majority FOR or AGAINST requires the wallet to vote on the AIP based on the prevailing vote count. In the event of a tie, then the wallet would vote ABSTAIN on the AIP.

  2. There is no time frame during which the CVW wallet is required to vote prior to the close of the regular AIP voting period. If for some reason (e.g. Force Majeure) the CVW wallet fails to vote prior to close of the voting period, then the results of the temp check vote are discarded.

In the event of a tie:

  • While mathematically it would be rare for this to occur, it’s probably best to plan a contingency. And so, in the event of a tie, then the community wallet would vote ABSTAIN on the AIP.

  • NOTE: I am hesitant to introduce a tie-breaker in the mix as that would rely on third-parties external to the community wallet. e.g. We could use a majority GwG member vote as the tie-breaker. And if that results in another tie, then it goes up to the Special Council for a similar majority vote of those members. And if that results in yet another tie, then the wallet would vote to ABSTAIN.

This proposal would also apply to ApeCoin DAO election candidate voting.

REPORTING EXPECTATIONS

The expectation is that this proposal would be implemented by the DAO’s administrative team.

The community should regularly review the impact of this proposal.

If accepted, the administration and the community should review the impact of the updates after the 3-month period for conflict ends.

OVERALL COST

Total amount requested from the ApeCoin Ecosystem Fund = 25,000,000 Apecoin

1 Like

It seems like you are calling out a very critical momet in the DAO. It reminds me of Michel’s Iron Law - that all forms of organization, regardless of how democratic they may be at the start, will eventually and inevitably develop oligarchic tendencies. This isn’t always a bad thing, in terms of the efficiency and quick decision making that some businesses need, but it certainly is centralized and entrenched.

Just to clarify, this AIP would put a 25 million APE into a multisig wallet, and these 25 million APE would be used to vote for whichever AIP has the most support via an informal temp check? Or would the 25 million APE be split among a the top few AIPs that have the most support? I’m a little unclear on how these 25 million votes would be apportioned.

Also, I’m curious what kind of safeguards could be put into place to ensure that the temp checks are really one wallet, one vote. Proof of humanity isn’t quite ready yet, as I understand it, and Gitcoin ID does require a certain level of doxxing to connect social media sites to an ETH address.

Yes. As per item #4 above, the $25M wallet will be used to vote for AIPs based on the community temp check vote. It’s basically the community’s answer to large whale wallets. Now we would have a wallet that is reflective of the community.

The “quadratic voting strategy” link that I provided in the proposal takes you to the Sybil-resistant settings for the Snapshot software that we use for voting because it is required.

1 Like

Question that came up in an earlier similar proposal (on mobile so can’t grab the reference):

How do you define “community” in this regard?

Sure there are large, corporate funded accounts, but there are also several very large delegations and holders that are comprised of individuals? Would they be included in the “temp check”?

Also, would this preclude any corporation from meaningfully participating in the DAO going forward? Is that what we all want?

Are you talking about this by @furiousanger?

REDRESSING THE BALANCE - APE FOUNDATION will delegate 6.3million $APE to a community VOTING wallet

If so, that wasn’t a proposal. It was just a general discussion to spark interest. And I have basically addressed all the queries over there in my proposal.

The definition hasn’t changed. This DAO community are those who have at least 1 $ape and can vote.

Yes. They are part of the DAO community by the very fact that they own $ape. And so, they too can vote in the temp check.

It doesn’t prevent anyone from voting. As long as you hold 1 $ape, you can still vote in the DAO. This proposal isn’t about preventing people from voting. It’s about eliminating the influence of whale wallets in our voting system by giving the community a voice via our treasury.

Let me reframe.

Under this proposal, how does a wallet qualify as a “whale wallet”, and are opinions of these wallets considered in the “temp check”?

The proposal doesn’t need nor have the concept of a “whale” wallet. It’s a descriptor that denotes wallets of high value.

The proposal is clear in that everyone can still vote in the temp check. Nobody is excluded. The only difference here is that the temp check uses a combination of quadratic voting + Sybil-resistant protections to ensure that 1 wallet = 1 vote. That’s the whole point of the temp check.

The 25M community (which includes everyone that holds $ape) wallet in the temp check has protections that the regular Snapshot voting doesn’t. And so, instead of votes being controlled solely by 2-4 large “whale” wallets, the community at least has a chance to make their voices heard via this voting wallet.

Before someone else asks - no, I didn’t pick 25M out of a hat. I used a heuristics based math model to determine the “safe zone” value based on votes since AIP-1 to the last AIP votes from the past two weeks.

