Reform of the Voting Systems in the ApeCoin DAO

I’m against this whole idea. Just more manual processes, more hurdles, more control, more overreach, more rules, more confusion & more exclusion. No thanks.

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Will this apply to budget proposal as well? Do it support delegate, lot of stuff to be consider.

~ApeCoin DAO Chaos~

Dissolve the WGs!
Dissolve the DAO!
Burn the treasury!

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“They” have plans to “sunset” SC already seems. Not sure if it’s another attempt to regain control or whether it’ll be of benefit to the many. :man_shrugging:

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I’m not for burning the treasury. In reality we only have like 130m $ape left after we pay all outstanding, so it’s not even that much tbh.

I just want to see a fair playing field. I don’t think some parts of this idea does that.

Let’s look at this for example:

So I am in limbo before it can go to vote as I try to find a delegation that will “vouch” for me with a 100k $ape.

So does this mean other ideas will be rejected on the forum due to possible conflicts? If yes then how long do we give people to find this “support”? If no then is this system even fair? As it will mean someone could full copy pasta my idea and then get to vote before mine as they hold 100k $ape or similar. :person_facepalming:

This not only adds delays, but puts pressure on delegations to hold yet more internal votes (as will be needed to “vouch” for an idea).

What if it’s a weekend or holiday period in certain countries - days would turn into weeks, and possibly months as I move from delegation to delegation searching for support.

It’s just bad for a “normal” community member and/or new entrants imo.

Tl;dr - the only people not impacted here are those with the wider social connections and/or large bags of $ape.

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At this point, despite what CT would like us to believe, I still believe that the token is going to remain depressed and within the < $1 range for the foreseeable future. And, all things being equal, the precipitous fall below $0.30c is still on track to happen sometime in Q1/25 - if not before.

And so, I fail to see how authors needing to have 100K APE helps the token in any way. In fact, it would literally deter people from actually submitting proposals because we already have a $250K / 69% threshold to meet for large asks.

Oh, and we’re out of money. Ape Foundation Transparency Report - 2024 - Q1. So, there’s that.

I don’t see it as defunding the DAO. I see the Banana Bill as augmenting the DAO grants systeml similar to how GwG and ThankApe also have grant programs that are an extension of the DAO funding. BB takes the voting responsibility away from the voting community and puts it in the hands of a team of 8-10 people. To date, the DAO has funded approx $80M in various programs - with zero ROI - some of which are blatant grifts. So, the $100M BB carve out is there to create a program that does the same thing, but with the hopes of some ROI to the DAO. It’s why I was originally opposed to it because we already had a program, ThankApe, setup to do specifically that, and which they’ve done exceptionally well.

Thing is, giving money away isn’t all that hard. Giving money away with the right intentions, to the right people, to the right projects - with the expectations that you will get some or all of it back, is the cornerstone of risk.

Indeed. However, in all fairness - and I used to get a lot of flak for this - the DAO wasn’t setup to generate revenue. So, it didn’t. From the start, it was the sort of wink-wink nonsense that Web3 is notorious for. I mean, who with more than 10 brain cells, thought that an entity setup to just give away money via grants - and with zero investments - was destined to succeed in the long-term? Here we are. And so, it’s no surprise that the leadership came out in Nov 2023 and said yeah, we can totally receive income. Then proceeded to retain the status quo, unabeted.

Wait! So you mean to tell me that forking out $12M to buy NFTs for a museum or a $5M marketing deal with a crap F1 team were bad ideas? :scream:

How did you arrive at that number?

This is from the Q1/24 financials released recently:

  • 326 million of $APE were held in treasury
  • 255,060 $APE in accounts payable
  • 59 million $APE reserved for grants

That doesn’t take into account the $100M BB carve out in Q3/24 which would need to be added either to “accounts payable” or “reserved for Banana Bill”.

Even if we assume that $60M for BB is year 1, that still puts us in the negative by Q2/24.

The whole delegation play is just a transfer of power that doesn’t solve any problem because 1M held by one whale wallet is the same as 1M held by a delegated wallet. Even in distributed methods like Mocaverse, the end result is the same: the wallet votes based on that delegation. I am not saying that delegations are bad. I’m just saying that they’re not the answer that some are making them out to be.

In this morning’s Spaces, I asked if the delegations would be amenable to voting to change the voting system to an equitable 1:1 ratio. You already know how that went. Nowhere. Which reminds me of this:

00001

Yes. Just like whales. Like I said, it’s just a transfer of power.

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how is discussing hypothetical ideas connected to WG and reasoning to close them all?

