Enable DAO-Wide Voting to Elect Working Group Stewards

Proposal Name: Enable DAO-Wide Voting to Elect Working Group Stewards

Proposal Author: Governance Working Group Stewards: @Amplify, @tigerisfine, @AllCityBAYC

Proposal Category: Process


The Ape Assembly was established as a Governance Working Group initiative outlined in AIP-239 that aims to facilitate Working Group Steward elections. However, with only 30-40 active voters, the lack of participation raises concerns about the credibility those elections would carry.

Currently, two Working Groups (Metaverse Working Group and Marketing & Communications Working Group) have received approval to execute critical functions for the DAO. However, their progress is on hold until a suitable Steward election process can be conducted.

To address these issues and enhance overall voting participation, this proposal recommends shifting future Working Group Steward elections from the Ape Assembly to a DAO-wide voting structure.


The Ape Assembly currently confronts a pressing challenge stemming from its limited level of participation, rendering credible Working Group Steward elections difficult to conduct. With only 110 members and just 30-40 actively engaging in voting, the Assembly’s capacity to accurately reflect the will of the DAO is uncertain. Delays in the ratification process, resulting from the Assembly’s current structure, could hinder critical initiatives of the Metaverse Working Group and the Marketing & Communications Working Group.

Working Groups serve a pivotal role in fulfilling essential functions for the DAO. Urgent action is necessary to ensure that qualified individuals promptly assume leadership roles within the Working Groups to drive their efficient operations.


This AIP is in line with the ApeCoin DAO’s values of collective responsibility and boldness.

The current Assembly’s size, with only a fraction of members actively voting, undermines its ability to accurately represent a DAO with a significant number of token holders. With approximately 110 Assembly members, and only 30-40 actively voting, the outcomes of Assembly votes do not accurately represent the DAO’s vast community of ~130,000 token holders. This discrepancy is evident in previous votes conducted on platforms like Discord and Snapshot, highlighting the more immediate need for increased participation and engagement.

This AIP adheres to the DAO’s values of collective responsibility and boldness by taking decisive action to address this issue of representation in Working Group Steward elections.

Benefit to ApeCoin Ecosystem

This AIP benefits the ApeCoin ecosystem by ensuring that Working Groups get up and running promptly, which will allow them to meet their mandates of providing critical functions and services to the DAO.

Key Terms

  • Ape Assembly (from AIP-239): “A governing body of highly active governance participants within the ApeCoin Ecosystem. The Ape Assembly is an Initiative to be established within the scope of the Governance Working Group.”
  • APE Foundation: From Apecoin.com: “The APE Foundation is the steward of ApeCoin. It is not an overseer, but the base layer on which ApeCoin holders in the ApeCoin DAO can build. The Foundation facilitates decentralized and community-led governance and is designed to become more decentralized over time.”
  • DAO Secretary (from AIP-239): “Acts as an oversight and accountability role to enhance inter-DAO communications amongst Working Groups, the Special Council, and with the DAO as a whole. The DAO Secretary role is an Initiative to be established within the scope of the Governance Working Group.”
  • Steward (from AIP-239): “Steward: Community members elected to serve the ApeCoin DAO within Working Groups. They have an obligation to facilitate the will of the DAO.”
  • Delegations: Vote delegation allows token holders and communities to delegate their votes to another token holder or community. The ApeCoin DAO relies on active participation from its delegate communities.


To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Working Groups, we propose a comprehensive alternative structure for Working Group Steward elections, outlined as follows:

  1. Governance WG Stewards:

The Governance WG Stewards will continue with their current cadence, aligning with the schedule established in AIP-239 and AIP-137 for Special Council Elections.

  1. DAO Secretary Position:
  • The DAO Secretary role will no longer be subject to the Ape Assembly process. Instead, it will remain an Initiative within the scope of Governance with the following additional rules in place:
  • At the start of each Term, starting July 1st, 2024, the current Stewards of each working group shall collaborate to appoint an individual who will serve as the DAO Secretary.

  • The Secretary may be appointed or removed from that role at any time by a majority vote of all elected Stewards in a given Term with the outcome of that vote communicated in the ApeCoin DAO governance forum.

  • The Secretary will remain in that position, as Secretary of the DAO, from the date of appointment until the end of a given Term or until the date at which they are removed from that position in accordance with rule 2 above.