And I didn’t bother accounting for the possibility that, at some point, that whale wallets could increase their wallet. Why? Because I also used a predictive model that says, going by the wallet ranges, and coupled by the rise/appearance (e.g. Mocaverse, Horizen) and fall (e.g. Machi, 0xPolygon) of large wallets, the possibility of there being collective wallets which would render this 25M pointless, is slim (I don’t have it on hand, but it was less than 2% iirc). It’s even less likely going by the fact that our voting turnout has dropped dramatically.

I am still working on some other models because I will be adding a 5th item to the steps to implement which gives the Ape Foundation leeway to adjust the size of the delegated wallet as-needed, though it cannot drop below 25M for as long as the treasury holds a minimum of that amount.

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Thanks for the clarification.

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You’re welcome.

My guess is that the two largest voting wallets are likely to kill this proposal. But that’s OK because then their intentions will be clear for all to see, and as such, set a record (digital trail) of the voting activity and which in turn will [hopefully] make an even more pressing case for the Ape Foundation - if they chose to do so - to consider my companion proposal: Special Council To Propose Voting System Reform

I think it’s fantastically progressive to consider a situation where one wallet truly equals one vote, whether that wallet has one dollar of APE in it or millions of dollars of APE it. At the same time, it also raises the question of why one individual, who may be a 14 year old with one ApeCoin and little understanding of the greater DAO, would have the same voting power in this temp check as a delegation or organization of members who carefully weigh options and analyze possibilities.

As you mentioned, it’s ironic (but fundamentally capitalist) that the largest wallets could shut down a vote that would remove power from the largest wallets. However, it raises the important issue in the DAO space of what a DAO really is - whether it’s a form of organizational behavior, a form of governance, or just capitalism rebranded. I don’t think this question has a simple, binary answer, but will exist differently across various DAOs, times, and leaderships.

That’s not an issue because we don’t employ a caste system in the DAO. 1 APE = 1 APE. Just because you’re 14 and clueless doesn’t mean that your vote should somehow have less weight.
In fact, the only reason that we even have a tiered system is because of the linear voting which gives voters with fat wallets voting power over others.

A DAO isn’t defined by its voting system. The whole purpose and point is for it to be decentralized. But ofc cryptozotes - as they are won to - decided to, once again, usurp the whole thing and flip the script by creating a centralized fiefdom in which the fat cats wield more power and control.

The biggest issue isn’t the size of the wallets per se, but rather the penchant for those fat cats to use their wallet power to shape and control the DAO.

And in a community like ApeCoin - as we see - it has a disastrous effect because then the community has no voice. If the DAO was just the fat cats among themselves, nobody would actually care. But when you have a large community (created just by having 1 $ape) of highly passionate and talented people struggling to benefit from a DAO + treasury that was created for them, the end result is a plutocracy. And with that, there’s no recourse.

To see some horrifying numbers, I urge you read the thread I posted on X earlier this morning.

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Hi @SmartAPE,

The community feedback period for your proposal would be ending in roughly 24 hours.

  • If you’re content with the feedback received, your next steps are to finalize your proposal using the AIP Draft Template.

  • A moderator will reach out to the author to finalize the AIP Draft. Upon receipt of the final Draft, we will review and provide instructions on the next steps.

  • Are you ready to proceed to the next phase or do you wish to extend community discussion for another 7 days?

We look forward to hearing from you.

-@Facilitators

1 Like

Yup - we’re good to go! Send it!

This topic was automatically closed after 7 days. New replies are no longer allowed.

Hi ApeCoin DAO Community,

@SmartAPE has completed editing their AIP Idea to be their AIP Draft.

This proposal has been assigned the AIP ID Number 474.

Follow this Topic as further updates will be posted here in the comments.

Kind Regards,

-@Facilitators

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It’s not a bad idea, but to make it sybil proof and to have people vote who would act in the best interest of apecoin and the whole ecosystem, it should be limited to 1 vote per bayc/mayc… in the wallet being used to vote.

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Yup. It’s part of the proposal.

While I like the general idea of this proposal, 25M $APE seems to be overkill and would singlehandedly decide every single vote. Something in the neighborhood of 5M $APE would be more reasonable.

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I did the maths before settling on 25M which I rounded up. Anything less than $10.6M is immaterial.

And it’s not as if the $APE leaves the treasury; and so, the 25M amount doesn’t actually matter.

The point of this is to ensure that the community vote is overwhelming enough to represent the voice of said community. And I find nothing wrong with the community deciding every single vote because that’s how it should be.