Its a multi pillar approach and system reform which is needed. Slowly adjusting one piece at a time A) takes a lot longer and B) generally does not resolve the core issues which are also changing due to the market.
My key point and my take regarding the AIP process - personally - its simple, AIP’s without an MVP, a working product where founders already have skin in the game, should only be granted funding on a milestone basis, minimising the risk to the DAO.
I do like the idea of having to gain delegate backing (if personal funds are not available to support initiating a vote) - it will encourage and promote active participation and canvassing of working groups etc. Happy to help where I can
tbh, I do not see any issues with having a requirement of having 100K-APE-support to propose AIP. If the proposer can’t get 100K APE to support the AIP draft it will fail the vote anyway.
Maybe instead of upvotes in the form of Sybil-prone likes it makes more sense to count upvotes in the form of the amount of APE behind the voters.
”A new vouching system will be ok if you don’t hold 100K $ape to submit certain types of proposals.”
This requires manual checks, and puts in place further hurdles for authors.
We need new ideas, new energy, new blood, yet some want to make it harder for these things to happen, by adding in more manual processes which they will oversee.
This is just a bad idea. I am really starting to think all working groups should be ended.
We are becoming more and more like traditional organisations and governments every single day and it’s so disappointing.
I’m against this whole idea. Just more manual processes, more hurdles, more control, more overreach, more rules, more confusion & more exclusion. No thanks.
I think VERY strong arguments could be made that this action would be best for the price of $APE both short and long-term. Especially since the Banana Bill was made to effectively defund the DAO and move the money into a system that would hopefully be more effective. (Of which I am dubious but that’s neither here nor there.)
At least if I was being asked to debate and pick a side with a goal of winning, there would be a lot less ammo to be potentially used against me if I were to pick the burn everything path, as the DAO has historically, over the course of years, has not been proven to generate meaningful ROI.
If I were to argue what was the single most positive impact $APE has had on anything thus far, it would be the initial charity donation to the Jane Goodall Foundation. At least that was a public good.
“They” have plans to “sunset” SC already seems. Not sure if it’s another attempt to regain control or whether it’ll be of benefit to the many.
I’m not for burning the treasury. In reality we only have like 130m $ape left after we pay all outstanding, so it’s not even that much tbh.
I just want to see a fair playing field. I don’t think some parts of this idea does that.
Let’s look at this for example:
So I am in limbo before it can go to vote as I try to find a delegation that will “vouch” for me with a 100k $ape.
So does this mean other ideas will be rejected on the forum due to possible conflicts? If yes then how long do we give people to find this “support”? If no then is this system even fair? As it will mean someone could full copy pasta my idea and then get to vote before mine as they hold 100k $ape or similar.
This not only adds delays, but puts pressure on delegations to hold yet more internal votes (as will be needed to “vouch” for an idea).
What if it’s a weekend or holiday period in certain countries - days would turn into weeks, and possibly months as I move from delegation to delegation searching for support.
It’s just bad for a “normal” community member and/or new entrants imo.
Tl;dr - the only people not impacted here are those with the wider social connections and/or large bags of $ape.
At a minimum, this requirement puts bias into the process from my point of view. Now you are in a power dynamic situation where the large delegation has something over you. They could, if they so wanted, use that power as leverage to get someone to adjust the AIP to benefit them specifically.
For that reason alone, I could never support such a change. Sure there are politics involved in the DAO and getting votes for a particular AIP, but I don’t think doubling down on that by making these political negotiations a hard requirement for some is a step in the right direction.
At this point, despite what CT would like us to believe, I still believe that the token is going to remain depressed and within the < $1 range for the foreseeable future. And, all things being equal, the precipitous fall below $0.30c is still on track to happen sometime in Q1/25 - if not before.
And so, I fail to see how authors needing to have 100K APE helps the token in any way. In fact, it would literally deter people from actually submitting proposals because we already have a $250K / 69% threshold to meet for large asks.