Steps to Implement

  1. There will be TWO elections needed in order to jump start the Working Group structures with rotating seats. This allows for continuity and turnover, without replacing all three Stewards of a Working Group at once.
  • The first election, will last for a total of 30 days, to be held over September 2023, in order to elect Seats 2 and 3 for both the Marketing and Communications Working Group, as well as the Metaverse Working Group, a total of four individuals, for terms starting October 1st 2023, until July 1st 2024. The exact details of this election begin in the "Nomination Process:" section below.

  • The second election, will last over the months of November and December 2023 following the cadence provided for in AIP-137, in order to elect Seat 1 for both the Marketing and Communications Working Group, as well as the Metaverse Working Group, a total of two individuals, for terms starting January 1st 2024 until January 1st 2025.

  • All future Working Group Steward elections will follow the regular cadence provided for in AIP-137, resuming the regular schedule of DAO wide elections.

Nomination Process:

The nomination process for Working Group Stewards will be initiated through Nomination Announcements by the Governance Working Group. These Announcements will be published as new topics under the category “Working Group Steward Elections > Announcements” on the forums. Each Nomination Announcement will provide the following details:

  1. Information about the nomination and election process.
  2. Timeline for the nomination and election phases.
  3. Guidelines for the application and candidate submission.
  4. Instructions on how to apply for the position.

The Working Group Steward nomination process for Metaverse and Marketing & Communications will begin upon the passing of this proposal. This will be signaled by the posting of the Nomination Announcement. Applicants can access the nomination form through the provided link and complete the required information to submit their nominations.

Phase 1 – Application and Verification – Duration: 17 days

During this phase, interested individuals may submit their applications as Applicants for the Working Group Steward position. The Nomination Announcement will contain a link to a form for applicants to provide their details.

  • Confidentiality of Applicant Information: Applicants’ private information will be treated with strict confidentiality throughout the process.

  • Application Period: The application period will remain open for 14 days from the date of the Nomination Announcement.

  • KYC and Background Verification: Upon submitting their nomination profiles and information, all applicants will undergo a KYC (Know Your Customer) and background verification process. The verification will validate the provided details to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the applicants.

  • Independent Third-Party Verification: To ensure impartiality, the Ape Foundation may collaborate with an independent third-party service provider to conduct the verification. The verification process may take up to 3 days to complete.

Phase 2 – Community Discussions – Duration: 7 days

Upon successfully passing the KYC and background verification process, Nominees will be officially recognized as official candidates for the Working Group Steward position. To provide a platform for candidate information and discussions, the Governance Working Group will generate distinct topics for each Nominee. These topics will be categorized under “Working Group Steward Elections > Working Group Steward Nominees” on Discourse and will encompass comprehensive details about the candidates and their nomination profiles.

  1. Title: The title will comprise the Discourse ID, Working Group, and nomination cycle or time period.
  2. Applicant Information: All details that are public or selected to be posted as public by the Nominee will be included in the topic.
  3. Nomination Profile: All details and information of the Nominee will be presented in the topic.

Topics in the “Working Group Steward Elections > Working Group Steward Nominees” category will be locked for editing but open for comments for 7 days.

Phase 3 – Community Vote – Duration: 6 days

The community will conduct a vote on Snapshot, which will include all the officially recognized candidates. The voting process will entail a single round of weighted voting to determine the newly elected Working Group Stewards. The community vote on Snapshot will last for 6 days.

Note: For this election process, the entire duration will span 30 days, including the phases of Application and Verification (17 days), Community Discussions (7 days), and Community Vote (6 days).


  • Working Group Elections will follow the same cadence established for in AIP-137.
  • Working Group Seats 2 and 3 will go up for election over the course of May and June for a term starting July 1st.
  • Working Group Steward Seat 1 will go up for election over the course of November and December, for a term starting January 1st.
  • Once elected, Working Group Stewards will have a term of one year, with 2 term limits. At which point they must wait 1 election cycle before being eligible to run again.

The Nominations Process will begin as soon as possible after this AIP passes.

Overall Cost

  • No cost


Strong disagree.


In no way are those Working Groups “critical functions of the DAO”.


Also this:

  • AIP-239 was approved with the understanding that the pool of qualified members to the Assembly would be in the 400-500 range.

  • Now this AIP is suggesting that 30-40 active votes is low because of the “vast community of 130,000 token holders” – 30-40 active votes is actually just less than 10% of the base of eligible voters, the Ape Assembly.