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Why not? To pass, at the end of the day, the budget proposal needs to get the majority of the votes anyway.

Definitely was being a bit generous. :grimacing:

Used treasury dashboard:
264m ape on hand.
Less:
100m BB (as you’ve mentioned).
25m Staking. (YR3 only as presumed 11m Q4 top up was done already due to the 20m $ape spend in last 30 days.)
10m New AIPs passed & AIPs not fully claimed/paid - this is a total guess, plucked it out of the air tbh as didn’t have time to do the work as would need go though all passed AIPs since beginning of Q2, and still would be unsure what had or had not been paid.

So tbh, imo, we might be anywhere between 120-130m $ape left to spend total.

But as we know 130m of our $ape is currently “locked”.

So I agree, we defo operating at a negative - still spending/allocating monies in reality we shouldn’t have access to yet.

Breaking the BB gave us/them some breathing room I guess. As they’ll probably wait to allocate/ring-fence the YR2 35m $ape.

It’s a bit of a mess. But still plenty worth fighting for imo - making sure we can fund that next great idea. :muscle::muscle::handshake::handshake:

Hi,

Seeing the calls recently to abolish certain WGs got me thinking back to a time when we didn’t have any. WGs simply being a direct copy pasta from ENS DAO, nothing original.

Let’s see what happens. We have a big AIP idea incoming that will try to wipe out special council totally. Wouldn’t be surprised if the WG author is involved, plus several ex and soon to be ex special council members. Maybe this saves GwG one. :man_shrugging: But think others may struggle ngl.

Indeed. It looks like you were writing that as I was writing this token unlocks synopsis and how it fits into our financials.

Indeed.

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The worst situation: Steward got elected, budget got rejected. Will the WG still able to operate?

Last question, why do the WGs have to setup their own legal entity, respectively, not all the committees under one umbrella? Will this cause conflict and increase the cooperation difficulty?

It is strange that people got elected first, then raised AIP for compensation and working budget. Then every WG has their own plan and projects to fund, discrete the direction and manpower; it should be a cross-functional group, but now it seems to be an individual functional group.
Take this as example:

Not sure how this question relates to my message you reply to. But my take is that WG is not operational until it is funded. So it serves as an incentive to propose a budget with a high chance of being accepted from the first attempt.

I am confused.

Minimum threshold to propose $100,000 APE $1,000,000 APE

Does this mean that only large holders would be able to submit AIPs?

Yup. Plain as day right there. I absolutely disagree with this. This just enables large holders to get AIPs to vote.

So you either have to be an individual with a very large holding to get an idea to pass. Or you have to have a delegate get the AIP to vote stage, and that brings on a whole other set of problems if it passes ( ex; who manages the money, how is that money distributed, can the funds be withheld from the Author because that’s what a delegate votes on, and a lot more issues).

Individuals holding one $APE should have the same ability to navigate the process as someone with 100,000 $APE.

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Yup. And I view this as part of the on-going activities to aggressively promote delegations. On one hand, it’s literally just a transfer of power, while on the other hand, it’s also a counter to other whale wallets.

And this my friends, is precisely what happens when you politicize a community.

Some people talk about how having large bags/wallets is showing “skin in the game”. It’s all complete and utter nonsense. It simply divides a community, reduces the voices of even the active and engaged people, and is precisely why our DAO - such as it is - isn’t growing. There is no plausible reason why the Apes community shouldn’t have evolved to be the biggest, baddest and best organized in all of Web3. Truth is, for as much noise as there is about “da club”, few even stopped to think about what it really takes to build an active and engaged community that’s designed to prosper. It’s how we came from a $1.4B treasury to less than $300M in 2 years - and we invested in nothing that would have generated sustained growth and prosperity because most just come through for what they can get and subsequently move on once they’ve got it.

Yet still, people are pushing to adopt the very same practices - but in different forms and by different names - that never worked in the first place.

When the vast majority of the votes are held by a few individuals, you have neither a democracy nor a DAO. You have an oligarchy or a plutocracy - a government of the rich and powerful. Historically, what they do is make rules that favor themselves and their supporters.

Michel’s Iron Law of Oligarchy states that ALL social movemens tend to start with a group of people who have a great idea to make things better for a lot of people, and quickly a small group of people rise to the top, start making good money, get power, and then do their best to keep their position of power and influence. DAOs have the opportunity to break this iron law, but I don’t see it happening here.

This would be what democracy looks like. Well said, @LOR3LORD

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A vote’s about to pass that will buy one man a BMW, so I’m sure that’ll fix the problem. :joy:

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