I don’t see it as defunding the DAO. I see the Banana Bill as augmenting the DAO grants systeml similar to how GwG and ThankApe also have grant programs that are an extension of the DAO funding. BB takes the voting responsibility away from the voting community and puts it in the hands of a team of 8-10 people. To date, the DAO has funded approx $80M in various programs - with zero ROI - some of which are blatant grifts. So, the $100M BB carve out is there to create a program that does the same thing, but with the hopes of some ROI to the DAO. It’s why I was originally opposed to it because we already had a program, ThankApe, setup to do specifically that, and which they’ve done exceptionally well.
Thing is, giving money away isn’t all that hard. Giving money away with the right intentions, to the right people, to the right projects - with the expectations that you will get some or all of it back, is the cornerstone of risk.
Indeed. However, in all fairness - and I used to get a lot of flak for this - the DAO wasn’t setup to generate revenue. So, it didn’t. From the start, it was the sort of wink-wink nonsense that Web3 is notorious for. I mean, who with more than 10 brain cells, thought that an entity setup to just give away money via grants - and with zero investments - was destined to succeed in the long-term? Here we are. And so, it’s no surprise that the leadership came out in Nov 2023 and said yeah, we can totally receive income. Then proceeded to retain the status quo, unabeted.
Wait! So you mean to tell me that forking out $12M to buy NFTs for a museum or a $5M marketing deal with a crap F1 team were bad ideas?
Fair point, I wouldn’t argue against that. I do think it was an action taken to try to make more effective decisions faster, and without the gauntlet that the AIP voting process brings in.
Very true, although it seems like the average ape didn’t care that this was set up as a grants DAO, and had expectations that the DAO should be driving significant revenue. But given the current status of the funding reserves… Well, it’s in a rough spot. But you know this.
That doesn’t take into account the $100M BB carve out in Q3/24 which would need to be added either to “accounts payable” or “reserved for Banana Bill”.
Even if we assume that $60M for BB is year 1, that still puts us in the negative by Q2/24.
The whole delegation play is just a transfer of power that doesn’t solve any problem because 1M held by one whale wallet is the same as 1M held by a delegated wallet. Even in distributed methods like Mocaverse, the end result is the same: the wallet votes based on that delegation. I am not saying that delegations are bad. I’m just saying that they’re not the answer that some are making them out to be.
In this morning’s Spaces, I asked if the delegations would be amenable to voting to change the voting system to an equitable 1:1 ratio. You already know how that went. Nowhere. Which reminds me of this:
Yes. Just like whales. Like I said, it’s just a transfer of power.
Used treasury dashboard: 264m ape on hand.
Less: 100m BB (as you’ve mentioned). 25m Staking. (YR3 only as presumed 11m Q4 top up was done already due to the 20m $ape spend in last 30 days.) 10m New AIPs passed & AIPs not fully claimed/paid - this is a total guess, plucked it out of the air tbh as didn’t have time to do the work as would need go though all passed AIPs since beginning of Q2, and still would be unsure what had or had not been paid.
So tbh, imo, we might be anywhere between 120-130m $ape left to spend total.
But as we know 130m of our $ape is currently “locked”.
So I agree, we defo operating at a negative - still spending/allocating monies in reality we shouldn’t have access to yet.
Breaking the BB gave us/them some breathing room I guess. As they’ll probably wait to allocate/ring-fence the YR2 35m $ape.
It’s a bit of a mess. But still plenty worth fighting for imo - making sure we can fund that next great idea.
Seeing the calls recently to abolish certain WGs got me thinking back to a time when we didn’t have any. WGs simply being a direct copy pasta from ENS DAO, nothing original.
Let’s see what happens. We have a big AIP idea incoming that will try to wipe out special council totally. Wouldn’t be surprised if the WG author is involved, plus several ex and soon to be ex special council members. Maybe this saves GwG one. But think others may struggle ngl.
Last question, why do the WGs have to setup their own legal entity, respectively, not all the committees under one umbrella? Will this cause conflict and increase the cooperation difficulty?
It is strange that people got elected first, then raised AIP for compensation and working budget. Then every WG has their own plan and projects to fund, discrete the direction and manpower; it should be a cross-functional group, but now it seems to be an individual functional group.
Take this as example:
Not sure how this question relates to my message you reply to. But my take is that WG is not operational until it is funded. So it serves as an incentive to propose a budget with a high chance of being accepted from the first attempt.