  • Using 130,000 as your base to make this argument is a little disingenuous, as most all AIPs to date generally have less than 1,000 voters participating (check me @vulkan.admin)

  • The argument could be made that the participation in the Ape Assembly is much higher as a percentage than the participation rate of all AIPs and Elections to date

  • Or do we have more than 13,000 voters at Snapshot?

Not thrilled that this is being proposed when the Ape Assembly is still forming and has yet to be ratified.

Questioning why the Assembly is not being given the chance to form and function :thinking:


And let’s not pretend one single vote suggests a representative number of active voters, or that anyone had been told “y’all better vote in sufficient numbers according to ppl with no mandate or authority to make that determination, or else…”

That vote was very thoroughly discussed, previously voted on by different methods, and for many wasn’t that compelling because it wasn’t very impactful.

The process which led to that vote was very important, impactful, and thoroughly debated. In the end that vote as it happened and was worded represents huge win for the Assembly even if nobody voted, and I write this as someone who wasn’t in favour of the Assembly.

That said, ppl can float an AIP to do, or undo, support or sabotage almost anything in the DAO. Don’t expect increasing interest or voter turnout for anything though once ppl realize things can get so easily rugged. Of course some might reasonably argue less participation would benefit large voting blocks. In any case, the slippery slope gets steeper as we go.


Not giving it the chance to role in motion has also given me this doubt, what is the hidden agenda


…we should now continue with the Work how it was decided in the election.

I am so Bored if waiting again and again … no process will ever change that you have advantages and disadvantages.

But we need to get things Rollin and not blockin the next weeks and months again with elections which where already done…

I am not even sure if that is a conpliant AIP Idwa regarding to the DAO Mindset and Rules…if …than maybe we have a general Problem with a never ending Voting Cycle which starts with this AIP-idea :sweat_smile:

Get the Sheez done Guys , now , we are all here to work and help and not to watch 12 months of Election TV and Twitter Shows


I see valid points on both sides of this issue, and understand the frustration. It’s not an easy decision. However, I do lean towards opening this up DAO-wide, while hoping that the AA (Ape Assembly) will grow and attract more participation and influence over time. Personally, I have just started delving more into everything Apecoin DAO, and I believe there are many more people out there willing to participate somehow but who have no idea about AA, etc. Anyway, I am looking forward to having some stewards assigned ASAP and getting these working groups up and running! I think they will be key to attracting more people overall. Big up everyone :orange_heart:


I’m somewhat conflicted about this. As an AA member I want it to be meaningful and I thought contributing my time + energy would allow us to make meaningful progress. But from the beginning it’s been a series of missteps and back and forths with the Gov WG.

Even if we contend the Gov WG tried to hijack AA or try to destroy, and that’s a big if, what has AA done to organize itself and be more effective? In the current state we have a small number of participants, with lots of ideas being thrown around. To me it seems that no one really has the combination of time and leadership to get AA out of this. A small group of people will try to elect WG stewards through an extremely flawed voting process.

That’s my other big gripe - how was AA passed without clearly defining how voting will be done in a secure way? I’ve already raised this issue a number of times - as it stands, AA voting is pretty easy to rig. It’s much easier to rig than token based voting. So we have an extremely flawed voting system, and a small group, selecting important positions? Does that sound reasonable? I feel like at the minimum we need to fix the voting system, sort out AA processes and then worry about power.

Normal token weighted voting is not necessarily the best way to get things done. But instead of fixing it with with a better, more secure system, we are still arguing about the basics while building on top of a house of cards and being upset that our mandate is being taken away. I thought when AA was formed, there was a lot of alignment but its been messy from the beginning.

Instead of holding up WG elections, maybe we let that go for now, sort out AA, which will probably take a couple months, and then follow through on the mandate.


I think that it would need to be more publicized to all DAO members, the issue of the importance of participation in the Assembly, also as you mentioned, it may be that opening it up to the whole public would be more interesting in the issues addressed and in the votes by all.

1 Like

I believe that there is a lack of more communication and more didactic information on the matters of the Assembly, I believe that there are many DAO people lost in matters.

1 Like

I could write a book (literally) on this. But I will refrain, and instead provide some insight. I mean, it’s not as if anything we say here is going to make a difference either way when the odds are stacked against prosperity and progress. But at least we can go on the record, even if it’s immaterial to the end result.


Though the Ape Assembly discussion is fragmented across Discourse and Discord, the general consensus is that, the Ape Assembly (AA), has been an unmitigated failure. There’s no other way to put it.

AA was an idea that was created via AIP-239.



I won’t get into the rather wonky method of actually being approved to be in the AA because that’s another topic entirely.

There are over 300 people, like me, who qualify to be in the Ape Assembly.

Screenshot 2023-07-27 093415

There are currently about 50 (or less) people in the AA. I don’t have the actual metrics, but hopefully @Lost.Admin has them and can provide them for us.

In the recent AA related election, only 30 (!) people voted.

I’m an advanced math guy. So, let’s talk Metrics for Dummies: “Those are terrible metrics”

I recently wrote an in-depth elections related thread where I talk about voting metrics. You should probably read it.

The main problem that I see with AA engagement is that it’s a voluntary activity with ZERO incentives. There are lots of studies on what sparks engagement in voluntary and indeed charity engagement by individuals. I won’t go into that. Go ask Google.

So, you have 304 eligible people for AA, removing the Ape Foundation from that count, you have less than 300. Of that count, only about 50 even bothered to join. And of that count, only 30 bothered to vote in the first AA related election.

As I type this, do you know the number of unique people engaging frequently in the Ape Assembly Discord channel which is the primary AA hub? 17. Don’t believe me? Go count it and report back.

While I’m at it, let me point this out. See this AIP-275 that failed? Guess what it was supposed to be doing.

“This proposal aims to leverage data analysis and segmentation to identify and address barriers to participation in ApeCoin DAO, enabling the development of tailored onboarding incentives and initiatives. By gaining insights into the interests and activity patterns of $APE token holders, the DAO can optimize its governance processes and foster a more engaged and vibrant community.”

That AIP, if it had passed, would have been the spearhead into not only gaining insights via metrics, but also incentives for ApeCoin DAO participation. It failed. Badly. And that was only $15K (!!!)

I urge you to read that AIP. Please. Just read it.

About 48 hrs ago, in a query regarding how to increase AA participation, I responded with this:

That was in response to this:

And it all started here:

Then we ended up here:

Then, while you were probably sleeping, this happened:

Do you see a pattern? As a programmer, AI (long before it became the buzz word it currently is) architect, and someone who is on the autism spectrum, I see patterns - in everything.

Literally nobody knows what’s going on.

There’s no confidence in the mandate and ops of the AA.

The AA is a volunteer position, thus it lacks incentive to join.

The people in leadership have grown - and rightfully so - frustrated by, well, everything.

You know the rather hilarious part? Scroll up to the AA image that I provided. The AA is a volunteer group - completely unpaid - that gets to [checks notes] elect stewards for three PAID working group positions as in:

“The $Ape Assembly was formed to facilitate steward elections for all Working Groups except Governance”

Right. So, let’s keep opining on why AA gets no engagement. And while we’re at it, let’s make things even worse, gut their mandate (which was doomed to fail the minuite someone thought AA, as-is, was a great idea) and setup yet another election that’s going to take away the most impactful part of the AA and the primary reason for its existence.

Which is precisely how we end right here…


That this AIP idea even exists - and if it goes to vote, has a highly probability of passing - signals to me that the Ape Foundation has admitted defeat, and that the Ape Assembly is a FAILURE.

It’s right there in the abstract :

The Ape Assembly was established as a Governance Working Group initiative outlined in AIP-239 that aims to internally elect all future Working Group Stewards. However, with only 30-40 active voters, the lack of participation raises concerns about the credibility those elections would carry.

I have only been here for a month. I joined the Ape Assembly last week - and immediately got up to speed.

I QUIT the Ape Assembly yesterday afternoon, long before this AIP idea went live.

From what I know now, the Ape Assembly has no basis or reason to exist. In corps - at least the good ones - major operational decisions such as AIP-239 which spawned the AA - aren’t made on a whim, or by people without hard data metrics to guide their decisions. Had they taken these steps, they would have seen - clearly - that spawning the Ape Assembly was doomed to failure. As they say, you never know if you don’t try. They tried. And that’s all that matters.

Now, when this AIP eventually goes to vote, because it’s a PAID position, there’s most definitely going to be more interest in it, though it is highly unlikely to reach the fervor of the Special Council elections - which was a social media phenom due to the entrance of @ThreadGuy who brought much attention and hilarous drama to it.

I had expressed interest in this very same Metaverse Working Group where I started maintaining a list of interested parties.

My interest was when it was under the purview of the AA collective which, I assumed, would be a lean, focused and streamlined group - much like the other groups - that would nominate and setup discussions and a credible voting (outside of the DAO wide voting mechanism) for the MWG stewards.

At this point, given the impending and untimely demise of the Ape Assembly, I am considering also withdrawing my interest in the Metaverse Working Group because I no longer have faith in the process nor in the voting (for which I have an AIP idea in progress). And I cannot - in good faith - be a part of something that I neither support nor have faith in.

I hope that you all read this post in the spirit with which it was written.


ps. I predict that specifically the Metaverse Working Group isn’t likely to succeed because, once again, buddies are going to be inserted in it, via a whale-controlled vote, and thus end up with people who aren’t lkely to gain much, if any, headway in moving ApeCoin DOA - and $APE - forward in terms of the MWG mandate of taking steps to spark interest and adoption.

Yuga is trying - hard to do this. But, despite their best efforts, are still facing an uphill battle. And they have a massive team of exceptionally experienced and talented people who operate in a corp environment that has rules, procedures, and processes in place. And they have metrics. Lots and lots of metrics.


I liked your arguments and points, it makes sense, I’m tending to think the same as you, there was no adherence as said.


Yeah. And they’re likely to show up here, take one look, and bolt. And that’s likely to happen the very first time they take even a glancing look at our voting process.


NOTE: This isn’t off-topic. I will get to the point shortly. Just read. It’s cathartic.

I mean, c’mon now, who are we kidding? There’s near zero interest in Web3 outside Web3. It’s the same people and communities in the churn. Though some have, hilariously, pivoted to AI. You get a spike a few times, and people move on. There’s seemingly zero reason to stick around. None. Other than those like us who want to belong to something impactful, in a well-managed (I believe the ApeCoin admin team have done a good job with this - all things considered) community where you can make a difference.

Web3, from the ground up, is about making money. There’s absolutely no other prosperity related utility to it. None. I don’t care what anyone says, that’s an absolute fact.

ApeCoin is a DAO with a $750M market cap. That’s a small cap corp territory. Yet, it’s not being run by professionals who would otherwise be hired for such a corp gig by other professionals in a small cap corp. Instead, the DAO is being run by a small group of individuals, hired via voting consensus, and who are making a go of it. As such, there are zero consequences to failure. It’s precisely why there’s an active battle going on in AIP-277 over transparency and accountability, even as some people in that thread are more concerned about their bags than about the community and wellfare of the DAO.

When you vote people into a PAID position there is an expectation of performance, transparency and accountability. These are some of the things that people with a keen interest, pay attention to. This isn’t 4Chan, Reddit or any number of inconsequential communities focused on the meme of the day. This is - again - is a small cap corp with a $750M market cap. And you wouldn’t know it just by a casual glance.

When I joined ApeCoin DAO on June 29th, 2023, the ApeCoin hodlers were at 123,508,. A few days ago, it was 129,666. You can see the metrics. I am on Edge and can’t run metrics using my Metamask wallet because it doesn’t work. But you can run it yourself for today’s snapshot.

  • July 16, 2022 - Yuga launches 1st Otherside trip → 81,719
  • Mar 25th, 2023 - Yuga launches 2nd Otherside trip → 114,764
  • June 29, 2023, Yuga launches HV:MTL game → 123,508
  • July 27, 2023, Today’s Snapshot → 129,780

So, between June 29th and July 27th, almost a month later, only 6,272 $APE “wallets” have entered the ecosystem.

And those metrics don’t even tell the whole story because individuals can have several wallets that hold $APE. I personally now have 3 wallets with $APE. Long story.

Add to that the fact that even with 129,780 wallets, Discourse and Discord combined, don’t even represent 10% of the Ape community proper. In fact, Discourse barely represents 6%.

Screenshot 2023-07-27 124931

So, even with those metrics, it’s easy to see that the Ape community is basically STAGNANT.

There’s literally zero interest in it outside of the pre-existing Web3 bubble cluster. You know why that is? There’s ZERO incentive and ZERO reason to be a part of it. The people who even have a passing interest in the Ape community - unlike most of us - are in it for the money and the value of their bags. They can do all that by staring at CEX/DEX charts 24-7, engaging in social media feeds where they can actually influence the trends of their $APE bags etc. Why on this God’s Earth would they come here? What’s the incentive? What’s in it for them?

And it’s specifically why, if you look at most of the AIP trends, most have come from new users to this community. That’s not to say that they didn’t have $APE or anything like that (see above), it’s to say that, for most, the value of engaging here is in one thing and one thing only: WHAT CAN APECOIN DO FOR ME?

And those who are already here, trying to help, vying for the PAID positions or whatever, are locked in this circular battle between “doing the right thing” and “towing the line”. And it took me all of 9 days (yes - I actually charted this) to figure this out.

Take a wild guess what happens when people in a community feel as if they 1) don’t belong or 2) nothing they do or say will make a difference?

They leave. And sometimes come back from time to time to lurk, not engage in any meaningful way etc.

So, imagine my surprise why this went up yesterday night on Discord.


People join a community for specific reasons. And once those reasons prove to be immaterial, they will move on.

To me, it doesn’t matter what a small cap corp - much less a DAO - does with their $750M market cap, without experienced people, advanced metrics, meaningful programs, meaningful outreach AND engagement incentives (for customers, workers, partners), it’s going to FAIL. The result? The loss of investor funds. And in the case of this DAO, the end result is going to be $APE going to zero.

So, the Ape Assembly failing - having achieved absolutely nothing in three months - should come as no surprise.

To that extent, the MWG is likely to end up being more of the same because I have thus far seen no plausible reason to believe that it will succeed where even Yuga has failed. But everyone in the Ape Foundation, of which the MWG will become a part, will still be getting DAO funding all the way to :

$APE == 0

1 Like

I rest my case:

While I am not inclined to get into the politics and in-fighting that’s now resulted from this incident AIP idea, I have no doubt that @Sasha intended to make a go of the AA - as best he could. For free no less.

But again, there’s ZERO tangible incentive to do it. He did it anyway.

Personally - and I have run the numbers and probabilities - below is what I believe is a better end goal here. Anything short of this, and there’s a 98.763% of failure in the short-term (there no long-term prospects here). You can quote me on this down the road.


  1. Dissolve the Ape Assembly. Nothing of value is lost. Much ire. Deal with it. Stuff happens.
  2. Cancel this “Enable DAO-wide voting to elect Working Group Stewards” AIP idea. Nothing of value is lost. Amplify would be miffed, but he gets paid for results, not for his feelings. I’m sure he won’t mind all that much.
  3. Governance Working Group hires 3 professionals to lead the Marketing/Metaverse/Treasury working groups (no voting required)
  4. Governance Working Group sets up a budget (no voting required) to fund the 9 individuals in the aforementioned working groups. And they should, you know, follow proper hiring guidelines and hire competent people (not necessarily their buddies) . A word on this: I note that they had a budget of $27K per month (for 3 people) which matches the salary of the current stewards. That’s more than adequate to hire 3 people with years of Web2/Web3 bizdev experience at $108K per year each for the MWG by itself. The other marketing and treasure group hires are self-explanatory.
  5. Use the $10K per month budget for the AA to hire 1 person to focus solely on the hiring of the above 9 people. Do NOT use a hiring agency for this. If you know anything about this, you already know why you don’t want to do this. You could use a single consultant for this. Give them 90 day contract to fill all 9 spots. Arguably, I don’t see why our $75K per year overlords at Webslinger can’t handle this aspect. If they do, that would save a lot of time - plus they’re probably just going to farm it out anyway, and pay for it using that $10K per month budget until all 9 positions are filled.


  1. Dissolve the Ape Assembly. Nothing of value is lost. Much ire. Deal with it. Stuff happens.
  2. Cancel this “Enable DAO-wide voting to elect Working Group Stewards” AIP idea. Nothing of value is lost. Amplify would be miffed, but he gets paid for results, not for his feelings. I’m sure he won’t mind all that much.
  3. Governance Working Group under an RFP (similar to this) hires a corp/team, similar to Webslinger
  4. Governance Working Group sets up a budget to fund the aforementioned corp/team, who then hires - and manages - the 9 individuals for all 3 working groups at a cost of $324K per year + their costs.

That’s the path forward that I recommend to our DAO overlords of sound mind and body.

ps. lol! Who am I kidding? They’re never going to do any of that. So, let’s get on with the vote. It’s what we do here now.

1 Like

First of all, I think the Governance Stewards have been doing an amazing job at most things, and they have a lot on their plate. I apologize in advance if my comments come off harsh. But I do have some comments and questions about this proposal.

As one of the authors of AIP-239: Working Group Guidelines & The Governance Working Group Charter, in hindsight, I don’t believe that the Ape Assembly was thought through enough and that’s why it’s so messy rn. It would have been better off as its own proposal with the details thought and worked through with the community here on the forum imo. The goal was to bring together those who were the most highly active governance participants with criteria to join that would make the Ape Assembly accessible to DAO members who had shown a level of participation achievable to anyone interested. It would allow the Ape Assembly and the DAO to experiment when it came to elections to figure out the best way to fill the Steward roles with the most qualified people.

That being said, it was never the intention to have the Governance Stewards run it, but they are responsible for “maintaining operations and supporting governance Initiatives like the Ape Assembly”, so without it’s own leadership to start, they had to take on that role on top of everything else they are responsible for. But a vote was just finished two days ago in which the members of the Ape Assembly voted for it’s own internal representation rather than the Governance Stewards taking on that role. A day later this proposal went up with no mention of it to the members of the Ape Assembly beforehand. One of the Guiding Values is Transparency, but I don’t feel like it was adhered to in this case.

While I appreciate the intention to improve the Ape Assembly’s effectiveness and voting credibility, I’m concerned this AIP centralizes more power to the Governance Stewards by weakening the Ape Assembly. I believe the members of the Ape Assembly should have been involved in the discussions about significant changes that affect their role in the DAO. This AIP gives the Governance Stewards significantly more power. The ability to decide how elections work is something that can invite corruption. While I don’t think the current Stewards plan to use that power in a negative way, future Governance Stewards could use this power to manipulate the system. The Ape Assembly is only tasked with a few things and this AIP strips the Ape Assembly of the first three:

  • Facilitating elections for Working Group Stewards
  • Electing an individual who will serve as the Secretary of the DAO (Vulkan was appointed as the first one through AIP-239)
  • Setting the term limits for the Secretary of the DAO (“The Secretary would have term limits subject to the discretion of the Ape Assembly”)
  • Meet regularly to discuss DAO-wide issues and collectively write AIPs to address them
  • Approve budgets for several committees, which are expected to form within the DAO

I don’t necessarily disagree that the Stewards should be elected by DAO wide vote either though I’m aware that not everyone shares my opinion, and that’s ok. Some excellent points were raised in this AIP imo and the potential for low participation in Ape Assembly in the beginning was one of the reasons we worded the Ape Assemblies mandate in AIP-239 as “tasked with facilitating elections for Working Group Stewards” instead of outright electing them themselves to begin with. I think how elections work is something that needs to be discussed among the community and Ape Assembly and then elections should be facilitated by the Ape Assembly as originally intended.

Some questions for the Governance Stewards:

  • Could you please provide your reasoning for putting up this AIP without mentioning it to the Ape Assembly or involving the members in discussions about the Working Group Steward elections?

  • What do you see as the role of the Ape Assembly if this AIP passes? And what should the members of the Ape Assembly be focused on in the meantime since much of their mandate could potentially be stripped?

  • If all three Stewards for each working group are elected at the same time and each has a 1 year term, what happens if all three lose their reelection or all three reach their term limit at the same time? The SC and Gov Steward elections are staggered so there is someone to onboard new members.

  • This AIP says that “Once elected, Working Group Stewards will have a term of one year, with 2 term limits”. The Governance Stewards, once they reach their term limit, per AIP-239, are able to “wait at least one election cycle prior to being able to nominate themselves for the Governance Working Group Steward position. In other words, if the term limit ended on Cycle One, the Steward may nominate themselves for the next Cycle Two election six months later.” Would the Stewards of the other working groups have a similar stipulation?

  • One of the reasons for the Ape Assembly was to try and avoid future constant DAO wide elections and potential voter fatigue.
    a) How do you plan to navigate the potential issue of constant elections/voter fatigue?
    b) Would you consider editing this proposal to the Gov Stewards just facilitating the initial Steward elections for the Metaverse, Marketing and Comms, and Treasury working groups? That way this AIP would not completely take away the most significant of the Ape Assembly’s mandate and would give it more time to get structured properly and bring more interested people into it. And it would not mean that the Ape Assembly would be deciding future Stewards either, just that it would give the AA back it’s mandate of facilitating future elections.

  • Could you please provide your reasoning for removing the Ape Assemblies mandate regarding the DAO Secretary through this AIP?

  • If this passes, will the Governance Stewards be putting term limits on the DAO Secretary and if so, what will they be?

  • If the DAO Secretary is treated as an initiative within the purview of the Governance Working Group, how will the role be filled if it is not elected through the Ape Assembly?

To the Governance Stewards, I really do appreciate all of your hard work and I look forward to your reply. And to anyone else who made it through my small novel, thank you for listening to my perspective and I would love to hear other’s opinions. :blue_heart:


This is so accurate to the core, thank you for putting all of this up and express what most of us were trying to say.
Was really dishearten to see this up last night out of nowhere, specially when we voted positively ono Ape Assembly’s Snapshot. I personally believe that the whole concept of " No engagement , very less number of active people, only 30 voted" is absurd. Ape Assembly was supposed to be for people who are the most active members of the community, and that number is low coz we were the most dedicated members.


Yup. And as I said above, it’s also about incentive. Why would an important group such as AA be a vounteer position; given it’s responsibilities? The DAO is giving millions away to borderline dodgy projects, but it can’t think about funding an initiative such as AA. Instead, it’s a volunteer group that’s supposed to be hiring a paid group of people. Makes zero sense.

At least they get $10K per month budget. What would they actually do with it - exactly?

Really? There are only 3 mentions of “Ape Assembly” appearing in the entire AIP-239. And two of those are passing mentions, while the 3rd is a reference to your discussion with Sword.

Literally nothing in there has clear guidelines for the Ape Assembly. And these announces it, says how to join - but nothing about what it actually does.



Then there’s this:


That’s as clear as mud.

There’s that. And this isn’t the only instance where transparency is ignored. In fact, since I’ve been here, I’ve noticed that it’s being treated as if it was merely a suggestion by the founders of the DAO.

The AA was created as a “focus group”. That should have been the first clue that it was headed for trouble. Those types of bodies tend to be controlled by a higher level team that provides them with direction, guidance etc. In this regard, that would be the Governance Working Group.

In addition to the above, the GWG also sets the budget of the AA. I am all but certain that nobody actually figured out what AA was going to do with a $10K per month budget. Buy donuts? That’s basically a stipend. And when you consider that about 50 people are in the AA, and the group wanted more people in it, what’s this stipend going to do?

Here’s another issue that I see.

From the Discord and Discourse chatter, I get the impression that some members of the GWG appear to be too involved in the AA. I don’t think that was the intent. And going by this map, it appears that the stewards were too involved in the AA rather than honoring the heirarchy they created and thus “staying in their lane”

And that breach of protocol is how we ended up with this incident AIP idea. That’s wrong. What’s the point of creating a body, then interfere, then knee-cap it?

Actually, this AIP would affect 1-3, 5.

Until and unless the voting process is revised, made more robust and secure, it’s only going to attract the people who have a vested interest in the specific AIP. The voting process is a mess. They should hold off ALL upcoming voting until it’s addressed. I have an AIP idea for that. I have little confidence that it will pass because there are those who are perfectly OK with the [defective] status quo; but at least it will be there for the record.

Those are solid questions. I can’t wait to read the responses - if any.

As I suggested above, if this AIP is withdrawn so the AA can get a chance, I believe my Plan A above is a more robust way to handle this. And specifically the AA needs to have autonomy and be independent of the GWG and the stewards who shouldn’t be meddling with their ops. That would also mean that, though it’s a “focus group”, it still needs leaders (at least 3) - elected within the AA membership - and who should be paid a monthly stipend for their leadership roles. As it is a part-time role, that $10K monthly budget can be split 3-ways. But again, that’s up to the AA leadership to determine.

The AA voting system is rife with issues which could lead to fraudulent votes. So, there’s that too.

Having 3 leaders in the AA also means that they can seek out [qualified] people for the 9 Working Group roles, present them to the AA community, and go through the nomination and selection process.

These are suggestions. I still haven’t seen anything that leads me to believe that this whole thing is going to lead to any tangible results anyway because various people have their own agenda which tends to not be in line with how things should be run efficiently.


Thanks, @adventurousape That was excellent and sorely needed.

I suggest we stop kneeling to the gov stewards. We should certainly appreciate them, and be respectful, but they do not have a great deal to do, or risk, compared to ppl IRL earning half as much, and they’d have much less to do if not causing chaos and apparent power grabs like this.

The sentiment in many people suggesting, and voting for, AA to be led by gov stewards boiled down to “they’re already being paid to do this stuff, so let’s have them do it so AA can move fwd ASAP.” Not unreasonable, but also not what was eventually decided.

“The voting process is a mess. They should hold off ALL upcoming voting until it’s addressed.”

Correct. There’s no need or rush to do things in the most flawed and corruptible ways; processes not found in use by a single successful enterprise ever.